SUMMONS ON CROSS COMPLAI (CITACION JUDICIAL)

5618910117270 A Received Helix Water District.

FOR COURTUSE ONLY (SOLO PARA USO DE LA CO LA CORTE)

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT: (Aviso a Acusado)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN THE RELATION OF JOHN B. LINDEN, HELIX WATER DISTRICT, SALLY MCPHERSON, sued solely in her capacity as the San Diego County Registrar of Voters, and DOES 1 through 50

REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST: HAROLD BALL, H. WARREN BUCKNER, BARBARA BARBER, JIM LEWANSKI

YOU ARE BEING SUED BY PLAINTIFF: (A Ud. le está demandando)

JOEL SCALZITTI

You have 30 CALENDAR DAYS after this summons is served on you to file a typewritten response at this court.

A letter or phone call will not protect you; your typewritten response must be in proper legal form if you want the court to hear your case.

If you do not file your response on time, you may lose the case, and your wages, money and property may be taken without further warning from the court.

There are other legal requirements. You may want to call an attorney right away. If you do not know an attorney, you may call an attorney referral service or a legal aid office (listed in the phone book).

Después de que le entreguen esta citación judicial usted tiene un plazo de 30 DIAS CALENDARIOS para presentar una respuesta escrita a máquina en esta corte.

Una carta o una llamada telefónica no le ofrecerá protección; su respuesta escrita a máquina tiene que cumplir con las formalidades legales apropiadas si usted quiere que la corte escuche su caso.

Si usted no presenta su respuesta a tiempo, puede perder el caso, y le pueden quitar su salario, su dinero y otras cosasde su propiedad sin aviso adicional por parte de la

Existen otros requisitos legales. Puede que usted quiera llamar a un abogado inmediatamente. Si no conoce a un abogado, puede llamar a un servicio de referencia de abogados o a una oficina de ayuda legal (vea el directorio telefónico).

CASE NUMBER: (Número del Caso)

GIE 012239

The name and address of the court is: (El nombre y dirección de la corte es) Robert P. Ottilie 550 West "C" St., Suite 1600 San Diego, CA 92101

619-231-4841

SBN 95845

The name, address, and telephone number of plaintiff's attorney, or plaintiff without an attorney, is: (El nombre, la dirección y el número de teléfono del abogado del demandante, o del demandante que no tiene abogado, es)

DATE: (Fecha)	: :	Clerk, by	R. Sarbor, Deputy	, Deputy
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Form Adopted by Rule 982 Judicial Council of California 982(a)(9) [Rev. January 1, 1984] (See reverse for Proof of Service) SUMMONS

WEST GROUP Official Publisher:

CCP 412,20

PROOF OF SERVICE — SUMMONS (Use separate proof of service for each person

	service for each person served)
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completed and blank Case Questionnaires	amenaca complaint
b. on defendant (name):	Other (specify):
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4 OUDSTITITED SERVICE OF SERVICE	
informed of the general nature of the papers, and the person served at the place.	r, conservatee, or candidate. By leaving copies at the dwelling siness of the person served in the presence of a competent member of the office or place of business, at least 18 years of age, who was thereafter mailing (by first-class mail, postage prepaid) copies to the left. (CCP 415.20(b)) (Attach separate declaration or affidavit illigence in first attempting personal service)
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3. The "Notice to the Person Served" (on the surrous)	
The "Notice to the Person Served" (on the summons) was cor a as an individual defendant.	npleted as follows (CCP 412.30, 415.10, and 474):
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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the	(For California sheriff, marshal, or constable use only)
Stateof California that the foregoing is true and correct.	I certify that the foregoing is true and correct.
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WEST GROUP Official Publisher

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ATTORNEY FOR (Name): Joel Scalzi	++4	
INSERT NAME OF COURT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT, AND B	BANCH COURT IS ANY	CLERK-SUSTANUK COURT
INSERT NAME OF COURT, JUDICIAL DISTRICT, AND B SUPERIOR COURT OF CA	LIFORNIA, COUNTY OF	SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CA
SAN DIEGO, EAST COUN	TY DIVISION	2 001,1 13 CM
CASE NAME:		
SCALZITTI V. PEOPLE	, et al.	
CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET	Complex Case Designation	CASE NUMBER: CTF: 012239
CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET	XX Counter Joinder	CASE NUMBER: GIE 012239
Limited Unlimited	Filed with first appearance by defendan	ASSIGNED JUDGE: TT L.L.
	(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1811)	Howatt
	Please complete all five (5) items below	V
1. Check one box below for the case type	e that best describes this case:	
Auto Tort	Other employment (15)	Writ of mandate (02)
Auto (22)	Contract	Other judicial review (39)
Other PI/PD/WD (Personal Injury/Proper Damage/Wrongful Death) Tort		Provisionally Complex Civil Litigation
Asbestos (04)	Collections (e.g., money owed, open book accounts) (09)	(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 1800-1812)
Product liability (24)		Antitrust/Trade regulation (03)
Medical maipractice (45)	Insurance coverage (18)	Construction defect (10)
Other PI/PD/WD (23)	Other contract (37)	Claims involving mass tort (40)
Non-PI/PD/WD (Other) Tort	Real Property Eminent domain/Inverse	Securities litigation (28)
Business tort/unfair business practice		Toxic tort/Environmental (30)
Civil rights (e.g., discrimination,	Wrongful eviction (33)	Insurance coverage claims arising from the above listed provisionally complex case
false arrest) (08)	Other real property (e.g., quiet	types (41) Enforcement of Judgment
Defamation (e.g., slander, libel) (13)	title) (26)	
Fraud (16)	Unlawful Detainer	Enforcement of judgment (e.g., sister state, foreign, out-of-county abstracts) (20)
Intellectual property (19)	Commercial (31)	Miscellaneous Civil Complaint
Professional negligence (e.g., legal	Residential (32)	RICO (27)
malpractice) (25)	Drugs (38)	Other complaint (not specified above) (42)
Other non-PI/PD/WD tort (35)	Judicial Review	Misceilaneous Civil Petition
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Wrongful termination (36)	Petition re: arbitration award (11)	Other petition (not specified above) (42)
 This case is is is not confirmed in a second in the second	omplex under rule 1800 of the California Rule ent:	s of Court. If case is complex, mark the factors
a. Large number of separately re	presented parties d. Large number of	of witnesses
b. Extensive motion practice raisi	ng difficult or novel e	nd related actions pending in one or more courts
issues that will be time-consum	ring to resolve in other countie	s, states or countries, or in a federal court
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a monetary b. xx nonmone	tary; declaratory or injunctive relief c.] punitive
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Date: June 7, 2002	////>	
Robert P. Ottilie	\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(/UU)
(Comme)	NOTICE (SIGN	ATORE OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY FOR PARTY)
Plaintiff must file this cover sheet with the	NOTICE e first paper filed in the action or proceeding	(except amail plaims see
under the Probate, Family, or Welfare an	id Institutions Code). (Cal. Rules of Court, rul	e 982.2.)
• File this cover sheet in addition to any co	ver sheet required by local court rule.]
• If this case is complex under rule 1800 e	t seq. of the California Rules of Court, you mi	ust serve a conv of this cover shoot an all
other parties to the action or proceeding.		
 Unless this is a complex case, this cover 	sheet shall be used for statistical purposes of	only.

