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9		HE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10	COUNTY O	F SAN DIEGO
11	THE PROTECT OUR COMMUNITIES	CASE NO.
12	FOUNDATION, a California nonprofit corporation,	VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF
13	Petitioner,	MANDATE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA
14	V.	ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT AND OTHER LAWS
15	COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, a municipal	(CCP §§ 1085, 1094.5; Public Resources
16	corporation; and DOES 1-100,	Code § 21000 et seq. ("CEQA"))
17	Respondent(s).	
18	THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF	
19	CALIFORNIA, on behalf of its San Diego Campus' School of Global Policy and	
20	Strategy; and ROES 101-200,	
21	Real Parties In Interest(s).	
22		
23		al, the changes are unprecedented,
24	and there is no	o more time for delay." ¹
25	I IPCC 2021: Climate Change 2021: The Physical S	Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the
26	Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental P	
27 28	Caud, Y. Chen, L. Goldfarb, M.I. Gomis, M. Huang Maycock, T. Waterfield, O. Yelekçi, R. Yu, and B. Z	, K. Leitzell, E. Lonnoy, J.B.R. Matthews, T.K. Zhou (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
28		Zhou (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, C

Petitioner THE PROTECT OUR COMMUNITIES FOUNDATION (Petitioner) alleges
 as follows in this Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate (Petition) pursuant to the California
 Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the County's competitive bidding mandates, and other
 laws:

INTRODUCTION

6 1. This case challenges certain actions by Respondent COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 7 (County) related to its decision to implement the County's Regional Decarbonization 8 Framework (RDF) based on a document entitled San Diego Regional Decarbonization 9 Framework Technical Report (Technical Report) that fails to comport with the County's own 10 decarbonization timeframe (Project). While Petitioner fully supports the preparation of a 11 regional plan to reduce carbon emissions as much as possible, as quickly as possible, such a 12 plan is only as good as the technical analysis it is based on. And here, the Technical Report 13 contains a renewable energy production geospatial analysis that does not reflect reality, lacks 14 evidentiary support, and arbitrarily minimizes rooftop and parking lot solar potential in San 15 Diego which constitutes the region's simplest and best mechanism to quickly reduce greenhouse 16 gas (GHG) emissions.

The Technical Report was prepared by a consultant that failed to publicly disclose
 its close ties to the investor-owned-utility industry, and specifically to San Diego Gas & Electric
 Company (SDG&E). The investor-owned-utility industry financially benefits from construction
 of capital projects like transmission lines, but does not enjoy such profits from rooftop and
 parking lot solar; thus, to protect its constituent shareholders' financial interests, the industry has
 been actively working to minimize distributed energy projects like rooftop and parking lot solar
 throughout the nation.

3. Instead achieving "zero carbon in the region by 2035," as the County had
directed, the consultant aimed for a "low carbon 2050 future for the San Diego region," and
made no attempt to establish any basis for the rapid reductions in GHG emissions required by
climate science in order to avoid or mitigate the most devastating climate change impacts.

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4. The Technical Report arbitrarily calculated transmission line construction costs
 utilizing irrelevant data that has nothing to do with new east-west transmission line construction
 to move power from remote utility-scale solar and wind projects to coastal demand centers,
 while ignoring admissions made elsewhere in the report about the costs and significant delays
 involved with developing remote, utility-scale projects and new transmission infrastructure.

6 5. Echoing the pro-utility and anti-customer messaging of the investor-owned-utility 7 industry to which the County's consultant was beholden, the Technical Report vastly 8 underestimated the GHG emissions reductions available from commercial rooftop solar and 9 arbitrarily avoids quantifying the tremendous benefits of rooftop and parking lot solar (which 10 can be deployed quickly to maximize near-term GHG emissions reductions, which avoid land 11 use impacts, and which minimize impacts to human health in disadvantaged communities) in 12 favor of remote, utility-scale renewable energy projects (which require long-term development 13 of new transmission lines and involve adverse environmental impacts).

6. As a result of these and other fundamental errors, the Technical Report fails to
constitute a fact-based assessment that could serve as a basis for implementing the region's most
promising decarbonization strategies – and in the timeframe necessary to for the region to do its
part to avert the worst climate change impacts.

Nevertheless, the County authorized development of an "Implementation
 Playbook" based on the Technical Report without first making the necessary corrections and
 revisions to the Technical Report and without properly analyzing, disclosing, avoiding, or
 mitigating the environmental impacts the County itself admits will occur.

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PARTIES

8. Petitioner is a nonprofit public benefit corporation formed and existing under
 California law with headquarters in San Diego. It is organized exclusively for charitable and
 public purposes. Petitioner represents the interests of San Diego and Southern California
 residential ratepayers in proceedings before the California Public Utilities Commission and other
 California agencies and in the courts. Petitioner advocates against unreasonably costly and
 unnecessary fossil-fueled utility projects, against investor-owned utility decarbonization

1 strategies designed to maximize utility profits over consumer and GHG emissions reduction 2 benefits, in support of just and reasonable utility rates, and in support of fair, reasonable, and in 3 support of responsible energy practices, polices, rules, and laws. Petitioner seeks to obtain 4 enforcement of the public duties that are the subject of this lawsuit.

9. 5 Respondent County is a public agency under section 21063 of the Public 6 Resources Code. The County is authorized and required by law to hold public hearings, to 7 determine the adequacy of and certify environmental documents prepared pursuant to CEQA, 8 and to take other actions in connection with the approval of projects within its jurisdiction.

9 10. Real Party in Interest The Regents of the University of California is the governing 10 body of the University of California which entered into the contract to produce the Technical 11 Report that is the subject of this litigation on behalf of its San Diego Campus' School of Global 12 Policy and Strategy (GPS).

13 11. The true names and capacities of Respondents identified as DOES 1 through 100 14 and Real Parties in Interest identified as ROES 101 through 200 are unknown to Petitioner, 15 which will seek the Court's permission to amend this pleading in order to allege the true names 16 and capacities as soon as they are ascertained. Petitioner is informed and believes, and on that 17 basis alleges, that each of the fictitiously-named Respondents 1 through 100 has jurisdiction by 18 law over one or more aspects of the project that is the subject of this proceeding and that each of 19 the fictitiously-named Real Parties in Interest 101 through 200 has some cognizable interest in 20 the allegations or the project challenged herein.

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A. The County Authorizes Development of a "Zero Carbon Sustainability Plan" in Partnership with GPS to Achieve Zero Carbon by 2023.

12. On January 27, 2021, the County, through its Board of Supervisors, directed its 24 Chief Administrative Officer "to develop a framework for a regional zero carbon sustainability 25 plan in partnership with the University of California San Diego School of Global Policy and 26 Strategy which shall include strategies and initiatives to achieve zero carbon in the region by 27 2035." (January 27, 2021 Statement of Proceedings, p. 4 [Item 3].) 28

BACKGROUND

The County also authorized the negotiation and award of a no-bid contract with
 GPS to develop "a regional framework and report to the Board as described below, with an
 option for additional research and leadership on subsequent actions as directed by the Board..."
 (January 27, 2021 Statement of Proceedings, p. 4-5; January 27, 2021 Board Letter for Agenda
 Item 3, p. 3).

