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lbeekman@f3law.com Kaley A Lichtman, SBN 286025 klichtman@f3law.com 1525 Faraday Avenue, Suite 300 Carlsbad, California 92008 Phone: 760-304-6000 Fax: 760-304-6011 6 7 Attorney for Real Party in Interest Tim Glover 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, CENTRAL DIVISION 10 SAN DIEGANS FOR OPEN 11 GOVERNMENT, 12 Plaintiff and Petitioner, 13 VS. 14 GROSSMONT UNION HIGH SCHOOL 15 DISTRICT; and DOES 1 through 100,

Defendants and Respondents;

Defendants and Real Party in

TIM GLOVER; and DOES 101 through 1,000,

Interest.

FAGEN FRIEDMAN & FULFROST, LLP

Peter K. Fagen, SBN 143118

Lynn Beekman, SBN 149325

pfagen@f3law.com

CASE NO. 37-2017-00001484-CU-MC-CTL

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST TIM GLOVER'S ANSWER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE

Assigned for All Purposes to: Hon. Joan M. Lewis, Dept. C-65

Action Filed: January 12, 2017

Trial Date: None Set

Defendant and Real Party in Interest, Tim Glover ("Dr. Glover") hereby files the following Answer to the "Verified Complaint For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition For Writ of Mandate" (Petition) filed by Plaintiff and Petitioner, San Diegans for Open Government ("Petitioner") as set forth herein. Unless specifically admitted, Dr. Glover denies, both generally and specifically, each and every allegation of the Petition and denies that Petitioner is entitled to any relief whatsoever.

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ANSWER TO PETITION

Introductory Statement

1. Answering paragraph 1 of the Petition, Dr. Glover denies all allegations contained therein and denies that the legal authorities cited support the initiation of this lawsuit.

Parties

- 2. Answering paragraph 2 of the Petition, Dr. Glover lacks sufficient information or belief to enable him to answer the allegations contained in this paragraph and on that basis denies such allegations. In addition, the paragraph contains legal conclusions and argument to which no response is required.
- 3. Answering paragraph 3 of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that Grossmont Union High School District is a "local agency" under Section 6252(a) of the CPRA.
- 4. Answering paragraph 4 of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that he is the superintendent of Grossmont Union High School District (the "District"). Except as specifically admitted, Dr. Glover denies the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 4.
- 5. Answering paragraph 5 of the Petition, Dr. Glover lacks sufficient information or belief to enable him to respond to the allegations contained in this paragraph and therefore denies each and every allegation therein.
- 6. Answering paragraph 6 of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that at all times alleged in the Petition he was the District's superintendent. Dr. Glover denies all remaining allegations.

Jurisdiction and Venue

- 7. Answering paragraph 7 of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that this court has jurisdiction pursuant to one or more of the statutes cited. The applicability of the statutes, "common law" and "other provisions of law" at this stage of the proceedings is unknown. The statutes cited speak for themselves.
 - 8. Answering paragraph 8 of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that venue is proper.