	Facsimile: 858/496-3980 Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner JOEL SCALZITTI	CLERT TO THE WOLL OF SAME DIESES TO CONTROL CA
10	SIDEDIOD	COLUMN
11		COURT OF CALIFORNIA IEGO-EAST COUNTY DIVISION
12	SOCIAL OF BAILD	IEGO-EAST COUNTY DIVISION
13	JOEL SCALZITTI,) CASE NO. GIE 012239
14	Plaintiff/Petitioner	VERIFIED CROSS-COMPLAINT FOR:
15	v.) 1. DECLARATORY RELIEF
16	PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN THE RELATION OF) 2. MANDAMUS
17	JOHN B. LINDEN, HELIX WATER DISTRICT, SALLY MCPHERSON) 3. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
18	sued solely in her capacity as the San Diego County Registrar of Voters, and) Judge: William J. Howatt) Dept: 17
19 20	DOES 1 through 50,) Trial date: May 24, 2002
21	Defendants/Respondents)
22	REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST:))
23	HAROLD BALL;	
24	H. WARREN BUCKNER;) BARBARA BARBER;)	
25	JIM LEWANSKI)	
26		
27		
28	Cros	1 5s-Complaint
		practite

COMMON ALLEGATIONS

- 1. Plaintiff/Petitioner, JOEL SCALZITTI (hereinafter referred to as "Petitioner" or "Scalzitti"), is a resident of San Diego County, currently residing at 1063-1/2 Sumner Avenue, El Cajon, California 92021, a residence located within Division 1 of the Helix Water District. Petitioner is the elected Director of Division 1 of the Helix Water District, having been elected to that position in the election conducted by the Helix Water District in November 2000.
- 2. Respondent People of the State of California in the Relation of John B. Linden, have filed a lawsuit against Joel Scalzitti, petitioner herein, in the San Diego Superior Court Case No. GIE 012239. Mr. Linden was the unsuccessful candidate for the position of Director in Division 1 of the Helix Water Board and he has petitioned the People of the State of California for permission to sue Mr. Scalzitti on the argument that non-landowners should not be allowed to participate in the decisions of the Helix Water District. He is an important party to this action because he is the one who has attempted to restrict the participation of non-landowners from the decision making process of the Helix Water District, and the People of the State of California, on their relation to Mr. Linden, at least at this time, are supporting him in that regard.
- 3. Respondent Helix Water District claims it is an irrigation district, but does not refer to itself as an irrigation district, instead referring to itself as a water district. It is a public entity doing business at 7811 University Avenue, La Mesa, California. The Helix Water District, directly and through its agent, San Diego Registrar of Voters, conducted an election in November of 2000 to fill three seats on the Helix Water Board, Divisions 1, 3 and 5, now held by Directors Scalzitti, Buckner and Barber, respectively.
- 4. Defendant and Respondent Sally McPherson, sued solely in her capacity as the San Diego Registrar of Voters, is the Registrar of San Diego County, and conducted majority of the elections in which voters elected the Directors to the Helix Water Board for Divisions 1, 3 and 5.

- 5. Petitioner is informed and believes and thereon alleges, that McPherson conducted the election as the agent of the Helix Water District which, by law, is assigned the responsibility of conducting the election.
- 6. Defendants and Respondents identified as real parties in interest, Harold Ball, H. Warren Buckner, Barbara Barber and Jim Lewanski, are all Directors of the Helix Water District, along with Petitioner, and are named as real parties to this cross-complaint because of the possibility that the elections in which they were elected to the Board of Directors of the Helix Water District may be determined to be illegal and void and their seat vacated as a result.
- 7. Petitioner is ignorant of the true names and capacities of respondents/defendants sued herein as Does 1 through 50, inclusive, and therefore sues these respondents/defendants by such fictitious names. Petitioner will amend this complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained. Petitioner is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of said fictitiously named respondents/defendants are responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged, and that the injuries herein alleged were proximately caused by their acts or omissions.
- 8. All of the respondents/defendants were the agents of each other at all times set forth herein, and were acting within the course and scope of their agency at all times described herein.
- 9. At many of the times herein mentioned, the Helix Water District has contended that it is an irrigation district formed and operating under Water Code §20500, et seq., in the County of San Diego, although it has dropped "irrigation" from its name, does little irrigation, and simply holds itself out as the "Helix Water District."
- 10. The Helix Water District operates through a board of directors with five separate directors, each representing a different division, Divisions 1 through 5.
- 11. Positions of Director are filled by elections conducted by the District. Elections are every two years. Three directors are elected in one election cycle and two directors are elected two years later in the next election cycle. Terms are for four years.

- 12. By law, this District is required to conduct its own elections. It may retain the services of the local Registrar of Voters to assist it in conducting the election and this District has done so by retaining the services of the San Diego County Registrar of Voters, Sally McPherson, to perform part of the District's responsibilities.
- 13. Prior to August 10, 2000, petitioner went to the offices of the Helix Water District. He said he wanted to run for the position of Director of the Helix Water Board. Petitioner was asked his address. The employee of the Helix Water District handling his request left him briefly and then returned to say that he could run for the office.
- 14. On or about August 10, 2000 petitioner submitted a Declaration of Candidacy for the position of Director of the District. He filled out every blank on the form and answered every question truthfully. He signed the form under penalty of perjury.
- 15. Acting through its agent, the San Diego County Registrar of Voters, petitioner was informed on or about August 18, 2000 of the following:

"You have qualified and your name will appear on the ballot."

- 16. Petitioner campaigned for office and spent a considerable amount of money in this pursuit. He did so on the representations of the Helix Water District that he was qualified to run based on the information that they had sought and received from him.
- 17. At no time did the Helix Water District advise the petitioner that he had to be a "freeholder" or "landowner" to run for office, although he did own property within the division which he sought to represent on the Helix Water Board.
- 18. At no time did the Helix Water Board or anyone for that matter, communicate to voters that they needed to be a "freeholder" or "landowner" to vote in the election for the Helix Water District.
- 19. Petitioner is informed and believes and thereon alleges, at no time did the Helix Water Board prepare a list of "freeholders" or "landowners" within the boundaries of the Helix Water

District who were qualified to run for office or vote in the election for Directors of the Helix Water Board.

- 20. Helix Water District conducted the election for the Helix Water Board in November of 2000. It was held on the same day as the general election at which time voters elected the President of the United States, the Governor of the State of California and individuals to a multitude of other offices in a multitude of other jurisdictions. The election for positions of Director of the Helix Water Board were not conducted in a separate election, in a separate place, on a separate ballot or with any limitations on who could vote. The election itself was in the same ballot that was given to everybody who was voting for president or any of those other positions that were on the general election ballot in November of 2000. A similar election was held in November 1998 to fill the positions of Directors in Divisions 2 and 4.
- 21. Mr. Linden, in the underlying complaint, has taken the position that the Helix Water District is, in fact, an irrigation district and not a water district. If this is accurate, it would impose upon the Helix Water District certain obligations imposed upon irrigation districts under the law.
- 22. Mr. Linden, in the underlying complaint, has contended that the Helix Water District is a "landowner" district, meaning that only landowners can run for positions on the Board of Directors of the Helix Water Board, and that only landowners can vote in said election.
- 23. If Mr. Linden is correct, and this is a "landowner" district, petitioner has asserted in the underlying complaint, and asserts herein, that such limitations would be unconstitutional and that it would deny equal protection of the law under the circumstances of this case, to individuals who would want to run for positions on the Board of Directors of the Helix Water District, and for people who want to vote in this district. Nevertheless, if the Mr. Linden is right that this is a "landowner" district and petitioner is wrong in his assertion that in such a case there would be a violation of the Constitution of the United States and of the State of California, then, and under those circumstances, petitioner is informed and believes and thereon alleges, that all five positions on the Board of Directors of the Helix Water District have been filled with illegal elections.

24. The Helix Water District has not made any effort to determine whether candidates for office are landowners. The Helix Water District has not prevented non-landowners from voting in elections for positions on the Board of Directors of the Helix Water District. The Helix Water District has not conducted separate elections for this position, as would be required by law. Petitioner is informed and believes and thereon alleges, that the Helix Water District has not published a list of landowners, nor has it communicated to anyone that non-landowners cannot vote or run for office.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (Declaratory Relief as against all Defendants)

- 25. Petitioner incorporates herein paragraphs 1 through 24 of the Common Allegations as though set forth fully herein.
- 26. An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between petitioner on the one hand, and respondents and the real parties in interest, concerning their respective rights and duties, and the legality of the elections in which real parties in interest were elected to the positions of Director of the Helix Water District. Mr. Linden contends, on the one hand, that this is a "landowner" district and that it is an "irrigation" district and that candidates for office must be landowners and voters for office must be landowners. If so, then the election for this district would have to be held at a date different than the general election and the district would have to distribute a list of all qualified landowners, conduct the election consistent with the obligations and requirements of a landowner election, and preclude individuals who were not landowners from voting or running for office. On the other hand, the Helix Water District and the San Diego County Registrar of Voters, have not conducted elections for the positions of Director of the Helix Water District as though it were an irrigation district or a "landowner" district.
- 27. Mr. Linden seeks to vacate the office of Director for Division 1 of the Helix Water District, contending that petitioner is illegally holding that office. Yet, Mr. Linden does not seek to

vacate any other offices, or have this court declare the process by which elections have been conducted by the Helix Water District illegal. He has singled out petitioner.