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B. The County and GPS Enter Into a "Single Source" Contract to Produce the Technical Report.

14. On or about July 12, 2021, the County entered into a "single source" contract with GPS, without competitive bidding, to produce the Technical Report. (Contract No. 564557.) 15. Although the contract between the County and GPS claimed that GPS had no direct or indirect conflict of interest (id. at p. 12), in fact GPS is heavily funded and influenced by the investor-owned electric utility industry which financially benefits from construction of capital projects like transmission lines; and, correspondingly, from minimizing distributed generation projects like rooftop and parking lot solar projects. Unlike remote, utility-scale renewable energy projects which require construction of long lead-time transmission lines to carry the output from remote solar and wind energy development areas to coastal areas, distributed generation projects like rooftop and parking lot solar generate energy at or near the end user of the energy and can be quickly deployed. Thus, rooftop and parking lot solar saturation can maximize GHG emissions reductions before the planet exceeds heating of 1.5°C above preindustrial levels, eliminate any need for more transmission lines and the associated utility industry profits, and mitigate or avoid the worst climate change impacts and other significant land use and human health impacts.

16. The investor-owned-utility industry is incentivized to oppose distributed generation projects like rooftop and parking lot solar, even though they make the most sense for the public from both the environmental (*e.g.* GHG emissions reduction, land use, and human health) and cost perspective for the San Diego region. As Edison Electric Institute (EEI), the trade association representing all U.S. investor-owned electric companies, warned its investorowned-utility company constituents a decade ago, distributed generation like rooftop solar

"would bring the 'prospect of declining retail sales and earnings; financing of major investments in the T&D [transmission and distribution]...; potential obsolescence of existing business and regulatory models," and that net metering programs that are used in connection with rooftop 4 solar deployment would have "significant potential adverse impact to utility investors."²

5 17. David Victor (Victor) is a professor at GPS, served as an advisor throughout 6 preparation of the Technical Report, and led the policy analysis to "connect the infrastructure 7 plan to policy levers at the County level and a discussion of state policy that can support San 8 Diego" after "detailing the physical system transformation." (Contract No. 564557, p. 22.)

9 18. GPS failed to disclose that Victor has long been involved with the investor-owned-10 utility companies' research and development arm, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), 11 where Victor currently serves as the longest-serving member of EPRI's Advisory Council. Most of EPRI's members are electric utility companies that provide funding to EPRI for specific 12 research projects.³ The same investor-owned utility CEOs that lead the EEI board of directors 13 14 also sit on the EPRI board of directors.⁴

15 19. According to documents obtained under the California Public Records Act, GPS 16 accepted a pledge from EPRI in the amount of \$900,000 on or about January 7, 2021, paid in 17 installments in 2021 and 2022, all of which were earmarked to support research "being 18 conducted by David G. Victor."

- 19 20. According to disclosures required by California Public Utilities Commission 20 General Order 77-M, SDG&E contributed \$843,411.00 to EPRI in 2021: a more than \$700,000 21 increase from SDG&E's contribution to EPRI two years earlier. (SDG&E 2021 GO 77-M Report, p. 46; SDG&E 2019 GO 77-M Report, p. 38.)⁵ In the three-year period from 2019 22 23 through 2021, SDG&E contributed \$3.06 million to EEI and \$1.26 million to EPRI.
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²⁵ ² Gideon Weissman, Bret Fanshaw, Blocking the Sun -12 Utilities and Fossil Fuel Interests That Are Undermining American Solar Power (Environment America Research & Policy Center: 2015), p. 12. 26

³ Electric Power Research Institute, Inc., Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements as of and for the Years Ended December 31, 2021 and 2020 (April 11, 2022), p. 8, 16; 27

⁴ EEI Newsroom, *Warner Baxter Elected EEI Chair; Pedro J. Pizarro and Maria Pope Elected Vice* Chairs (June 20, 2022). 28

⁵ SDG&E's 2022 GO 77-M Report has not yet been made publicly available.

21. On or about June 29, 2022, the County amended the contract with GPS by adding 2 "additional scope for the finalization of the RDF Technical Analysis Report." (Contract No. 3 564557, Modification 1, p. 1.) The amendment increased the compensation paid to GPS and resulted in a new total contact price of \$641,000. (*Ibid.*) The amendment supplemented the 4 5 scope of work to include finalizing the technical analysis and supporting the "implementation 6 process." (Contract No. 564557, Modification 1, Exhibit A, p. 1.)

7 22. The amendment required further work regarding the electric sector, including 8 "[s]patial analysis to identify low-impact, high quality areas for wind and solar development, and 9 to coordinate the early planning of the transmission network needed to interconnect new low-10 impact renewable energy power plants to the grid" and regarding the policy analysis led by 11 Victor. (Contract No. 564557, Modification 1, Exhibit A, p. 1.) The amendment added a 12 subtask described as follows: "Building on the chapter on Key Policy Considerations in the RDF 13 Technical Report, the RDF team will advise the County on institutional arrangements in order to 14 promote science-based climate policy across the San Diego region's jurisdictions and agencies," 15 work that would be co-led by Victor. (Contract No. 564557, Modification 1, Exhibit A, p. 3.) 16 23. At the time they entered into the amendment, GPS and the County knew but failed 17 to disclose that Victor co-authored the so-called "decarbonization plan" published in April 2022

18 by SDG&E.⁶ During the County's April 7, 2022 Energy Sector Workshop, Emily Leslie, the 19 lead author of the renewable energy production geospatial analysis in Chapter 2 of the Technical 20 Report, stated in the virtual workshop chat: "There is cross pollination between this project team 21 and the SDG&E project team. David Victor has been contributing to both."

22 24. Both the original contract and the amendment stated that "Prof. David Victor will 23 be providing significant in-kind hours to the project, financed by UC San Diego" (Contract No. 24 564557, p. 27; Contract No. 564557, Modification 1, Exhibit A, p. 6), without disclosing that 25 EPRI had paid money to GPS to support work by Victor and did not make reference to 26 SDG&E's payments to EPRI.

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⁶ SDG&E, *The Path to Net Zero* (April 2022).