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First Cause of Action

Violation of Open-Government Laws

- 9. Answering paragraph 9 of the Petition, Dr. Glover re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every response contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 above.
- 10. Answering paragraph 10 of the Petition, Dr. Glover responds that Cory Briggs, attorney of record for Petitioner, submitted (via e-email) on or about October 26, 2016, a CPRA request "on behalf of Nick Marinovich and other clients" to the District for "certain public records sent to or from GLOVER's private e-mail address "theglov8@gmail.com" and for "mobile messages" sent to or from GLOVER using public or private devices and equipment, among other categories of public records." Dr. Glover is without sufficient information or belief to enable him to admit or deny that Petitioner was one of the "other clients" that submitted the CPRA request on or about October 26, 2016 or to admit or deny that "SDOG caused" the CPRA request to be submitted to the District and based thereon, denies such allegation. Dr. Glover denies and contests the legal conclusion that the requested records are public records. Dr. Glover admits that Exhibit "A" to the Petition is a true and correct copy of the CPRA Request. The CPRA Request set forth in Exhibit "A" speaks for itself and Dr. Glover denies all mischaracterizations or statements that are inconsistent with the contents of Exhibit "A".
- 11. Answering paragraph 11 of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits to providing an initial response to the CPRA request on November 4, 2016, by and through his attorney of record. Dr. Glover is without sufficient information or belief to enable him to admit or deny that this was Petitioner's CPRA request (aka the "SDOG Request") and based thereon, denies such allegation. Dr. Glover admits that Exhibit "B" to the Petition is a true and correct copy of the District's initial response to the CPRA Request. The District's November 4, 2016, initial response to the CPRA Request set forth in Exhibit "B" speaks for itself and Dr. Glover denies all mischaracterizations or statements that are inconsistent with the contents of Exhibit "B".
- 12. Answering paragraph 12 of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits to receiving a question from Petitioner's attorney of record, Cory Briggs, on November 7, 2016 and admits that the "(partial) question" identified in paragraph 12 was one of the questions in the email. Dr. Glover is

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without sufficient information or belief to enable him to admit or deny that "SDOG caused" Mr. Briggs to send the email to the District and based thereon, denies such allegation. Dr. Glover admits that Exhibit "C" to the Petition is a true and correct copy of the November 7, 2016 email from Mr. Briggs. Mr. Briggs' November 7, 2016, email set forth in Exhibit "C" speaks for itself and Dr. Glover denies all mischaracterizations or statements that are inconsistent with the contents of Exhibit "C".

- Answering paragraph 13 of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that on November 9, 13. 2016, the District, by and through its attorney of record, responded to Mr. Briggs' November 7, 2016, email. Dr. Glover is without sufficient information or belief to enable him to admit or deny whether it was "SDOG's question" and based thereon, denies such allegation. Dr. Glover admits that Exhibit "D" to the Petition is a true and correct copy of the District's November 9, 2016 response to Mr. Briggs. The District's November 9, 2016, response to Mr. Briggs speaks for itself and Dr. Glover denies all mischaracterizations or statements that are inconsistent with the contents of Exhibit "D".
- Answering paragraph 14 of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that on November 9, 14. 2016, Mr. Briggs sent another email to the District and admits the content of that email as set forth in Exhibit "E". Dr. Glover is without sufficient information or belief to enable him to admit or deny whether "SDOG caused" the email to be sent to the District and based thereon, denies such allegation. Dr. Glover admits that Exhibit "E" to the Petition is a true and correct copy of the email from Mr. Briggs. Mr. Briggs' November 9, 2016, email speaks for itself and Dr. Glover denies all mischaracterizations or statements that are inconsistent with the contents of Exhibit "E".
- 15. Answering paragraph 15 of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that on November 18, 2016, the District sent Mr. Briggs the final response to the CPRA request. Dr. Glover is without sufficient information or belief to enable him to admit or deny whether Mr. Briggs submitted the CPRA request on Petitioner's behalf and based thereon, denies such allegation. Dr. Glover admits that Exhibit "F" to the Petition is a true and correct copy of the District's final response to the CPRA request. The District's final response to the CPRA request speaks for itself and Dr. Glover denies all mischaracterizations or statements that are inconsistent with the contents of Exhibit "F".