- 28. Petitioner desires a judicial determination as to whether or not the Helix Water District is an irrigation district, whether or not it is a "landowner" district and on what terms it conducts its elections. If Mr. Linden is correct, then petitioner is informed and believes that all of the elections for all of the director positions at the Helix Water District have been conducted illegally and the court should so declare.
- 29. Judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time under the circumstances in order that petitioner may ascertain his rights and protect the rights of all the residents of the Helix Water District, which exceed 200,000 people. Without a judicial determination on these issues, petitioner's rights and the rights of all voters and all those affected by the actions of the Helix Water District, will be detrimentally impacted.
- 30. There are no administrative remedies to correct the deficiency and the rulings of this court are necessary to protect the residents of this district.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (Peremptory Writ of Mandate as against all Respondents)

- 31. Petitioner incorporates herein paragraphs 1 through 24 of the Common Allegations as though set forth fully herein.
- 32. If, based on the declaration of rights, this court determines that the elections for Director of the Helix Water District have been conducted illegally, and in violation of state election laws and state water laws, then this court should issue a peremptory writ of mandate from this court compelling the following:

Cross-Complaint

1	5.	For attorneys' fees as may be permitted in the Water Code, Elections Code or
2		California Code of Civil Procedure §1017.5;
3	6.	For such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper.
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6	Dated: 6	
7		ROBERT P. OTTILIE Attorney for Plaintiff/Petitioner
8		JOEL SCALZITTI
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Cross-Complaint

VERIFICATION

I, JOEL SCALZITTI, am the Petitioner/Plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I have read the foregoing Cross Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Mandamus and Injunctive Relief and know the contents thereof. The same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which are therein stated on information and belief and, as to those matters, I believe it to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 7th day of June, 2002 at San Diego, California.

OEL SCALZITTI

PROOF OF SERVICE

2 People of the State of California on the Relation of John B. Linden v. Scalzitti San Diego Superior Court Case No. GIE 012239 3 4 I am, and was at the time of service of the papers herein referred to, over the age of eighteen lyears and not a party to this action; I am employed in the County of San Diego, CA, in which county the within-mentioned mailing occurred. My business address is 550 West "C" Street, Suite 1600, San Diego, California 92101. On June 7, 2002 I served the foregoing document described as 6 7 Verified Cross-Complaint for declaratory relief, mandamus, and injunctive relief on interested parties in this action by placing $\underline{}$ the original; $\underline{\underline{X}}$ a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows: 10 Kenneth S. Klein 11 Gregory V. Moser John C. Lemmo Foley & Lardner 402 W. Broadway, 23rd Floor 13 San Diego, CA 92101 619-234-6655 619-234-3510 (fax) 15 16 BY MAIL: By placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as above, with postage thereon fully prepaid in the United States mail, at San Diego, California. I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of 17 collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. Postal service on the same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at San Diego, California, in the ordinary course of 18 business. 19 BY FAX: I transmitted a copy of the foregoing document(s) this date via facsimile to the fax numbers shown herein pursuant to Rule 2003(3) 20 BY PERSONAL SERVICE/KNOX ATTORNEY SERVICE Delivered during business hours to 21 receptionist 22 Executed on June 7, 2002 at San Diego, California. 23 24 25

26 27

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(Proof of service on reverse)

PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER:	People	CASE NUMBER: GIE 0122398
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT:	Scalzitti	,

PROOF OF SERVICE OF CIVIL SUBPOENA

110 West "C" St., #1013 San Diego, CA 92101		
Peter DeLuke, Jr.		•
 f. Registered professional photocopier. g. Exempt from registration under Business and Profession h. Name, address, telephone number, and, if applicable, county 		
 d Employee or independent contractor of a registered Ca exxxx Exempt from registration under Business and Profession f Registered professional photocopier. 		
 b California sheriff or marshal. c Registered California process server. 		
. Person serving: a. Not a registered California process server.		
. I received this subpoena for service on (date): June 17,	2002	
f. Fee for service:		
(2) were not demanded or paid.		
(1) were offered or demanded and paid. Amount: \$		
e. Witness fees (check one):		
c. Date of delivery: d. Time of delivery:		
a Data of dalirons		P
b. Address where served:		
a. Person served (name):		

1	JAMES B. GILPIN, Bar No. 151466 MELISSA W. WOO, Bar No. 192056	
2	LAW OFFICES OF	
3	BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP 402 WEST BROADWAY, 13 TH FLOOR	
4	SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101-3542 TELEPHONE: (619) 525-1300	
5	TELECOPER: (619) 233-6118	
	Attorneys for Cross-Defendant	20 D I
6	HELIX WATER DISTRICT, and REAL PARTIE INTEREST HAROLD BALL, H. WARREN	SS IN
7	BUCKNER, BARBARA BARBER and JIM LEWANSKI	
8		
9	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE	E STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10	COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO -	EAST COUNTY DIVISION
11	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF	G N- CIE 012220
12	CALIFORNIA ON THE RELATION OF JOHN B. LINDEN,	Case No. GIE 012239
13	Plaintiff,	Judge: William J. Howatt Dept. 17
14	v.	PROOF OF SERVICE
15	JOEL SCALZITTI,	
16	Defendant.	
17	JOEL SCALZITTI,	
18	Cross-Complainant,	·
19	v.	
20	PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF	Trial Date: June 24, 2002
21	CALIFORNIA IN THE RELATION OF JOHN B. LINDEN, HELIX WATER	
22	DISTRICT, SALLY McPHERSON, sued solely in her capacity as the San Diego	
23	County Registrar of Voters, and DOES 1 through 50,,	
24	Cross-Defendants.	
25	REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST:	
26	HAROLD BALL;	
27	H. WARREN BUCKNER; BARBARA BARBER;	
28	JIM LEWANSKI	

LAW OFFICES OF BEST & KRIEGER LLP 402 WEST BROADWAY, 13TH FLOOR SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101-3542

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PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Lori L. Ford, declare:

I am a resident of the State of California and over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action; my business address is Best & Krieger LLP, 402 West Broadway, 13th Floor, San Diego, California 92101-3542. On October 30, 2002, I served the within documents:

EX PARTE APPLICATION BY CROSS-DEFENDANT HELIX WATER DISTRICT FOR RESTRAINING ORDER;

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION BY CROSS-DEFENDANT HELIX WATER DISTRICT FOR RESTRAINING ORDER;

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION BY CROSS-DEFENDANT HELIX WATER DISTRICT FOR RESTRAINING ORDER;

DECLARATION OF JULIE CRAVEN IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION BY CROSS-DEFENDANT HELIX WATER DISTRICT FOR RESTRAINING ORDER;

DECLARATION OF LORI L. FORD OF TELEPHONIC NOTICE OF EX PARTE HEARING;

[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING EX PARTE APPLICATION BY CROSS-DEFENDANT HELIX WATER DISTRICT FOR RESTRAINING ORDER.

- by transmitting via facsimile the document(s) listed above to the fax number(s) set forth below on this date before 5:00 p.m.
- by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at San Diego, California addressed as set forth below.
- by causing personal delivery by of the document(s) listed above to the person(s) at the address(es) set forth below.
- by personally delivering the document(s) listed above to the person(s) at the address(es) set forth below.
- I caused such envelope to be delivered via overnight delivery addressed as indicated on the attached service list. Such envelope was deposited for delivery by {Overnight Delivery Name Inserted Here} following the firm's ordinary business practices.

Robert Ottilie 550 West "C" Street, Suite 1600 San Diego, CA 92101 Fax: 619-231-3293 Kenneth Klein Foley & Lardner 402 W. Broadway, 23rd Floor San Diego, CA 92101 Fax: 619-234-3510

-1-

Timothy M. Barry Office of the County Counsel 1600 Pacific Highway, Room 355 San Diego, CA 92101 Fax: (619) 531-6005

I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on October 30, 2002, at San Diego, California.