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C. GPS Lacked "Unique Knowledge, Skill, or Ability" Required for a **Technical Assessment of Regional Decarbonization Pathways.**

25. Board of Supervisors Policy A-87 requires the County to "competitively procure 3 goods and/or services unless otherwise allowed for under this Policy or required by State or 4 federal law." (Policy A-87, p. 1.) Policy A-87 states that single source contracts can be utilized 5 where "Only one manufacturer, distributer, supplier or service provider can provide the required 6 goods and/or services." (Policy A-87, p. 2.). 7 26. The County claimed that an agreement with GPS "qualifies for a single source 8 exception to Board Policy A-87 under paragraph D.3 of that policy" solely because GPS "has 9 been a leader in global and national research on decarbonization strategies and is well-positioned 10 and uniquely-qualified to scale this work to the San Diego County region" (January 27, 2021) 11 Board Letter for Agenda Item 3, p. 3) and without justifying the exception pursuant to the policy. 12 27. The County did not address the terms of D.3 which on its face applies only when 13 "[t]he procurement is for services from a provider with unique knowledge, skill, or ability not 14 available from other sources." (Policy A-87, p. 2). In fact, numerous consultants could have 15 performed the technical analysis necessary to establish a basis for development of meaningful 16 regional decarbonization policies and actions. 17 28. Far from procuring services from a provider with unique knowledge, skill, or 18 ability not available from other sources, the contract itself recognized that GPS would need to 19 engage subcontractors in order to perform the work. (Contract No. 564557, p. 1.) 20 D. A Critical Chapter of the Technical Report Demonstrates that GPS Failed 21 to Perform the Contract Objectively, Competently, or Accurately. 29. The Technical Report falsely claimed that it "was funded by the County of San 22 Diego," and that "[t]he authors declare no competing interests with relevant entities in the San 23 Diego region." (Technical Report, p. 3.) In fact, Victor was paid with funds provided by GPS 24 and remains intimately involved with the investor-owned-utility industry through EPRI and 25 26 SDG&E. (See Contract No. 564557, p. 27; Contract 564557, Modification 1, Exhibit A, p. 6; EPRI Advisory Council Roster; SDG&E website [stating that its plan to "decarbonize California 27 through 2045" was "conducted with technical support" from Victor].) 28

30. Chapter 2 of the Technical Report, entitled "Geospatial Analysis of Renewable
Energy Production," reveals that GPS failed to perform the contract objectively, competently, or
accurately, much less demonstrate any unique knowledge, skill, or ability.

4	31. In purporting to estimate the costs of new transmission line construction that
5	would be necessary for development of remote, utility-scale renewable energy projects in San
6	Diego County and Imperial County, the Technical Report arbitrarily ignored the \$3.9 billion cost
7	of and decade-long construction time necessary to develop the only transmission line project
8	listed in the Technical Report that is capable of transporting 2,000 MW (the targeted
9	transmission capacity) from the Greater Imperial CREZ ⁷ located in eastern San Diego County
10	and Imperial County. (See Technical Report, p. 63 [New Imperial Valley-Serrano 500 kV line
11	estimated to take 120 months at the cost of \$3,680 million, plus New Imperial Valley 500/230
12	kV Bank at new substation estimated to take 105 months at the cost of \$214 million].)
13	Inexplicably and inconsistently, the Technical Report later admits to the exponentially higher
14	costs and long construction timeframe necessary for transmission line development that it
15	ignores in Chapter 2. (Id. at p. 267 [admitting in Chapter 7 that "CAISO estimates necessary
16	transmission network upgrades for San Diego - Imperial - Baja – Arizona to be \$3.9 billion and
17	will take decades to complete"].)
18	32. Instead, the Technical Report arbitrarily utilized the costs of a project identified as
19	"Non-CREZ" and described as an "Internal San Diego reconductoring" project (by definition a
20	project not intended to transport electricity from remote areas and that can be developed on a
21	much shorter timeframe than new transmission line construction) to erroneously account for only
22	a tiny fraction of actual transmission costs. (See Technical Report, p. 63 [non-CREZ, internal
23	San Diego reconductoring project estimated to take 18 months and cost \$89 million].)
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27	⁷ CREZ is an acronym for Competitive Renewable Energy Zone: a specific area within California identified by state agencies as having high-value solar and/or wind resources. (<i>See e.g.</i> Brewster Birdsall
28	et al., <u>Senate Bill 350 Study Volume IX: Environmental Study Prepared for California ISO</u> (July 8, 2016),


^{28 ||} et al., <u>Senate Bill 350 Study Volume IA</u>. Environmental Study Frepared for Senatory p. 6 (Figure 1-1. Competitive Renewable Energy Zone (CREZ) Boundaries). 8