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- 16. Answering paragraph 16 of the Petition, Dr. Glover is without sufficient information or belief to enable him to admit or deny whether the source of the subject CPRA request was "SDOG" and based thereon, denies such allegation. As to all remaining allegations in paragraph 16, Dr. Glover denies each and every allegation.
- 17. Answering paragraph 17, subsection A, of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that in or around October 2016, in his individual capacity as a private citizen volunteering on the Measure BB campaign, he made the statements set forth in the Answer to one or more private citizens volunteering on the campaign. Dr. Glover contends that the characterization and use of the term "subordinate employee" is not appropriate or applicable in the context of these statements and denies any and all allegations referencing that term. Dr. Glover denies that these statements are public records as defined under the CPRA and denies that these were "responsive public records" that fell within the "SDOG Request." In addition, Dr. Glover denies that any "illegal political activity" took place and that he was conducting "illegal public business" and asserts that all communications were made in his individual capacity as a private citizen volunteering on the campaign and transmitted to other like-minded citizens expressing their Constitutional rights.
- 18. Answering paragraph 17, subsection B of the Petition, Dr. Glover is without sufficient information or belief to enable him to admit or deny whether "SDOG" caused the CPRA request to be made and based thereon, denies that allegation.
- 19. Answering paragraph 17, subsection B (1) of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that District's Information Technology ("IT") personnel performed searches for responsive public records on the District's server. Dr. Glover admits that he did not perform any searches on his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.
- 20. Answering paragraph 17, subsection B (2) of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that District IT personnel performed searches for responsive public records on the District's server. Dr. Glover admits that he did not perform any searches on his private, personal accounts, devices or

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equipment. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.

- 21. Answering paragraph 17, subsection B (3) of the Petition, Dr. Glover is without sufficient information or belief to enable it to admit or deny that "nobody performed any search for responsive public records beyond those found on GUHSD's server" and based thereon, denies that allegation. Dr. Glover admits that District's Information Technology personnel ("IT") performed searches on the District server for responsive public records. In addition, Dr. Glover denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.
- 22. Answering paragraph 17, subsection B (4) of the Petition, Dr. Glover is without sufficient information or belief to enable him to admit or deny that "nobody performed a thorough search for responsive public records beyond those found on GUHSD's server" and based thereon, denies that allegation. Dr. Glover admits that District's Information Technology personnel ("IT") performed searches on the District server for responsive public records. In addition, Dr. Glover denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.
- 23. Answering paragraph 17, subsection C of the Petition, Dr. Glover is without sufficient information or belief to enable him to admit or deny whether "SDOG" caused the CPRA request to be made and based thereon, denies that allegation.
- Answering paragraph 17, subsection C (1) of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that he 24. did not perform any searches for "Mobile Messages" on any "GUHSD device or equipment" or his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.
- 25. Answering paragraph 17, subsection C (2) of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that he did not perform any searches for "Mobile Messages" on any "GUHSD device or equipment" or his

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private, personal accounts, devices or equipment. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.

- 26. Answering paragraph 17, subsection C (3) of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that he did not perform any searches for "Mobile Messages" on any "GUHSD device or equipment" or his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.
- 27. Answering paragraph 17, subsection C (4) of the Petition, Dr. Glover denies that "nobody performed any searches for responsive public records." Dr. Glover admits that District IT personnel performed searches on the District server for responsive public records. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.
- 28. Answering paragraph 17, subsection C (5) of the Petition, Dr. Glover denies that "nobody performed a thorough [sic] for responsive public records." Dr. Glover admits that District IT personnel performed searches on the District server for responsive public records. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.
- 29. Answering paragraph 17, subsection C (6) of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that there are no "cell phones owned or controlled by GUHSD" and that, therefore, no searches were performed on "cell phones owned or controlled by GUHSD." Dr. Glover admits that District IT personnel performed searches on the District server for responsive public records. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his

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private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.

- 30. Answering paragraph 17, subsection D of the Petition, Dr. Glover is without sufficient information or belief to enable him to admit or deny whether "SDOG" caused the CPRA request to be made and based thereon, denies that allegation.
- 31. Answering paragraph 17, subsection D (1) of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that he did not perform any searches for "Mobile Messages" any "GUHSD device or equipment" or on his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.
- 32. Answering paragraph 17, subsection D (2) of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that he did not perform any searches for "Mobile Messages" any "GUHSD device or equipment" or on his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.
- 33. Answering paragraph 17, subsection D (3) of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that he did not perform any searches for "Mobile Messages" any "GUHSD device or equipment" or on his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.
- 34. Answering paragraph 17, subsection D (4) of the Petition, Dr. Glover denies "nobody performed any search for responsive public records." Dr. Glover admits that District IT personnel performed searches on the District server for responsive public records. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.