LORI L. FORD

RECEIVED

FEB 2 4 2003

1			LER S 4 YOUR
2	550 West "C" Street, Suite 1600 San Diego, CA 92101		BEST, BEST & KRIEGER
	Telephone: 619/231-4841		
3	Facsimile: 619/231-3293		
4	11		·
5	BOB GLASER (Bar No. 102976) The La Jolla Group		
6	8304 Clairemont Mesa Blvd., Suite 213 San Diego, CA 92111		,
7	Telephone: 858/496-8896 Facsimile: 858/496-3980		
8	Attorneys for Defendant		
9	JOEL SCALZITTI		
10	SUPERIOR CO	URT OF CAL	FORNIA
11	COUNTY OF SAN DIE	GO-EAST CO	UNTY DIVISION
12	PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF	OASTNO	CITE 0100000
13	CALIFORNIA ON THE RELATION OF) JOHN B. LINDEN,	CASE NO.	GIE 0122398
14) Plaintiffs,	NEATHERN AS	Fi A Things (W
15	V	NOTICE O	FAPPEAL
16	JOEL SCALZITTI,		
17	Defendant.		
18	TOTAL DOLLY CRACK		
19	JOEL SCALZITTI,) Cross-Complainant,)	Judge; Dept:	William J. Howatt
20	v.	Trial date:	June 24, 2002
21	PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF) CALIFORNIA IN THE RELATION OF)		
22	JOHN B. LINDEN, HELIX WATER) DISTRICT, SALLY McPHERSON, sued)		
23	solely in her capacity as the San Diego		
24	County Registrar of Voters, and DOES 1) through 50,		
25	Cross-Defendants.		
26			
27		1	
28	NOTIC	E OF APPEAL	

1	REAL PARTIES INTEREST:
2	HAROLD BALL;) H.WARREN BUCKNER;)
. 3	
4	- N
5	TO: THE CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
6	FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO AND ALL PARTIES HERETO:
7	
8	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that defendant JOEL SCALZITTI hereby appeals from the
9	decision/judgment entered on or about January 8, 2003 in favor of Plaintiff PEOPLE OF THE
10	STATE OF CALIFORNIA ON THE RELATION OF JOHN B. LINDEN, the related order entered
11	on or about January 8, 2003 denying the motions to tax costs and the court's decision on the award
12	of attorney's fees. The basis for this appeal includes, but will not be limited to, the following specific
13	rulings and actions of the trial court:
14	
15	1. Appeal from the court's decision awarding costs in the sum of \$1,964.47 for the cost
16	of trial transcripts. The trial transcripts were both an unnecessary expense, and an expense not
17	incurred by Plaintiff;
18	2. Appeal from the court's decision on the motion to award attorney's fees in the sum
19	of \$75,000.00 for the following reasons:
20	a. There is insufficient evidence that the work was performed; if the work was
21	performed, it was an unreasonable amount of time to be expended in support
22	of this litigation;
23	b. A public entity was the plaintiff in this case; public entities cannot recover
24	attorney's fees under CCP §1021.5;
25	c. CCP §809 does not contemplate the award of attorney's fees in a quo
26	warranto action;
27	2
28	NOTICE OF APPEAL

NOTICE OF APPEAL

1	d. To the extent that the trial judge has determined that the plaintiff, State of
2	California, is not a public entity, which is inherent in his ruling, then the cost
3	of pursuing this litigation was not such that it substantially exceeded the
4	personal interest of the plaintiff;
5	e. No public benefit has been served.
6	Dated: February 21, 2003
7	1
8	ROBERTA OTTILIE, ESQ. Attorney for Defendant Joel Scalzitti
9	
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PROOF OF SERVICE

People of the State of California on the Relation of John B. Linden v. Scalzitti, etc. San Diego Superior Court Case No. GIE 012239

I am, and was at the time of service of the papers herein referred to, over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action; I am employed in the County of San Diego, CA, in which county the within-mentioned mailing occurred. My business address is 550 West "C" Street, Suite 1600, San Diego, California 92101. On February 21, 2003 I served the foregoing document(s) described as follows:

Notice of Appeal

б

on interested parties in this action by placing ___ the original; X_ a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows:

SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

- X BY MAIL: By placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as above, with postage thereon fully prepaid in the United States mail, at San Diego, California. I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. Postal service on the same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at San Diego, California, in the ordinary course of business.
 - BY FAX: I transmitted a copy of the foregoing document(s) this date via facsimile to the fax numbers shown herein pursuant to Rule 2003(3)
 - BY PERSONAL SERVICE/KNOX ATTORNEY SERVICE Delivered during normal business hours to receptionist

Executed on February 21, 2003 at San Diego, Califorylia.

Vivian Krotzer

People of the State of California on the Relation of John B. Linden v. Scalzitti 1 San Diego Superior Court Case No. GIE 012239 2. 3 SERVICE LIST 4 5 Plfs/Cross-Defts, People, John B, Linden, etc. Kenneth S. Klein 6 Gregory V. Moser 7 John C. Lemmo Foley & Lardner 8 402 W. Broadway, 23rd Floor San Diego, CA 92101 9 619-234-6655 10 619-234-3510 (fax) 11 Cross-Defts, Helix Water District & Real Parties in Interest, Harold Ball; H.Warren 12 Buckner, Barbar Barber & Jim Lewanski James B. Gilpin 13 Melissa W. Woo 14 Best, Best & Krieger 402 West Broadway, 13th Floor 15 San Diego, CA 92101 619/525-1300 16 619/233-6118 (fax) 17 San Diego Superior Court Clerk 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

1 JAMES B. GILPIN, Bar No. 151466 MELISSA W. WOO, Bar No. 192056 2 LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP 3 402 WEST BROADWAY, 13TH FLOOR SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101-3542 4 TELEPHONE: (619) 525-1300 TELECOPIER: (619) 233-6118 5 Attorneys for Cross-Defendant HELIX WATER DISTRICT, and REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST HAROLD BALL, H. WARREN BUCKNER, BARBARA BARBER and JIM LEWANSKI 8 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - EAST COUNTY DIVISION 11 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ON THE RELATION OF Case No. GIE 012239 12 JOHN B. LINDEN, Judge: William J. Howatt 13 Plaintiff, Dept. 17 14 STIPULATION FOR SEVERANCE OF ٧. CROSS-COMPLAINT AND ORDER 15 JOEL SCALZITTI. THEREON 16 Defendant. 17 JOEL SCALZITTI, 18 Cross-Complainant, 19 V. 20 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF Trial Date: June 24, 2002 CALIFORNIA IN THE RELATION OF 21 JOHN B. LINDEN, HELIX WATER DISTRICT, SALLY McPHERSON, sued 22 solely in her capacity as the San Diego County Registrar of Voters, and DOES 1 23 through 50, 24 Cross-Defendants. 25 REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST: 26 HAROLD BALL: H. WARREN BUCKNER: 27 BARBARA BARBER; JIM LEWANSKI 28

SDLIT/MWW/265005

1	It is hereby stipulated by and between Defendant/Cross-Complainant Joel Scalzitti and Cross-		
2	Defendants/Respondents People of the State of California in the Relation of John B. Linden, Helix		
3	Water District, Sally McPherson, and Real Parties in Interest Harold Ball, H. Warren Buckner,		
4	Barbara Barber and Jim Lewanski, by and through their attorneys of record as follows:		
5	1. The parties agree that the Cross-Complaint filed on or about June 10, 2002 in San		
6	Diego County Superior Court Case No. GIE 012239 shall be severed from the Action.		
7	DATED: June 17, 2002 BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP		
8	By:		
9	JAMES B. GILPIN MELISSA W. WOO		
10	Attorneys for Cross-Defendant HELIX WATER DISTRICT and Real		
11	Parties in Interest HAROLD BALL, H. WARREN BUCKNER, BARBARA		
12	BARBER and JIM LEWANSKI		
13	DATED: June, 2002 ROBERT P. OTTILIE, ESQ.		
14	Ву:		
15	ROBERT P. OTTILLE Attorneys for Cross-Complainant		
16	JOEL SCALZITTI		
17	DATED: June, 2002 FOLEY & LARDNER		
18	Ву:		
19	KENNETH S. KLEIN GREGORY V. MOSER		
20	JOHN C. LEMMO Attorneys for Cross-Defendant People of the		
21	State of California in Relation of JOHN B. LINDEN		
22	DATED: June, 2002 OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COUNSEL		
23			
24	By: JOHN J. SANSONE		
25	Attorneys for Cross-Defendant SALLY McPHERSON		
26	IT IS SO ORDERED.		
27	Y W. Wild. and give a proper special property in the second property of the second property in the second property		
28	JUDGE WILLIAM J. HOWATT		