1	33. Had GPS utilized the cost of the relevant \$3.9 billion transmission line project to
2	estimate the costs of new transmission line construction necessary to support remote, utility-scale
3	renewable energy projects, the Technical Report would have concluded that the transmission
4	cost adder necessary to deliver remote solar and wind power to areas where the power is used
5	equals approximately \$127 per megawatt-hour (/MWh) and will take at least a decade to build.
6	The cost adder of the new San Diego – Imperial Valley transmission line with transformer
7	capacity project, in dollars per megawatt hour, is calculated first by ascertaining the annual cost
8	of the project, and then by dividing the annual cost of the project by the annual potential
9	generation of the line: \$3.894 billion ⁸ [estimated project cost] x 0.1349 ⁹ [new transmission line
10	capital recovery factor] = \$525 million/yr [annual cost]; \$525 million/yr [annual cost] ÷
11	4,119,351 MWh/yr [annual potential generation] ^{10} = \$127/MWh. ^{$11$}
12	34. The Technical Report identifies large rooftop solar potential citing to a GIS
13	analysis conducted by the consultant(s) in two set of units, square footage and acres, but then
14	arbitrarily assumes extraordinarily low rooftop solar potential for San Diego County with no
15	supporting documentation. (Technical Report, p. 35.)
15 16	supporting documentation. (Technical Report, p. 35.)
	supporting documentation. (<u>Technical Report</u> , p. 35.)
16	
16 17	⁸ As identified in the Technical Report, the total cost of the transmission plus transformer project equals \$3.894 billion, with a total increase of 1,812 MW. (<i>See</i> <u>Technical Report</u> , p. 63 (Table 2.F: identifying a
16 17 18	⁸ As identified in the Technical Report, the total cost of the transmission plus transformer project equals \$3.894 billion, with a total increase of 1,812 MW. (<i>See</i> <u>Technical Report</u> , p. 63 (Table 2.F: identifying a \$3,680 million transmission line with 1,412 MW increase, and a \$214 million transformer bank with 400 MW increase); <i>see also id.</i> , at p. 267 (Table 7.1: "CAISO estimates necessary transmission network
16 17 18 19	 ⁸ As identified in the Technical Report, the total cost of the transmission plus transformer project equals §3.894 billion, with a total increase of 1,812 MW. (<i>See</i> Technical Report, p. 63 (Table 2.F: identifying a §3,680 million transmission line with 1,412 MW increase, and a \$214 million transformer bank with 400 MW increase); <i>see also</i> <u>id.</u>, at p. 267 (Table 7.1: "CAISO estimates necessary transmission network upgrades for San Diego - Imperial - Baja - Arizona to be \$3.9 billion"). ⁹ The new transmission line capital recovery factor has been extrapolated from SDG&E's Sunrise
16 17 18 19 20	⁸ As identified in the Technical Report, the total cost of the transmission plus transformer project equals \$3.894 billion, with a total increase of 1,812 MW. (<i>See Technical Report</i> , p. 63 (Table 2.F: identifying a \$3,680 million transmission line with 1,412 MW increase, and a \$214 million transformer bank with 400 MW increase); <i>see also id.</i> , at p. 267 (Table 7.1: "CAISO estimates necessary transmission network upgrades for San Diego - Imperial - Baja - Arizona to be \$3.9 billion"). ⁹ The new transmission line capital recovery factor has been extrapolated from SDG&E's Sunrise Powerlink application before the California Public Utilities Commission: \$254 million/yr [annualized cost] ÷ \$1.883 billion [total cost] = 0.1349/yr, with \$1.883 billion being the final Sunrise Power Link cost and
16 17 18 19 20 21	 ⁸ As identified in the Technical Report, the total cost of the transmission plus transformer project equals \$3.894 billion, with a total increase of 1,812 MW. (<i>See</i> Technical Report, p. 63 (Table 2.F: identifying a \$3,680 million transmission line with 1,412 MW increase, and a \$214 million transformer bank with 400 MW increase); <i>see also id.</i>, at p. 267 (Table 7.1: "CAISO estimates necessary transmission network upgrades for San Diego - Imperial - Baja - Arizona to be \$3.9 billion"). ⁹ The new transmission line capital recovery factor has been extrapolated from SDG&E's Sunrise Powerlink application before the California Public Utilities Commission: \$254 million/yr [annualized cost] ÷ \$1.883 billion [total cost] = 0.1349/yr, with \$1.883 billion being the final Sunrise Power Link cost and \$254 million/yr being the annualized cost of Sunrise Power Link: (\$1.883 billion/\$1.265 billion) x \$164 million/yr] + \$10 million/yr operations and maintenance = \$254 million/yr. (<i>See</i> D.08-12-058, p. 293
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 	 ⁸ As identified in the Technical Report, the total cost of the transmission plus transformer project equals \$3.894 billion, with a total increase of 1,812 MW. (<i>See</i> Technical Report, p. 63 (Table 2.F: identifying a \$3,680 million transmission line with 1,412 MW increase, and a \$214 million transformer bank with 400 MW increase); <i>see also id.</i>, at p. 267 (Table 7.1: "CAISO estimates necessary transmission network upgrades for San Diego - Imperial - Baja - Arizona to be \$3.9 billion"). ⁹ The new transmission line capital recovery factor has been extrapolated from SDG&E's Sunrise Powerlink application before the California Public Utilities Commission: \$254 million/yr [annualized cost] ÷ \$1.883 billion [total cost] = 0.1349/yr, with \$1.883 billion being the final Sunrise Power Link cost and \$254 million/yr being the annualized cost of Sunrise Power Link: (\$1.883 billion/\$1.265 billion) x \$164 million/yr] + \$10 million/yr operations and maintenance = \$254 million/yr. (<i>See</i> D.08-12-058, p. 293 [final Sunrise Power Link cost: \$1.883 billion]; A.06-08-010, SDG&E Application Chapter IV (August 4, 2006), p. V-9 [original capital cost = \$1.265 billion]; <i>id.</i> at p. V-11 [\$164 million/yr annualized capital
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 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	 ⁸ As identified in the Technical Report, the total cost of the transmission plus transformer project equals \$3.894 billion, with a total increase of 1,812 MW. (<i>See</i> Technical Report, p. 63 (Table 2.F: identifying a \$3,680 million transmission line with 1,412 MW increase, and a \$214 million transformer bank with 400 MW increase); <i>see also</i> <u>id.</u>, at p. 267 (Table 7.1: "CAISO estimates necessary transmission network upgrades for San Diego - Imperial - Baja - Arizona to be \$3.9 billion"). ⁹ The new transmission line capital recovery factor has been extrapolated from SDG&E's Sunrise Powerlink application before the California Public Utilities Commission: \$254 million/yr [annualized cost] + \$1.883 billion [total cost] = 0.1349/yr, with \$1.883 billion being the final Sunrise Power Link cost and \$254 million/yr leng the annualized cost of Sunrise Power Link: (\$1.883 billion/\$1.265 billion) x \$164 million/yr] + \$10 million/yr operations and maintenance = \$254 million/yr. (<i>See</i> D.08-12-058, p. 293 [final Sunrise Power Link cost: \$1.883 billion]; A.06-08-010, SDG&E Application Chapter IV (August 4, 2006), p. V-9 [original capital cost = \$1.265 billion]; <i>id.</i> at p. V-11 [\$164 million/yr annualized capital over 40 years + \$10 million/yr operations & maintenance].) ¹⁰ Extrapolated production of 1,812 MW of solar and wind generation interconnected to new San Diego – Imperial Valley transmission line: (1,812 MW [added generation identified in the Technical Report at p. 63] / 1,264 MW [actual renewables capacity connected to Sunrise Power Link]) x 2,873,543 MWh/yr
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	 ⁸ As identified in the Technical Report, the total cost of the transmission plus transformer project equals \$3.894 billion, with a total increase of 1,812 MW. (<i>See</i> Technical Report, p. 63 (Table 2.F: identifying a \$3,680 million transmission line with 1,412 MW increase, and a \$214 million transformer bank with 400 MW increase); <i>see also id.</i>, at p. 267 (Table 7.1: "CAISO estimates necessary transmission network upgrades for San Diego - Imperial - Baja - Arizona to be \$3.9 billion"). ⁹ The new transmission line capital recovery factor has been extrapolated from SDG&E's Surrise Powerlink application before the California Public Utilities Commission: \$254 million/yr [annualized cost] ÷ \$1.883 billion [total cost] = 0.1349/yr, with \$1.883 billion being the final Sunrise Power Link cost and \$254 million/yr operations and maintenance = \$254 million/s1.265 billion) x \$164 million/yr] + \$10 million/yr operations and maintenance = \$254 million/yr. (<i>See</i> D.08-12-058, p. 293 [final Sunrise Power Link cost: \$1.883 billion]; A.06-08-010, SDG&E Application Chapter IV (August 4, 2006), p. V-9 [original capital cost = \$1.265 billion]; <i>id.</i> at p. V-11 [\$164 million/yr annualized capital over 40 years + \$10 million/yr operations & maintenance].) ¹⁰ Extrapolated production of 1,812 MW of solar and wind generation interconnected to new San Diego – Imperial Valley transmission line: (1,812 MW [added generation identified in the <u>Technical Report</u> at p. 63] / 1,264 MW [actual renewables capacity connected to Sunrise Power Link]) x 2,873,543 MWh/yr [Sunrise Power Link annual production] = 4,119,351 MWh/yr. (R.20-08-020, Exhibit <u>PCF-24</u> [Powers Rebuttal Testimony], p. 37; Exhibit <u>PCF-60</u>).
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 	 ⁸ As identified in the Technical Report, the total cost of the transmission plus transformer project equals \$3.894 billion, with a total increase of 1,812 MW. (<i>See</i> Technical Report, p. 63 (Table 2.F: identifying a \$3,680 million transmission line with 1,412 MW increase, and a \$214 million transformer bank with 400 MW increase); <i>see also id.</i>, at p. 267 (Table 7.1: "CAISO estimates necessary transmission network upgrades for San Diego - Imperial - Baja - Arizona to be \$3.9 billion"). ⁹ The new transmission line capital recovery factor has been extrapolated from SDG&E's Sunrise Powerlink application before the California Public Utilities Commission: \$254 million/yr [annualized cost] ÷ \$1.883 billion [total cost] = 0.1349/yr, with \$1.883 billion being the final Sunrise Power Link cost and \$254 million/yr operations and maintenance = \$254 million/\$1.265 billion) x \$164 million/yr] + \$10 million/yr operations and maintenance = \$254 million/yr. (<i>See</i> D.08-12-058, p. 293 [final Sunrise Power Link cost: \$1.883 billion]; <i>A.</i>06-08-010, SDG&E Application Chapter IV (August 4, 2006), p. V-9 [original capital cost = \$1.265 billion]; <i>id.</i> at p. V-11 [\$164 million/yr annualized capital over 40 years + \$10 million/yr operations & maintenance].) ¹⁰ Extrapolated production of 1,812 MW of solar and wind generation interconnected to new San Diego – Imperial Valley transmission line: (1,812 MW [added generation identified in the Technical Report at p. 63] / 1,264 MW [actual renewables capacity connected to Sunrise Power Link]) x 2,873,543 MWh/yr [Sunrise Power Link annual production] = 4,119,351 MWh/yr. (R.20-08-020, Exhibit PCF-24 [Powers