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- 35. Answering paragraph 17, subsection D (5) of the Petition, Dr. Glover denies that "nobody performed a thorough [sic] for responsive public records." Dr. Glover admits that District IT personnel performed searches on the District server for responsive public records. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.
- Answering paragraph 17, subsection D (6) of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that 36. there are no "cell phones owned or controlled by GUHSD" and that, therefore, no searches were performed on "cell phones owned or controlled by GUHSD." Dr. Glover admits that District IT personnel performed searches on the District server for responsive public records. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.
- 37. Answering paragraph 17, subsection E of the Petition, Dr. Glover is without sufficient information or belief to enable him to admit or deny whether "SDOG" caused the CPRA request to be made and based thereon, denies that allegation.
- 38. Answering paragraph 17, subsection E (1) of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that he did not perform any searches for "Mobile Messages" on his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.
- 39. Answering paragraph 17, subsection E (2) of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that he did not perform any searches for "Mobile Messages" on his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.

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- 40. Answering paragraph 17, subsection E (3) of the Petition, Dr. Glover denies that "nobody performed any search for responsive public records." Dr. Glover admits that District IT personnel performed searches on the District server for responsive public records. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.
- Answering paragraph 17, subsection E (4) of the Petition, Dr. Glover denies that 41. "nobody performed a thorough [sic] for responsive public records." Dr. Glover admits that District IT personnel performed searches on the District server for responsive public records. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.
- Answering paragraph 17, subsection F of the Petition, Dr. Glover is without 42. sufficient information or belief to enable him to admit or deny whether "SDOG" caused the CPRA request to be made and based thereon, denies that allegation.
- 43. Answering paragraph 17, subsection F (1) of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that he did not perform any searches for "Mobile Messages" on his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.
- Answering paragraph 17, subsection F (2) of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that he 44. did not perform any searches for "Mobile Messages" on his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.
- 45. Answering paragraph 17, subsection F (3) of the Petition, Dr. Glover denies that "nobody performed any search for responsive public records." Dr. Glover admits that District IT personnel performed searches on the District server for responsive public records. In addition, Dr.

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Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.

- 46. Answering paragraph 17, subsection F (4) of the Petition, Dr. Glover denies that "nobody performed a thorough [sic] for responsive public records." Dr. Glover admits that District IT personnel performed searches on the District server for responsive public records. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, devices or equipment.
- 47. Answering paragraph 17, subsection G of the Petition, Dr. Glover is without sufficient information or belief to enable him to admit or deny whether "SDOG" caused the CPRA request to be made and based thereon, denies that allegation.
- 48. Answering paragraph 17, subsection G (1) of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that he did not perform any searches of his private cell phone records for "GUHSD phone records for mobile-communication devices (e.g. cell phone, tablet, Android, IPhone, IPad, etc.)." In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, records, devices or equipment.
- 49. Answering paragraph 17, subsection G (2) of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that he did not perform any searches of his private cell phone records for "GUHSD phone records for mobile-communication devices (e.g. cell phone, tablet, Android, IPhone, IPad, etc.)." In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, records, devices or equipment.
- 50. Answering paragraph 17, subsection G (3) of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that he did not perform any searches of his private cell phone records for "GUHSD phone records for mobile-communication devices (e.g. cell phone, tablet, Android, IPhone, IPad, etc.)." In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were

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public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, records, devices or equipment.