STIPULATION FOR SEVERANCE OF CROSS-COMPLAINT AND ORDER THEREON

	982(a)(15.1)
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, state bar number, and address):	FOR COURT USE ONLY
John C. Lemmo, Bar No. 190885 Foley & Lardner	İ
402 W. Broadway, 23rd Floor	
San Diego, CA 92101-3542	
TELEPHONE NO.: 619-234-6655 FAX NO.: 619-234-3510	
ATTORNEY FOR (Name):	_ '
NAMEOF COURT: Superior Court of the State of California	
STREET ADDRESS: County of San Diego	
MAILING ADDRESS: 250 East Main Street	
CITY AND ZIP CODE: El Cajon, CA 92020	
BRANCH NAME: East Division .	1
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: The People of the State of	
California on the Relation of John B. Linden	
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Joel Scalzitti	
CIVIL SUBPOENA (DUCES TECUM) for Personal Appearance	CASE NUMBER:
and Production of Documents and Things at Trial or Hearing	GIE 012239
AND DECLARATION	
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, TO (name, address, and telephone nu	mber of witness, if known):
Sarah Arnold c/o Melissa Woo, Esq.	_
402 W. Broadway, Suite 1300, San Diego, California 9210)1
1. YOU ARE ORDERED TO APPEAR AS A WITNESS in this action at the date, time, a	and place shown in the box below
UNLESS your appearance is excused as indicated in box 3b below or you make a item 4 below.	n agreement with the person named in
	Div. Boom!
a. Date: July 30, 2002 Time: 9:00 A.M. X Dept: 17 b. Address: 250 East Main Street, El Cajon, California 92	Div.: Room:
b. Address. 230 East Main Street, Er Cajon, Carriornia 32	V 4. V
UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 1985.3 OR 1985.6 AND A MOTION BEEN SERVED ON YOU, A COURT ORDER OR AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES, WE EMPLOYEE AFFECTED MUST BE OBTAINED BEFORE YOU ARE REQUIRED TO PRECORDS. 3. YOU ARE (item a or b must be checked): a. X. Ordered to appear in person and to produce the records described in the decked.	ITNESSES, <i>AND</i> CONSUMER OR RODUCE CONSUMER OR EMPLOYEE
a. X Ordered to appear in person and to produce the records described in the declaration on page two or the attached declaration or affidavit. The personal attendance of the custodian or other qualified witness and the production of the original records are required by this subpoena. The procedure authorized by Evidence Code sections 1560(b), 1561, and 1562 will not be deemed sufficient compliance with this subpoena.	
 b. Not required to appear in person if you produce (i) the records described in the declaration on page two or the attached declaration or affidavit and (ii) a completed declaration of custodian of records in compliance with Evidence Code section 1560, 1561, 1562, and 1271. (1) Place a copy of the records in an envelope (or other wrapper). Enclose the original declaration of the custodian with the records. Seal the envelope. (2) Attach a copy of this subpoena to the envelope or write on the envelope the case name and number; your name; and the date, time, and place from item 1 in the box above (3) Place this first envelope in an outer envelope, seal it, and mail it to the clerk of the court at the address in item 1. (4) Mail a copy of your declaration to the attorney or party listed at the top of this form. 4. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE TIME OR DATE YOU ARE TO APPEAR, OR IF YOU WANT TO BE CERTAIN THAT YOUR PRESENCE IS REQUIRED, CONTACT THE FOLLOWING PERSON BEFORE THE DATE ON WHICH YOU ARE 	
TO APPEAR: a. Name of subpoenaing party or attorney: John C. Lemmo b. Telepi	none number: (619) 234-6655
Witness Fees: You are entitled to witness fees and mileage actually traveled both way at the time of service. You may request them before your scheduled appearance from the	ne person named in item 4.
DISOBEDIENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA MAY BE PUNISHED AS CONTEMPT BY THIS COURT. YOU WILL ALSO BE LIABLE FOR THE SUM OF FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS AND ALL DAMAGES RESULTING FIOM YOUR FAILURE TO OBEY.	
Date issued: July 3, 2002	4, -
- Alan	Ne
John C. Lemmo	TURE OF PERSON ISSUING SUBPOENA)
	eople of the State of California
(Declaration in support of subpoena on reverse)	(TITLE) Page one of three
i Jeciaration in Support of Suppoena on (eVerse)	, afterna or miles

PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: The People of the State of	CASE NUMBER:
California on the Relation of John B. Linden	GIE 012239
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Joel Scalzitti	
Out all of the second s	the same of the first and a small
The production of the documents or the other things sought by the subpoena on page one	e is supported by (cneck one):
the attached affidavit or declaration X the following declaration:	
DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF CIVIL SUBPOENA (DUCES T	ECUM) FOR PERSONAL
APPEARANCE AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND THING	S AT TRIAL OR HEARING
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1985, 1987.5)	
1. I, the undersigned, declare I am the plaintiff defendant petition	ner
X attorney for (specify): People of the other (specify):	
State of California in the above-entitled action.	
2. The witness has possession or control of the following documents or other things and	shall produce them at the time and place
 The witness has possession or control of the following documents of out the first specified in the Civil Subpoena for Personal Appearance and Production of Documents 	ts and Things at Trial or Hearing on page one
of this form (specify the exact documents or other things to be broduced):	
(1) Sign-in ledger from August 2000, or thereabout,	wherein Joel Scalzitti
eigned for receiving candidacy materials.	
(2) Notes, records relating to August 2000 communica	tions with Joel Scalzitti
concerning receipt of candidacy materials.	
	·
Continued on Attachment 2.	
Good cause exists for the production of the documents or other things described in pa	aragraph 2 for the following reasons:
	•
Continued on Attachment 3.	
4. These documents or other things described in paragraph 2 are material to the issues	involved in this case for the following reasons:
4. These documents or other things described in paragraph 2 are material to the reserve	
.·•	·
Continued on Attachment 4.	
	to the total and angent
l declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the forego	l strue and correct.
	n = 1
Date: July 3, 2002	H-An-
John C. Lemmo	
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME) (SIGNATURE OF 1)	SUSPOENAING PARTY X ATTORNEY FOR SUBPOENAING PARTY)
(Proof of service on page three)	

· E + b - Chata of	
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: The People of the State of	
- PLANNIFF/FEITHOUSE - 1-1-1- of John B Linder	1
California on the Relation of John B. Linder	-
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Joel Scalzitti	
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: JOEL SCALZICE	_

CASE NUMBER: GIE 012239

PROOF OF SERVICE OF CIVIL SUBPOENA (DUCES TECUM) FOR PERSONAL APPEARANCE AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS AT TRIAL OR HEARING AND DECLARATION

	1.0.12		
1.	I served this Civil Subpoena (Duces Tecum) for Personal Appearance and Declaration by personally delivering a copy to the person server	e and Production of Documents and Things at 1 i as follows:	rial or Hearing
	a. Person served (name):		
	b. Address where served:		
	c. Date of delivery: 7-3-62		
	d. Time of delivery: 11:30 4	-	
	e. Witness fees (check one): (1) were offered or demanded and paid. Amount: \$ 0.00 (2) were not demanded or paid.		
	f. Fee for service:	-	
2.	I received this subpoena for service on (date):		
3.	Person serving: a. Not a registered California process server. b. California sheriff or marshal. c. Registered California process server. d. Employee or independent contractor of a registered California. e. Exempt from registration under Business and Professions Company of the Exempt from registration under Business and Professions Company. g. Exempt from registration under Business and Professions Company. h. Name, address, telephone number, and, if applicable, county of respective to the professions of the Professions Company. Chic P. Depatric the professions Company.	ode section 22451. egistration and number:	
c	I declare under penalty of peniury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.	(For California sheriff or marshal use only I certify that the foregoing is true and correct Date:) t.
(Date:	Date.	
Ì	(SIGNATURE)	(SIGNATURE)	
			O Marin of Marin
			Page three of three