1 35. The 2.7 billion square feet of usable rooftop solar potential identified in the Technical Report converts to more than 21,000 MW DC¹² and about 19,500 MW AC,¹³ but the 2 3 Technical Report claims that "estimated region-wide rooftop solar potential capacity of 4 approximately 3,360 MW AC" by citing to a footnote that does not in fact support the statement 5 made. (Technical Report, p. 35). The Technical Report then utilizes this artificially low rooftop 6 solar potential to erroneously conclude that rooftop solar could meet only "12% of estimated 7 2050 electricity demand." (Technical Report, p. 36.) 8 36. Google Project Sunroof, a software developed by Google utilizing Google's 9 expansive mapping and computing data resources and relying only upon reliable rooftop surface 10 area, estimates 14,700 MW DC of rooftop solar potential in San Diego County -- in the range of four times the output the Technical Report erroneously assumes -- with 9.5 million metric tons 11 per year of avoided CO₂ emissions from the electricity sector in San Diego County.¹⁴ 12 13 37. The Technical Report repeatedly recognized the benefits of customer-generated 14 solar conceptually, but entirely and irrationally failed to quantify those benefits. 15 38. The Technical Report also arbitrarily reduced the potential contribution of rooftop 16 and parking lot solar to decarbonization by arbitrarily using an exceptionally high – and 17 unsupported – 2050 electricity demand estimate of 49,979 GWh, approximately 2.6 times the actual 2020 demand of 19,158 GWh. (Technical Report, p. 64). In contrast, California projects 18 19 a statewide increase of only 1.76 times from 2022 to 2045. (See California Air Resources Board, 2022 Scoping Plan for Achieving Carbon Neutrality (November 16, 2022), p. 202.)¹⁵ 20 21 22 ¹² CPUC Docket Number A.08-03-015, Southern California Edison Solar Photovoltaic Program 23 Testimony (March 27, 2008), p. 32 ["Generally, a 1 MW array employing crystalline modules will require 125,000 square feet of roof space."]. Therefore, 2.7 billion $ft^2 \div 125,000 ft^2/MW DC = 21,600 MW DC$. 24 ¹³ The direct current (DC) produced by the solar panel must be converted to alternating current (AC) in an inverter to be compatible with grid power. (Id. at p. 1 [DC to AC conversion ratio of 0.90].) 25 ¹⁴ Project Sunroof data explorer (June 2019), results available at https://sunroof.withgoogle.com/dataexplorer/place/ChIJHWD IzDr24ARKAeA6yv9DTU/. Google Project Sunroof sets a rigorous solar 26 exposure definition of usable roof area that reduces overall rooftop solar potential and identifies San Diego County rooftop solar potential as 1 billion square feet (ft²), equivalent to 14,700 MW DC). The Google 27 Project Sunroof 14,700 MW DC estimate equates to approximately 13,230 MW AC. ¹⁵ Similarly, the Draft 2022 Scoping Plan Update stated that electricity demand will grow by "nearly 80 28 percent" by 2045. (Draft 2022 Scoping Plan Update (May 10, 2022), p. 161.)

1	39. Like residential rooftop and parking lot solar, commercial/industrial building solar
2	does not require new transmission capacity to be deliverable. Rooftop and parking lot solar flow
3	over the lower voltage distribution grid in the urban and suburban areas where the power is used.
4	40. The Technical Report assumes erroneously high commercial rooftop solar cost by
5	using outdated estimates that do not purport to be production cost estimates from a
6	geographically limited report (see Technical Report, p. 36), concluding only that further work
7	should be done "to confirm distribution grid capability" to accommodate commercial rooftop
8	solar. (Technical Report, p. 36.) The Technical Report irrationally ignores commercial solar
9	costs in the reputable National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) Annual Technology
10	Baseline (ATB) database ¹⁶ that the Technical Report itself uses when estimating capital costs for
11	remote utility-scale solar and wind costs elsewhere in the report (Technical Report, p. 25). The
12	commercial rooftop solar cost should be approximately \$48/MWh in 2022 as identified by in the
13	same 2020 NREL ATB spreadsheet relied on in the Technical Report, not the \$92/MWh
14	commercial rooftop solar cost erroneously assumed in the Technical Report.
15	41. The Technical Report entirely ignores parking lot solar potential in the region,
16	even though the County's own Office of Education has implemented a highly space efficient
17	(60+ percent of parking area covered with solar panels) and successful parking lot solar project.
18	See Figure 1.
19	42. San Diego County ground-level commercial parking area solar potential has been
20	very conservatively estimated at 3,300 MW AC by Powers Engineering assuming only 25
21	percent of the parking area is covered with solar panels. ¹⁷ Commercial parking area solar
22	potential estimates increase to about 7,900 MW AC utilizing average parking lot solar coverage
23	estimates of 60 percent consistent with the County's Office of Education solar parking lot array
24	as shown in Figure 1.
25	
26	 https://atb-archive.nrel.gov/electricity/2020/data.php See Bill Powers, <u>Roadmap to 100 Percent Local Solar Build-Out by 2030 in the City of San Diego</u> (May
27	2020), p. 21-24 (This report relies on very conservative rooftop solar and parking lot solar potential estimates to make the point that, even using very conservative estimates, the City of San Diego has

estimates to make the point that, even using very conservative estimates, the City of San Diego has sufficient local solar potential to achieve 100 percent clean electricity by 2030 relying only on a build-out of local solar capacity.).