- 51. Answering paragraph 17, subsection G (4) of the Petition, Dr. Glover is without sufficient information or belief to enable him to admit or deny that "nobody performed any search for responsive public records" and based thereon, denies that allegation. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, records, devices or equipment.
- 52. Answering paragraph 17, subsection G (5) of the Petition, Dr. Glover is without sufficient information or belief to enable him to admit or deny that "nobody performed a thorough [sic] search for responsive public records" and based thereon, denies that allegation. In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, records, devices or equipment.
- Answering paragraph 17, subsection G (6) of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that there are no "cell phones owned or controlled by GUHSD." Dr. Glover is without sufficient information or belief to enable him to admit or deny that "all persons other than GLOVER who performed a search for responsive public records limited their search to cell phones owned or controlled by GUHSD that they knew did not exist even though the request was not limited to cell phones." In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, records, devices or equipment.
- 54. Answering paragraph 17, subsection H of the Petition, Dr. Glover denies each and every allegation contained therein. Dr. Glover responds that in the District's final response to the CPRA request it stated, in the second paragraph from the bottom of the response, "[t]he District understands its obligation to assist you with making focused and effective requests that would facilitate identification of responsive records. To the extent the District misinterpreted your requests and you are seeking documents other than those identified in this response, please feel

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free to contact me at your convenience." In addition, Dr. Glover categorically denies and contests the legal conclusion that all records requested were public records as defined under the CPRA or that the District had control over, or access to, his private, personal accounts, records, devices or equipment.

55. Answering paragraph 18 of the Petition, Dr. Glover denies each and every allegation contained therein.

Second Cause of Action

Declaratory Relief under Code Civil Procedure Section 1060, et seg.

- 56. Answering paragraph 19 of the Petition, Dr. Glover re-alleges and incorporates by reference each and every response contained in paragraphs 1 through 55 above.
- 57. Answering paragraph 20 of the Petition, Dr. Glover admits that he disputes Petitioner's contention regarding the legal definition of "public records" and Petitioner's contentions about the rights and duties of the parties under the CPRA, the California Constitution, common law and other applicable legal authorities. The remaining portions of this paragraph do not contain factual assertions but only statements of Petitioner's desires for which no response is required.
- Answering paragraph 21 of the Petition, Dr. Glover responds that this paragraph 58. does not contain factual assertions. Rather, it only contains a statement of Petitioner's desires to which no response is required.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Dr. Glover pleads the following separate and distinct affirmative defenses to the Petition:

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure to State a Claim)

As a separate and first affirmative defense to the Petition, and to the purported causes of action set forth therein, the Petition fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

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SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(All Obligations Performed)

As a separate and second affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Dr. Glover alleges that he has fully and lawfully performed any and all duties and obligations he may have had to Petitioner, if any, and to "Nick Marinovich and other clients," if any.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Requested Documents Do Not Fall Within

the Meaning of a Public Record under the CPRA)

As a separate and third affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Dr. Glover alleges Petitioner has no right to obtain or inspect documents which are not "Public Records" as defined in the CPRA and precedential case law interpreting the same.

FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Actions Legally Compliant)

As a separate and fourth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Dr. Glover alleges that that Petitioner is barred from seeking the relief sought in the Petition because his actions and conduct towards Petitioner were at all times lawful, reasonable and justified. Dr. Glover alleges that his acts were all done within the scope of his discretion, in good faith, and with due care, and with the intent that such acts conform in all respects to the laws of the State of California.

FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(No Damages)

As a separate and fifth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Dr. Glover alleges that Petitioner has not suffered any damages as a proximate result of any act or omission for which he is responsible.

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SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Damages Not Recoverable – Attorney's Fees)

As a separate and sixth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Petitioner improperly seeks attorney's fees when they are not justified given the state of the law and the definition of "Public Records" at the time of the CPRA request.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Mitigation of Damages)

As a separate and seventh affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Petitioner has had, and continues to have, the ability and opportunity to mitigate its damages, if any, and has failed to take reasonable and necessary steps to mitigate purported damages. Dr. Glover requested that the case be stayed pending the outcome of City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal. App. 4th 75, review granted June 25, 2014, S218066 and will continue to make that request in order to conserve the resources of the parties and reduce attorneys' fees incurred.

EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Seeking Relief Beyond Declaration of Rights)

As a separate and eighth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Petitioner's cause of action for declaratory relief seeks relief beyond a declaration of rights and thus is not the proper subject of a declaratory judgment.

NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Bad Faith)

As a separate and ninth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Petitioner's claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands and bad faith.

TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Compliance with the Law)

As a separate and tenth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Dr. Glover alleges that the actions he took were in full compliance with

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the law, including, but not limited to, the CPRA, the California Constitution, Penal Code § 1546.1 and the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act, among other laws. In addition, Dr. Glover has exercised his discretion in accordance with applicable law, has not acted in any arbitrary or capricious manner, and has not committed an abuse of discretion. In addition to producing documents by and through his employer, the District, he believed the documents produced were responsive to the CPRA request, and that the District made several attempts to clarify the scope of the CPRA request.

ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Justification/Excuse)

As a separate and eleventh affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Dr. Glover alleges that Petitioner is barred from prosecuting the purported causes of action set forth in the Petition because the acts and/or omissions alleged in the Petition were justified and/or legally excused.

TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Standing/Capacity)

As a separate and twelfth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Petitioner lacks sufficient standing to bring this Petition and it is unclear whether SDOG was the actual entity that caused the CPRA request to be submitted by "Nick Marinovich and other clients."

THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Laches)

As a separate and thirteenth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Petition is barred by the doctrine of laches.

FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Lack of Deception)

As a separate and fourteenth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Dr. Glover alleges that his actions were not deceptive or performed with conscious disregard to California or Federal law, or Petitioner's rights, if any.

FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Violation of Privacy)

As a separate and fifteenth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Petitioner's purported CPRA request potentially seeks records that are subject to applicable privileges or other statutory exemptions, the disclosure of which will infringe upon the privacy rights of persons or entities that are not parties to this action, as well as the privacy rights of Dr. Glover.

SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure to Identify Records and/or Authority)

As a separate and sixteenth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Petitioner's record requests are vague, overbroad, and unduly burdensome, or fail to sufficiently identify the records sought to be reviewed and/or inspected and/or the authority permitting the review and/or inspection, in an adequately focused and specific manner that will provide Dr. Glover, by and through his employer the District, with a meaningful opportunity to respond as otherwise permitted by law.

SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Frivolous Petition)

As a separate and seventeenth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, the Petition is frivolous, unfounded and unreasonable. Therefore, Dr. Glover is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs upon judgment in his favor in accordance with applicable law, including but not limited to California Government Code section 6259(d).

EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Proper Exercise of Discretion)

As a separate and eighteenth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Petitioner fails to state a basis upon which a writ of mandate can be granted because Dr. Glover properly exercised discretion, and, based upon applicable facts and

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law, has not abused his discretion, and cannot be compelled to exercise his discretion in a particular manner.

NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Waiver)

As a separate and nineteenth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Dr. Glover alleges that Petitioner is barred in whole or in part from making the claims set forth in the Petition by the doctrine of waiver.

TWENTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Estoppel)

As a separate and twentieth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Dr. Glover alleges Petitioner is estopped from recovering the relief sought against him.

TWENTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Impossibility/Illegality)

As a separate and twenty-first affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Dr. Glover alleges that Penal Code § 1546.1 and the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act and other applicable law prevent him from complying with Petitioner's demands and the relief sought in the Petition.

TWENTY-SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(CCP §425.16)

As a separate and twenty-second affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Dr. Glover alleges that certain aspects of this Petition appear to have been brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and freedom of association and rights protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, article I § 2 of the California Constitution and similar statutes. To the extent the Petition contains causes of action that arise from any act in furtherance of the right of free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue, it violates Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16, among other laws.