982(a)(15)

	982(a)(15)
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, state bar number, and address):	FOR COURT USE ONLY
Robert P. Ottilie SBN 958	45
7550 West "C" St., Suite 1600	·
San Diego, CA 92101	
]
TELEPHONE NO.: 619-231-4841 FAX NO.: 619-2	31_3203
TELEPHONE NO.: 619-231-4841 FAX NO.: 619-2 ATTORNEY FOR (Name): Joel Scalzitti	31-3293
CIPEDTOD COURT OF CALLEONIES	
OFO TO MATERIAL CONTROLL	
<u> </u>	
MAILING ADDRESS: CITY AND ZIP CODE: EL CAJON, CA 92020	
CITY AND ZIP CODE: EL CAJON, CA 92020 BRANCH NAME: EAST COUNTY DIVISION	
The state of the s	THORNER
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CAL	1FORNIA
IN THE RELATION OF JOHN B. LINDEN	
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: JOEL SCALZITTI	
CIVIL SUBPOENA	CASE NUMBER:
For Personal Appearance at Trial or Hearing	GIE 012239
1 of 1 crashar Appearance at That of Nearing	018 012209
a. Date: July 30,42002 Time: 9:00 a.m. x Dept.: 17 Div.: Room: b. Address: El Cajon Superior Court, 250 E. Main Street, El Cajon, CA 92020	
2. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE TIME OR DATE FOR Y THAT YOUR PRESENCE IS REQUIRED, CONTACT THE FOLLOWIN TO APPEAR: a. Name of subpoenaing party or attorney: Robert P. Ottilie SBN 958-	b. Telephone number: 619-231-4841
3. Witness Fees: You are entitled to witness fees and mileage actually traveled both ways, as provided by law, if you request them at the time of service. You may request them before your scheduled appearance from the person named in item 2.	
DISOBEDIENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA MAY BE PUNISHED AS CONTI FOR THE SUM OF FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS AND ALL DAMAGES R	
Date issued: July 25, 2002 Robert P. Ottilie SBN	
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME)	(SIGNATURE OF PERSON ISSUING SUBPOENA)
<u>Att</u>	orney for Joel Scalzitti (TITLE)
	\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
	• •

PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN THE RELATION OF JOHN B. LINDEN DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: JOEL SCALZITTI

CASE NUMBER:

GIE 012239

PROOF OF SERVICE OF CIVIL SUBPOENA FOR PERSONAL APPEARANCE AT TRIAL OR HEARING

 I served this Civil Subpoena for Personal Appearance at Trial of follows: 	or Hearing by personally delivering a copy to the person served as
a. Person served (name):	
b. Address where served:	
c. Date of delivery:	
d. Time of delivery:	
e. Witness fees (check one): (1) were offered or demanded and paid. Amount: \$	
f. Fee for service:	
2. I received this subpoena for service on (date):	·
 3. Person serving: a. Not a registered California process server. b. California sheriff or marshal. c. Registered California process server. d. Employee or independent contractor of a registered California process and Professional Pr	ons Code section 22350(b). ons Code section 22451.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.	(For California sheriff or marshal use only) I certify that the foregoing is true and correct.
Date:	Date:
	L
(SIGNATURE)	(SIGNATURE)

982(a)(15) [Rev. January 1, 2000]

	ROBERT P. OTTILIE (Bar No. 95845) 550 West "C" Street, Suite 1600 San Diego, CA 92101 Telephone: 619/231-4841 Facsimile: 619/231-3293	
5	The La Jolla Group	
6	San Diego, CA 92111	•
7 8	Attorneys for Defendant	
9		
10		•
11		OURT OF CALIFORNIA
12	COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO-EAST COUNTY DIVISION	
13	PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF) CASE NO. GIE 012239
14	CALIFORNIA ON THE RELATION OF JOHN B. LINDEN,)) TRIAL BRIEF NO. 2 RE:
15	Plaintiffs,) CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
16	₹.) Judge: William J. Howatt
17	JOEL SCALZITTI) Dept: 17) Trial date: July 30, 2002
18	Defendants.	
19	AND ALL RELATED CROSS ACTIONS	
20	ACTIONS	
21		
22	I	
23	INTRODUCTION For purposes of trial, this court bifurcated constitutional issues raised by Defendant's Answer. In his original Answer, by way of his Eleventh Affirmative Defense Defendant Scalzitti	
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25		
26	nau contenued that any requirement limiting	candidacy for position as Director of the Helix Water
27		•
28	Trial Brief	1

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Trial Brief

District would violate the rights of residents to equal protection under the law, as provided in the California and United States Constitutions.

Pursuant to CCP §472 (amendment as a matter of course), Scalzitti filed his First Amended Answer on July 17, 2002 adding a Thirteenth Affirmative Defense, citing section 22 of Article 1 of the California Constitution which provides, "the right to vote or hold office may not be conditioned by a property qualification."

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At the continued trial on July 30 and/or July 31, 2002, defendant may produce some additional facts with respect to the composition of the Helix Water District, its responsibilities, and the impact it has on users, property owners and non-owners. However, the parties have already stipulated to the admissibility of Exhibits 9 and 10, and those have been accepted by the court into evidence. Those will provide the principal facts as they relate to the constitutional issues.

Exhibit 9 is the Helix Water District website. It provides an excellent background on the District, but more importantly describes is governance, water ownership, service area, mission statement, functions, and customer base. It also describes, in detail, how revenues are generated, who pays fees, who receives water, and the rate structure in the district.

Exhibit 10 is a document dated May 1, 2002 prepared by Mark S. Weston, general manager of the Helix Water District. He has been identified as a witness, but his testimony may come in through this document which is a response by the Helix Water District to a Request for Information generated by the San Diego LAFCO (Local Agency Formation Commission). This provides additional facts that have a bearing on the two constitutional issues that will be addressed by this court in that portion of the trial.

The two principal factual issues that this court will have to determine in resolving the equal protection issue, are the scope of this irrigation district's activities and whether its activities,

THE BOSELIE CALL THE SECOND

financial practices and revenue generating mechanisms impose a burden on landowners that is significantly disproportionate to that imposed upon non-landowners.

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WATER CODE SECTION 21100 DENIES EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS BOTH TO CANDIDATES FOR OFFICE AND THE VOTERS WHOSE CHOICES FOR THE POSITION OF DIRECTOR ARE LIMITED

A. The right to Hold Office And the Concurrent Right of Electors to Be Able to Vote For the Most Qualified Candidate, is a Fundamental Right and the "Compelling Interest" Test Should Be Applied To Any Restriction On the Right to Hold Office

The United States Supreme Court has held that the "strict scrutiny" analysis must be applied in an equal protection analysis if the classification has a "real and appreciable impact" upon the quality, fairness and integrity of the electoral process. *Bullock v. Carter* (1972) 405 US 134, 144.

A number of cases have therefore held that a strict scrutiny test must apply in analyzing a law which would require the payment of a filing fee as a precondition to having access to the ballot (Bullock v. Carter, supra, 405 US 134, 144; Knoll v. Davidson (1974) 12 Cal.3d 335, 345), to certain durational residence requirements for candidacy (Johnson v. Hamilton (1975) 15 Cal.3d 461; Thompson v. Mellon (1973) 9 Cal.3d 96, 101-102; Zeilenga v. Nelson (1971) 4 Cal.3d 716, 720-723), and to a statute reserving the top place on the ballot to incumbents (Gould v. Grubb (1975) 14 Cal.3d 661, 670-672).