46. The Technical Report thus failed to recognize the tremendous GHG emissions reduction and other benefits that could be quickly achieved by rooftop solar and parking lot solar, especially when combined with battery storage to enable 24/7 power, connected to the distribution grid.

E. The County Decides to Authorize Development of an Implementation Playbook Based on the Misleading and Erroneous Technical Report.

47. On August 31, 2022, the Board of Supervisors heard an item entitled "Receive an Update on the Integrated Regional Decarbonization Framework and Design of Implementation Playbook (Districts: All)." (August 31, 2022 Statement of Proceedings, p. 9 [Item 5].)

48. The County explained that the "the integrated RDF has three key components: the technical report, the workforce development study, and the Implementation Playbook;" and decided to turn its focus to "the development of the Implementation Playbook, which will translate the technical findings of the RDF so far into implementable actions for our region to decarbonize." (*Ibid.*) The County decided it would be "transitioning from the education phase of outreach to the implementation phase of the RDF" since "[t]he technical report and the workforce development study are now complete and available on our website." (*Ibid.*)

49. However, because the Technical Report failed to address the County's directive to
achieve zero carbon by 2035, and because the Technical Report vastly understates both (1) the
energy output available from the region's simplest, most straightforward renewable energy
source (rooftop and parking lot solar), and (2) the true costs of remote, utility-scale renewable
energy sources; developing implementing strategies using the Technical Report as a baseline is
arbitrary and would fail to reduce GHG emissions to the extent possible and as quickly as
possible and result in adverse climate change, land use, and human health impacts.

50. On August 31, 2022, the County announced that the Technical Report was "now
complete and available on our website," and directed staff to "translate the technical findings of
the RDF so far into implementable actions for our region to decarbonize" by developing an
"Implementation Playbook" based on the Technical Report. (*Ibid.*)

1 51. The County Refuses to Address the Deficiencies in the Technical Report, 2 Requiring Petitioner to File the Instant Petition. 3 52. Petitioner seeks review by and relief from this Court under Code of Civil 4 Procedure section 1085, Public Resources Code section 21168.5, and other provisions of law. 5 53. The County has taken final agency action with respect to approving the Project. 6 The County has a duty to comply with applicable state and local laws, including but not limited 7 to CEQA, prior to undertaking the discretionary approvals at issue in this lawsuit. Petitioner 8 possesses no effective remedy to challenge the approvals at issue in this action other than by 9 means of this lawsuit. 10 54. Petitioner has performed any and all conditions precedent to filing the instant 11 action. 55. 12 Neither Public Resources Code section 21177 nor any other exhaustion-of-13 remedies requirement may be applied to Petitioner, because the County prevented any 14 meaningful public comment under CEQA. 15 56. Nonetheless, Petitioner identified the flaws in Chapter 2 of the Technical Report 16 and repeatedly requested that the County avoid relying on such flawed information. Petitioner 17 and others provided comments orally, in writing, and in chats at every opportunity; and did their 18 best, under the circumstances, to express their concerns to the County. 19 On February 24, 2023, Petitioner complied with Public Resources Code section 57. 20 21167.5 by mailing to the County a letter stating that Petitioner planned to file a Petition for Writ 21 of Mandate seeking to invalidate the County's approval of the Project. Attached hereto as 22 Exhibit A is the true and correct copy of this letter and proof of service. 23 58. On or about February 27, 2023, Petitioner will comply with Public Resources 24 Code section 21167.7 and Code of Civil Procedure section 388 by furnishing the Attorney 25 General of the State of California with a copy of the Petition. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is the 26 true and correct copy of the letter transmitting the Petition to the Attorney General. 27 28

59. Pursuant to Public Resources Code section 21167.6(b)(2), Petitioner elects to prepare the record of proceedings in this action. Concurrently with this Petition, Petitioner will file a notice of election to prepare the administrative record.

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- 60. The County's conduct in approving the Project and in purporting to comply with
 CEQA constitutes a prejudicial abuse of discretion because, as is explained herein, the County
 failed to proceed in the manner required by law and it acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
- 7 61. Petitioner has no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, 8 and Petitioner will suffer irreparable harm as a result of the County's violations of the laws 9 referenced herein, including CEQA and the County's own competitive bidding requirements, 10 unless this Court grants the requested writ of mandate to require the County to set aside its 11 approval of the Project and related actions. In the absence of such remedies, the County's 12 approvals will remain in effect in violation of State and local law, and Petitioner and its members 13 will be irreparably harmed. No money damages or legal remedy could adequately compensate 14 Petitioners and their members for that harm.
- 15 62. The County failed to satisfy its clear, present, ministerial duty to act in accordance
 with the laws and its own requirements as referenced herein. When the County is permitted or
 required by law to exercise discretion in setting policy, taking action, and approving projects
 under the aforementioned laws, the County remains under a clear, present, ministerial duty to
 exercise its discretion within the limits of, and in a manner consistent with, those laws and
 requirements. The County has failed and refused to do so, and instead has exercised its
 discretion beyond the limits and in violation of those laws.
- 63. Venue for this action properly lies in the Superior Court for the State of California
 in and for the County of San Diego pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 394. The
 County's main offices are located in and the activities authorized by the County will occur in San
 Diego County. Venue for this action properly lies in the Central division. The County's Board
 of Supervisors, which took action to approve this Project, does business at 1600 Pacific
 Highway, San Diego, CA 92101, which is assigned to the Central division. Similarly, the action
 that is challenged in this litigation--the approval of the Project—took place at the same location.

1 2	<u>FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION</u> Violations of CEQA Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 1085 (Against All Respondents and Real Parties in Interest)
3	64. Paragraphs 1 through 63 are fully incorporated into this paragraph.
4	65. The County has a mandatory and ministerial duty to comply with CEQA whenever
5	the County approves a non-exempt activity which has the potential for resulting in a direct or a
6	foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment – a "project" as defined by CEQA.
7	(Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. County of San Diego ("Medical Marijuana
8	Patients ") (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1171, 1191-1193; Pub. Res. Code, §§ 21065, 21080, subd. (a).)
9	66. Petitioner seeks to ensure the public receives the benefits to which it is entitled
10	under the County's own ordinances and policies, and under CEQA, which "was enacted to (1)
11	inform the government and public about a proposed activity's potential environmental impacts;
12	(2) identify ways to reduce, or avoid, those impacts; (3) require project changes through
13	alternatives or mitigation measures when feasible; and (4) disclose the government's rational for
14	approving a project." (Protecting Our Water & Environmental Resources v. County of
15	Stanislaus ("POWER") (2020) 10 Cal.5th 479, 488.)
16	67. The County's decision to implement the Technical Report constitutes an "activity
17	directly undertaken by any public agency." (Pub. Res. Code, § 21065.)
18	68. Establishing strategies, policies, plans, or pathways with reference to an
19	unrealistic and arbitrary baseline and timeframe one that does not adequately account for the
20	GHG reduction potential and other benefits of rooftop and parking lot solar, and that
21	dramatically overstates the benefits of remote, utility-scale renewable energy projects will not
22	allow for GHG emissions reductions as quickly as possible and to the extent possible; and is the
23	type of activity that "by its general nature" is "capable of causing a direct or reasonably
24	foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment." (Medical Marijuana Patients, 7
25	Cal.5th at 1197).
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69. The County misconstrued CEQA's definition of "project" and failed to apply the
 proper legal standard under CEQA and California law when it determined that implementing the
 Technical Report was not subject to CEQA because it was "administrative in nature and is not a
 project as defined in CEQA Guidelines Section 15378(b)(5)."