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TWENTY-THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Ripeness/Mootness)

As a separate and twenty-third affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Dr. Glover alleges that the relief requested is premature and may be mooted altogether given the state of the law and the definition of "Public Records" currently existing and the pending similar issues queued up before the California Supreme Court in City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal. App. 4th 75, review granted June 25, 2014, S218066.

TWENTY-FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Failure to Exhaust Remedies)

As a separate and twenty-fourth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Dr. Glover alleges that Petitioner failed to exhaust its remedies by failing to reach out to the District and further clarify the CPRA as suggested in the District's November 18, 2016 correspondence.

TWENTY-FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Violation of Real Party in Interest's Rights under the First Amendment (Free Speech and Freedom of Association) and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution)

As a separate and twenty-fifth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Petitioner seeks a remedy which infringes upon and seeks to chill Dr. Glover's rights of free speech and freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and is thus barred.

TWENTY-SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Violation of Real Party of Interest's Rights under Cal. Const. Art. I, § 2 (Free Speech))

As a separate and twenty-sixth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Petitioner seeks a remedy which would violate Dr. Glover's free speech rights guaranteed by the California Constitution Art. I § 2, and is thus barred.

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TWENTY-SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Governmental Immunity)

As a separate and twenty-seventh affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Dr. Glover is immune from liability for the claims in Petition pursuant to Government Code §§ 820.2, 820.9 and 822.2.

TWENTY-EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Violation of Real Party of Interest's Civil Rights)

As a separate and twenty-eighth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Petitioner seeks a remedy which would violate Dr. Glover's civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and thus is barred.

TWENTY-NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

(Other Defenses)

As a separate and twenty-ninth affirmative defense to the Petition and each purported cause of action contained therein, Dr. Glover presently has insufficient knowledge or insufficient information upon which to form a belief as to whether he may have additional, yet unasserted, affirmative defenses. Dr. Glover therefore reserves the right to assert additional affirmative defenses in the event discovery indicates it would be appropriate.

WHEREFORE, Real Party in Interest, Dr. Glover, prays for relief as follows:

- 1. That the Petition be dismissed, with prejudice and in its entirety;
- 2. That Petitioner be denied any relief against Dr. Glover whether declaratory, injunctive, monetary, or otherwise;
 - 3. For reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of this suit; and
 - 4. That Dr. Glover be awarded such further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

24 DATED: March 1, 2017

FAGEN FRIEDMAN & FULFROST, LLP

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Ву: /4

Lynn Beekman

Kaley A Lichtman
Attorney for Real Party in Interest Tim Glover

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PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am employed in the County of San Diego, State of California. My business address is 1525 Faraday Avenue, Suite 300, Carlsbad, CA 92008.

On March 1, 2017, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as **REAL PARTY IN INTEREST TIM GLOVER'S ANSWER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE** on the interested parties in this action as follows:

SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

BY MAIL: I enclosed the document(s) in a sealed envelope or package address	ed
to the persons at the addresses listed in the Service List and placed the envelope for collection a	nc
mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with Fagen Friedman	&
Fulfrost, LLP's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same	Ē
day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary cour	se
of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepai	id.
I am a resident or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. The envelope was place	d
in the mail at Carlsbad, California.	

BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address mminnick@f3law.com to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful.

BY EXPRESS MAIL: I enclosed said document(s) in an envelope or package provided by the United States Postal Service and addressed to the persons at the addresses listed in the Service List. I placed the envelope or package for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly utilized drop box of the United States Postal Service.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on March 1, 2017, at Carlsbad, California.

Meg Minnick

Fagen Friedman & Fulfrost, LLP 1525 Faraday Avenue, Suite 300 Carlsbad, California 92008 Main: 760-304-6000 • Fax: 760-304-6011

SERVICE LIST

San Diegans for Open Government

Grossmont Union High School District; and Tim Glover San Diego Superior Court Case No. 37-2017-00001484-CU-MC-CTL

E-Mail Service per Agreement between Counsel

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