The limitation on candidacy for a position on the Board of Directors of the Helix Water District has a significant impact on both the quality and the fairness of the electoral process. Not only does it deny non-landowner voters the right to run for office and make decisions for the district, it limits the options that will be presented to landowners and non-landowners alike in the actual election. The choice of the voters is confined to a limited number of people. The pool of qualified candidates is reduced. As the California Supreme Court concluded in *Choudhry v. Imperial*

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Irrigation District, the restriction involved in Water Code Section 21100 in some respects is more pervasive than those considered in the several election cases cited above, "because here the potential candidate is entirely excluded from the ballot on the ground that [he or she] is not a freeholder, and neither the payment of a fee, the fulfillment of a durational residence requirement nor the willingness to allow the placement of [his or her] name on the ballot below that of the name of the incumbent can qualify him as a candidate." 17 Cal.34 660 at 665.

B. Most Election Decisions Invalidate Property Requirements

There are few cases (with the notable exception of Choudhry v. Imperial Irrigation District, supra) that address the issue of property qualifications to run for office. Most of the decisions address statutes that limit the right to vote.

The United States Supreme Court has considered, and struck down, a number of statutes requiring property qualifications for voting in special purpose districts. The notable exceptions for that trend are Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District (1973) 410 US 719, and Ball v. James (1981) 451 US 355. Both will be addressed below.

The United States Supreme Court has invalidated property requirements for voters in a school district election (Kramer v. Union School District (1969) 395 US 631, 632) and elections to approve the issuance of bonds for the construction of a city library Hill v. Stone (1975) 421 US 289, 297), revenue bonds for the use of a municipal utility district; (Cipriano v. City of Houma (1969) 395 US 701, 705-706) and general obligation bonds to finance municipal improvements (Phoenix v. Kolodziejski (1970) 390 US 204).

In Burry v. Embarcadero Municipal Improvement District (1971) 5 Cal.3d 671, the California Supreme Court held that a statute imposing a property qualification for voting in a municipal improvement district was invalid because the district exercised powers normally held by a municipal government. A "strict scrutiny" test applied.

In Choudhry v. Imperial Irrigation District (1976) 17 Cal.3d 660, the California Supreme Court noted the central theme of these cases resolved by both the United States and California Supreme Court cases:

"The consistent theme of these cases is that in order to deny the franchise to some voters the excluded class must be substantially less affected by the results of the election than those who are entitled to vote." 17 Cal.3rd at 666.

C. In Choudhry v. Imperial Irrigation District, the California Supreme Court Invalidated as Unconstitutional Under the Equal Protection Clause of the California and United States Constitutions Water Code Section 21100 As Applied To the Imperial Irrigation District

In Choudhry v. Imperial Irrigation District (1976) 17Cal.3d 660, the California Supreme Court invalidated as unconstitutional Water Code Section 21100 as applied to the Imperial Irrigation District to the extent it provided that one must be a "freeholder" of the district in order to run for a position on the board of directors of that irrigation district.

Choudhry was a potential candidate for director of the Imperial Irrigation District. The other two plaintiffs were voters in the district. None owned real property. All three challenged the constitutionality of Water Code Section 21100 (requiring landownership to run for the board of directors) as a violation of Article 1, Section 22 of the California Constitution and the equal protection clauses of both the United States Constitution and the California Constitution (the United States Constitution 14th Amendment; California Constitution, Article 1, Section 7). In the Imperial Irrigation District, in contradistinction to the Helix Water District, the district actually enforced Water Code Section 21100 and would not accept papers from prospective candidates who could not prove they owned land in the district.

The court noted that neither the respondent (district) nor the real parties in interest opposed petitioner's assertion that section 21100 was unconstitutional. This, as the court noted, virtually eliminated all adversary aspects to the litigation. However, the Association of California Water Agencies, an organization that at the time represented over half of the state's 104 irrigation districts,

did file an amicus brief defending the constitutionality of the section. The Secretary of State appeared in support of the petitioners.

The court reviewed the broad powers of the irrigation district, most of which were authorized by the California water code including, at that time, conducting the affairs of the district (§31285), supplying and delivering water for both irrigation and domestic use (§22075, et seq.), fine protection (§22077), and the power to store, treat and salvage water (§22078). The court noted the legislative empowerment of these districts to generate electricity if they chose, provide for drainage made necessary by irrigation, for the construction, maintenance and operation of flood control and sewage disposal and for the construction, maintenance and operation of recreational facilities in connection with dams, reservoirs and other property the control of these districts (§s 22115 - 22122; §s 22095-22099; § 22160; § 22162; § 22176; § 22185).

The supreme court [17 Cal.3d 6690 at 663] went on to note that under the legislative scheme in California this district had general powers such as eminent domain and the right to enter into contracts and to sell or lease its property (§s 22456, 22230, 22500), to make assessments on land (§ 22950) and to derive revenue from charges for the service it provides, such as water, electric, power, sewage disposal, and the operation of a recreational facility (§s 22252, 22115 and 22117, 22179, 22186). The court noted that these districts had the authority to substitute such charges for assessments (§ 22280), pay for its bonds from revenues other than assessments (§s 25240, 25241), and to call for bond elections (§ 21925(a)).

The court found that the irrigation district covered 501,265 acres, supplied all of the water for Imperial County and serviced a county that had a population of 74,000 people (67% of whom live in urban areas). [17 Cal.3d at 663-664] With this background the court concluded:

"In our view, the pervasive powers exercised by this irrigation district over all residents within its vasi area, whether or not they are landowners, are such that neither the right to vote nor the right to serve as a director may be confined to freeholders." 17 Cal.3d at 666 [emphasis added]

The court considered a number of United States Supreme Court cases (including the Salyer case discussed below) and correctly interpreted those United States Supreme Court decisions as follows:

"The consistent theme of these cases is that in order to deny the franchise to some voters the excluded class must be substantially less affected by the results of the election than those who are entitled to vote. In applying this rule, it was held that all voters have an important interest in the benefits of adequate service and favorable rates of a utility district (Cipriano), that both property owners and those who do not own property are called upon either directly or indirectly to pay for the improvements acquired from the proceeds of bonds (Phoenix, Hill), and that those who do not own property may have as direct an interest in school affairs (Kramer) or in a library (Hill) as those who do." (17 Cal.3d 660 at 666) [emphasis added]

The court specifically addressed the case of Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District (1973) 410 US7 19. In that case the United States Supreme Court had held that a water storage district did not exercise normal government authority, and that its actions disproportionately affected landowners because the economic burdens of its operations were confined to landowners and thus it was not a denial of equal protection to withhold the right of franchise from those who did not own land.

In Choudhry, the court distinguished the irrigation district from the water district addressed by the United States Supreme Court in the Salyer case concluding the following:

"Moreover, in the present case, unlike Salyer the assessments against land are not the sole means by which the district's expenses are paid. The district may collect charges for the sale of domestic water, electric power, sewage disposal and other services in lieu of assessments, and such charges are paid by both landowners and those who do not own land. And, it is authorized to pay its bonds from revenues other than assessments. (17 Cal.3rd 660 at 667) [emphasis added]

The Choudhry court also noted another distinction from the Salyer case. In Salyer, at that time, the legislature had not granted water district residents the right to vote. The California Supreme Court in Choudhry noted that the legislature had specifically granted the right to vote in irrigation districts to all residents leading the California Supreme Court to conclude as follows:

"Indeed, the very fact that the Legislature granted the franchise to electors who do not own land indicates that they have an appreciable stake in the affairs of the district." (17 Cal.3rd 660 at 668)

Because the California Supreme Court concluded on equal protection grounds that § 21100 was unconstitutional, insofar as it applied to candidates for director of the imperial Irrigation District, the court did <u>not</u> reach the remaining question as to whether or not § 21100 violated § 22 of Article 1 of the California Constitution.

D. The United States Supreme Court Decisions in Salyer, Toltec and Ball: the United States Supreme Court Applies a Two-Step Test with an Emphasis On Whether or Not The Conduct of a Specialized District Places a Disproportionate Impact on Property Owners

Salver Land Co. v. Tulore Water District

In Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water District, supra, a case considered by the California Supreme Court in Choudhry, the United States Supreme Court was considering a scheme for electing the directors of a California Water Storage District. Under that scheme, non-landowners could not vote. As to landowners, voting power was apportioned according to accessed valuation. The district had a population of 77; most residents worked for the four corporations that farmed 85% of the land in the district.