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70. In fact, the County's decision to implement the Technical Report cannot be described as an administrative activity "that will not result in direct or indirect physical changes in the environment." (14 Cal. Code. Regs., § 15378, subd. (b)(5).) According to the County itself, the "Implementation Playbook" will "translate the technical findings of the RDF so far into implementable actions for our region to decarbonize." These implementable actions, by definition, will result in direct or indirect physical changes as detailed herein.

11 71. The County's decision to proceed with implementation plans based on the
12 Technical Report committed the County to a definite course of action and precluded
13 consideration of alternatives and mitigation measures.

14 72. Under CEQA, the County "cannot argue" that its decision to proceed with
15 implementation based on the Technical Report "is not a project 'merely because further
16 decisions must be made' before the activities directly causing environmental change will occur."
17 (*Medical Marijuana Patients,* 7 Cal.5th at 1200 (citation omitted).) Environmental review must
18 be "done early enough to serve, realistically, as a meaningful contribution to public decisions."
19 (*Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 116, 134-35.

20 73. The County itself admits that "to avert the worst impacts of climate change, the
21 region needs to take a carbon neutral approach to climate action planning immediately." (Board
22 Letter dated January 27, 2021, p. 3.)

23 74. Scientists agree that if global warming exceeds 1.5°C above preindustrial levels,
24 "some impacts will cause release of additional greenhouse gases," including some that "will be
25 irreversible, even if global warming is reduced."²²

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- 28 22 IPCC, <u>Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report</u>, p. 19.

1	75. In 2020, the average global temperature reached 1.2°C above preindustrial
2	levels. ²³ Without rapid emissions reductions, the 1.5° target will be passed by 2030. ²⁴
3	76. The Technical Report made no attempt to maximize GHG emissions reductions in
4	the region sufficient to contribute its fair share of the emissions reductions required to avoid
5	exceeding the 1.5° target and the associated climate change impacts.
6	77. The Technical Report even failed to reduce GHG emissions in the timeframe
7	required by the County's initial authorization, which was "to achieve zero carbon in the region
8	by 2035." (January 27, 2021 Statement of Proceedings, p. 4 [recommendation #2]; <i>id.</i> at p. 5
9	[taking action as recommended].)
10	78. Instead, while conceding that "aiming to decarbonize sooner may be desirable
11	from the climate standpoint," the County explained that its consultants at GPS believed
12	decarbonization should occur more slowly "to move in concert" with "national, State, and local
13	governments." (Board Letter dated November 17, 2021, p. 4.)
14	79. The County's consultant's belief that decarbonization should move more slowly
15	contradicts the consensus of climate scientists which establishes that reducing GHG emissions to
16	the extent possible as quickly as possible is required to avoid devastating environmental impacts.
17	80. Climate science instructs that the more quickly GHG emissions are reduced in the
18	near term, the more likely that the severity of impacts caused by climate change will be
19	minimized: "It is virtually certain that global surface temperature rise and associated changes can
20	be limited through rapid and substantial reductions in global GHG emissions" and "[c]continued
21	GHG emissions greatly increase the likelihood of potentially irreversible changes in the global
22	climate system." ²⁵
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24	
25	
26	²³ World Meteorological Organization, Press Release Number: 14012021: <u>2020 was one of the three</u>
27	<i>warmest years on record</i> (January 15, 2021). ²⁴ Adam R. Aron, <i>The Climate Crisis – Science, Impacts, Policy, Psychology, Justice, Social Movements</i>
28	(2023), p. 73-74 & Figure 3.3. ²⁵ IPCC, <u>Working Group I Contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report</u> , p. 63.
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VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE

1 81. "The science is unequivocal, the changes are unprecedented, and there is no more 2 time for delay."²⁶ "With each additional increment of warming, these changes will become larger, resulting in long-lasting, irreversible implications, in particular for sea level rise."27 3

4 82. Instead of decarbonizing within the 2030 timeframe necessary to avoid the severe 5 climate change impacts anticipated by climate scientists, or even within the 2035 timeframe the 6 County itself required of GPS, the Technical Report mapped a trajectory toward what it refers to 7 as "an aspirational low-carbon 2050 future for the San Diego region." (See e.g. Technical 8 **Report**, p. 20.)

9 By proceeding with implementation plans based on an inaccurate report that used 83. 10 arbitrary data and failed to assess decarbonization on a timeframe necessary to mitigate or avoid 11 the worst climate change impacts or the 2035 timeframe established by the County, and that 12 failed to properly quantify and acknowledge available rooftop and parking lot solar in the San 13 Diego region (the GHG emissions reduction strategy that for the San Diego region can be most 14 quickly, efficiently, and effectively deployed), the County precluded implementation of 15 alternatives and mitigation measures that can reduce GHG emissions to the greatest extent 16 feasible in the most critical timeframe necessary to avoid the worse climate impacts.

17 84. The cumulatively significant GHG emissions impact of the County's decision to 18 proceed with implementation based on the Technical Report alone constitutes a significant 19 environmental effect. (Pub. Res. Code § 21083, subd. (b)(2); Pub. Res. Code, § 21084, subd. 20 (b); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15064, subd. (h)(1); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15183.5.)

21 85. The County's decision to proceed with implementation based on the Technical 22 Report precludes alternatives and mitigation measures that could lead to adoption of an 23 implementation plan that would minimize pollution and human health impacts in disadvantaged 24 communities by maximizing replacement of polluting fossil fuels with rooftop and parking lot 25 solar in disadvantaged communities.

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- ²⁶ IPCC, Working Group I Contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report, p. v. 28
 - ²⁷ IPCC, Working Group I Contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report, p. v. 19

1	86. As the Legislature has recognized, "[c]ontinuing to reduce greenhouse gas
2	emissions is critical for the protection of all areas of the state, but especially for the state's most
3	disadvantaged communities, as those communities are affected first, and, most frequently, by the
4	adverse impacts of climate change, including an increased frequency of extreme weather events,
5	such as drought, heat, and flooding. The state's most disadvantaged communities also are
6	disproportionately impacted by the deleterious effects of climate change on public health."
7	(Stats. 2016, Ch. 249, § 1, subd. (c).)
8	87. The County's decision to proceed with implementation based on the Technical
9	Report precludes alternatives and mitigation measures that would avoid or minimize significant
10	land use impacts caused by developing large, utility-scale solar in the backcountry and
11	potentially in Imperial County instead of maximizing rooftop and parking lot solar in already
12	developed areas of the County.
13	88. The County was required by law to complete CEQA review before deciding to
14	proceed with development of implementation plans based on the arbitrary Technical Report.
15	(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15004.) By failing to conduct any CEQA review, the County violated
16	CEQA.
17	89. The County violated the fundamental CEQA principle "that before conducting
18	CEQA review, agencies must not 'take any action' that significantly furthers a project 'in a
19	manner that forecloses alternatives or mitigation measures that would ordinarily be part of
20	CEQA review."" (Save Tara, 45 Cal.4th at 138.)
21	SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
22	Violations of Competitive Bidding Mandates Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 1085
23	(Against All Respondents and Real Parties in Interest)90. Paragraphs 1 through 89 are fully incorporated into this paragraph.
24	90. Faragraphs 1 through 89 are fully incorporated into this paragraph.91. The County has a clear, present, and ministerial duty under Policy A-87 to ensure
25	all contracts are competitively bid, unless a specific exemption applies and has been properly
26	documented.
27	uocumentea.
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92. Petitioner is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the contracts with
 GPS violated the public bidding requirements because they were awarded on a single source
 basis without documenting or meeting the requirements for single source contracts; and without
 acknowledging that GPS - through Victor's involvement with the investor-owned-utility
 industry and SDG&E, had a conflict of interest and could not represent the public's interest in
 the simplest and quickest GHG emissions reduction strategies – regional saturation of rooftop
 and parking lot solar with battery systems.

8 93. Petitioner seeks to enforce the public duties established by the County's 9 competitive bidding requirements, which "are for the purposes of inviting competition, to guard 10 against favoritism, improvidence, extravagance, fraud and corruption, and to secure the best 11 work or supplies at the lowest price practicable, and they are enacted for the benefit of property 12 holders and taxpayers, and not for the benefit or enrichment of bidders, and should be so 13 construed and administered as to accomplish such purpose fairly and reasonably with sole 14 reference to the public interests." (Domar Electric, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (1994) 9 15 Cal.4th 161, 173 [quoting 10 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations (3d rev. ed. 1990) § 29.29, p. 16 375].)

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully prays for relief as follows:

19 On the First Cause of Action

20 1. For a peremptory writ of mandate directing that:

(a) The County void its decision to proceed with implementation plans based on the
Technical Report, and any and all subsequent decisions based on the Technical Report;

(b) The County and Real Parties (and any and all persons acting at the request of, in
concert with, or for the benefit of one or more of them) suspend any action authorized by the
ordinances, resolutions, and associated agreement(s) approved by the County that could result in
any change or alteration to the physical environment unless and until the County complies with
CEQA and the Judgment of this Court; and

1	On the Second Cause of Action
2	2. For a peremptory writ of mandate directing that:
3	(a) The County refrain from violating competitive bidding mandates;
4	(b) The County rescind its approval of the contract with GPS and any and all
5	amendments thereto; and
6	(c) The County refrain from relying on the Technical Report without first complying
7	with competitive bidding mandates.
8	On All Causes of Action
9	3. For costs of suit;
10	4. For reasonable attorneys' fees; and
11	5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
12	
13	DATED: February 27, 2023 SHUTE, MIHALY & WEINBERGER LLP
14	
15	L-6 4-2
16	By: WINTER KING
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18	Attorneys for Petitioner The Protect Our Communities Foundation
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1	Verification
2	I, Bill Powers, declare:
3	I am a member of the Board and Board Secretary of Petitioner The Protect Our
4	Communities Foundation. I am authorized by Petitioner to make this verification on its behalf. I
5	have read the foregoing Petition and know the contents thereof, and the facts therein stated are
6	true to my own knowledge, except as to those matters stated on information and belief, and as to
7	those matters, I believe them to be true.
8	I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the
9	foregoing is true and correct.
10	Executed on February 27, 2023 at San Diego, California.
11	By: Bill Powers
12	By: Dry Torberg Bill Powers, Secretary
13	The Protect Our Communities Foundation
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VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE

EXHIBIT A



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February 24, 2023

U.S. Mail

San Diego County Board of Supervisors c/o Clerk of the Board County of San Diego County Administration Center, Room 402 1600 Pacific Highway San Diego, CA 92101

Re: <u>The Protect Our Communities Foundation v. County of San Diego</u>, <u>et al.</u>: Notice pursuant to PRC § 21167.5

Dear Chair Vargas and Members of the Board:

This letter is to notify you that The Protect Our Communities Foundation will file suit against San Diego County for failure to comply with the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Public Resources Code section 21000 et seq., the CEQA Guidelines, California Code of Regulations title 14, section 15000 et seq., and other state and local laws in the administrative process that culminated in the County's decision to proceed with the County's Regional Decarbonization Framework (RDF) by developing an "Implementation Playbook" based on a document entitled San Diego Regional Decarbonization Framework Technical Report (Technical Report). The lawsuit will also challenge the County's decision to contract with a consultant to prepare the Technical Report even though the consultant had a conflict of interest in the substance of that document due to its close ties with the investor-owned-utility industry, and specifically with San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E), in violation of the County's public bidding requirements. This notice is given pursuant to Public Resources Code section 21167.5.

San Diego County Board of Supervisors February 24, 2023 Page 2

Very truly yours,

SHUTE, MIHALY & WEINBERGER LLP

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PROOF OF SERVICE

At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and **not a party to this action**. I am employed in the County of San Francisco, State of California. My business address is 396 Hayes Street, San Francisco, CA 94102.

On February 24, 2023, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as:

NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUE

on the parties in this action as follows:

San Diego County Board of Supervisors c/o Clerk of the Board County of San Diego County Administration Center, Room 402 1600 Pacific Highway San Diego, CA 92101

BY MAIL: I enclosed the document(s) in a sealed envelope or package addressed to the persons at the addresses listed in the Service List and placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger LLP's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that the correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on February 24, 2023, at San Francisco, California.

()en

Jennifer K Miao

EXHIBIT B



396 HAYES STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102 T: (415) 552-7272 F: (415) 552-5816 www.smwlaw.com WINTER KING Attorney King@smwlaw.com

February 27, 2023

Via U.S. Mail

Attorney General Rob Bonta Office of the Attorney General 1300 I Street Sacramento, CA 95814-2919

Re: The Protect Our Communities Foundation v. County of San Diego, et al.

Dear Attorney General Bonta:

Enclosed please find a copy of the Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate ("Petition") in the above case.

This Petition is provided to you in accordance with Public Resources Code section 21167.7 and Code of Civil Procedure section 388. Please acknowledge receipt in the enclosed prepaid, self-addressed envelope. Thank you.

Very truly yours,

SHUTE, MIHALY & WEINBERGER LLP

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Enclosure

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