The court found that this was a limited purpose district because "its primary purpose...[was] to provide for the acquisition, storage and distribution of water for farming" in the district. 410 US at 728. Significantly, the court found that the district's financial burdens could fall only on landowners in proportion to the benefits they received from the district, 410 US at 729. For this reason, the Salyer court concluded that the water storage district, "by reason of its special limited purpose and of the disproportionare effect of its activities on landowners as a group, is the sort of exception to the [one person one vote] rule laid down in Reynolds...." 410 US at 728.

It is significant that because the Salyer court determined that the "one person one vote" rule did not apply, it also determined that the statute in question did not have to be considered under the

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"strict scrutiny" analysis flowing from that principal, and instead could be determined by the less demanding "rational basis" test. The court then conducted a rational basis analysis and concluded that there was a rational basis for the provision in that case.

2. Associated Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec District (1973) 410 US 743

This case was decided on the same day as Salyer. There, the court dealt with a Watershed District which it determined to be a limited purpose district which disproportionately affected landowners. Given that determination the court considered the equal protection challenge under a rational basis test and determined that since landowners are primarily burdened and benefitted by the district, [the right to] vote may be conditioned accordingly. (410 US at 744 - 745)

3. Ball v. James (1981) 451 US 355

At issue in *Ball* was the constitutionality of a requirement in a large water reclamation district in Arizona that limited voting to land ownership. An important distinction in *Ball*, from the *Salyer* case, was that in *Ball* the district exercised its statutory authority to generate and sell electric power and had become one of the state's largest suppliers of electricity. Another distinction in *Ball* was that the district delivered about 40% of its water to urban areas, as opposed to the *Salyer* district which had delivered water almost entirely for agricultural purposes.

As it had in Salyer, the United States Supreme Court in Ball concluded that the district did not exercise the sort of governmental powers that invoked the one person one vote principal. Significantly, and a distinction from the present case, the court noted that even the district's water functions were very narrow. In that district, the court could not own, sell or buy water.

In fact, in the Ball case, the district could not even control the use of any water it delivered. This was because all of its water was distributed according to landownership (acreage rights determined under law). Because all of the water in that district was distributed according to who owned how much land, the court also found the distinction between agriculture and urban land as

to be of no special constitutional significance in that case. More significantly, the United States Supreme Court determined that only landowners were subject to land assessment liens to secure district bonds and subject to the district's acreage-based taxing power, and only landowners had committed capital to the district. Given this disproportionate impact of the district's activities on those who owned land, the court applied the rational basis test and concluded the voting scheme was constitutional, largely for the reasons already expressed by the court in the Salyer case. 451 US at 371.

E. In Quinn v. Millsap the California Supreme Court Characterized Its Holdings in Salyer-Toltec-Ball

In 1989, the United States Supreme Court had an occasion to characterize its holdings in the Salyer-Toltec-Ball trilogy of landowner voting cases. In Quinn, the United States Supreme Court found unconstitutional, under the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, a requirement for land ownership to become a member on a public board that was drafting a municipal reorganization plan that would be submitted to voters in the general election. In distinguishing the Salyer line of cases, the United States Supreme Court in 1989 declared:

"Whereas it was rational for the states in those cases to limit voting rights to landowners [citations], the 'constitutionally relevant fact' there was 'that all water delivered by [those districts was] distributed according to land ownership' [citation] the purpose of the board [here] however is not so directly linked with land ownership." 491 US at 109

F. Bjornstad v. Hulse Is the Leading California Case Subsequent to Both Choudhry and the Salyer-Toltec-Ball Line of Cases at the United States Supreme Court

The principal California case to interpret these interesting voting cases, since the United States Supreme Court weighed in with the cases referenced above and since Choudhry was decided by the California Supreme Court, is the case of Ejornstad v. Hulse (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1568. That involved a water district (which Helix appears now to have become) and an action which

challenged the constitutionality of then Water Code Section 30700.6 which restricted <u>both</u> voting and eligibility for membership on the district board to landowners. The trial court found in favor of plaintiffs on a constitutional challenge to those provisions, but stayed its judgment pending appeal.

While the case was pending on appeal, the legislature amended the water code to provide for voting and board eligibility for all residents of the district, as well as non-resident landowners. The legislature also limited the powers of the district in its amendments to the code.

In its amendments, the legislature allowed the then sitting members of the district to retain their positions (those who had been elected according to the prior unconstitutional election process) until either the next election or until that seat became vacant.

When the matter was heard on appeal, the water district contended all issues were moot as a result of the legislative action which had voided the unconstitutional provisions. The court determined otherwise, both because it presented an interesting on-going issue (that may affect other districts) and because the legislature had allowed the other members of the board of directors (elected at the unconstitutional election) to remain in office rather than providing for a special election (conducted constitutionally) to replace the entire board.

The court in *Bjornstad* had benefit of the California Supreme Court decision in *Choudhry* and the entire line of the United States Supreme Court cases addressed above. The court correctly determined that the issue was whether or not that particular water district was akin to the districts in *Sayler, Toltec and Ball*, which impacted the landowners disproportionately, making landowner only voting (and board membership) constitutionally permissible.

The court concluded that the statute in question was <u>unconstitutional</u> under the equal protection provisions of the California and United States Constitutions.

First, the court agreed with the peritioners that the district was not as limited a district as the districts in Sayler. Toltec and Ball where activities disproportionately affect "landowners as a group". The court found significant that the legislature had amended the statute to allow all residents

to vote, which the Bjornstad court found to be "a powerful recognition that [the district] does not engage in activities disproportionately affecting landowners as a group." 229 Cal.App.3d at 1585. 2 3 The court then issued its holding: 4 "A few general observations bolster our view. Sierra's primary purpose is to provide domestic water and sewer services. This aligns with a county water district's primary purpose of "furnishing water to 5 its inhabitants. (Glenbrook Development Co. v. City of Brea (1976) 6 253 Cal.App.2d 267, 274 [61 Cal.Rptr. 189], italics added.) As noted without hesitation in Johnson v. Lewiston Orchards Irr. Dist. (1978) -7 99 Idaho 501 [584 P.2d 646] - a case which invalidated a landowneronly voting scheme for a domestic water district - "[d]omestic water service, of course, substantially affects not just landowners but 8 all...residents." (584 P.2d at p. 650; accord, Wright v. Town Bd. of Carlton (1973) 41 A.D.2d 90 [342 N.Y.S.2d 577]). Furthermore, the 9 constitutionality relevant facts recognized in Ball were that the 10 district there distributed all of its water according to land ownership, and could not control the use of any water it delivered. (Ball, supra, 451 U.S. at pp. 367-368 [68 L.Ed.2d at pp. 160-161]; see also Quinn 11 v. Millsap, supra 491 U.S. at p. 109 [105 L.Ed.2d at p. 901].)" 12 The court, noting that all residents were impacted by the conduct of the district, and that the 13 revenues were not generated or determined as a result of land ownership concluded: 14 "Therefore, [all of the districts] residents have a vital stake in their district and cannot be denied a voice in its affairs." 229 Cal. App.3d 15 at 1585 16 17 18 IV 19 THE RESTRICTION ON THE RIGHT TO RUN FOR OFFICE IN THE HELIX WATER DISTRICT VIOLATES THE 20 EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE BECAUSE OF THE SCOPE OF SERVICES NOW PROVIDED BY THE DISTRICT AND BECAUSE 21 THE ACTIVITIES OF THE DISTRICT DO NOT IMPOSE A DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT ON PROPERTY OWNERS 22 Even if this court were to conclude that the Helix Water District is a limited entity akin to 23 the Salyer-Toltec-Ball line of cases, and applied a rational basis test to this equal protection 24 challenge, it would still have to conclude that there is no rational basis for the statutory scheme 25 challenged here. 26 27

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Trial Brief

Unlike those other cases, this statutory restriction does not affect the right to vote. It is on the right to hold office in an irrigation district where the legislature has specifically provided that all residents may vote.

By providing that all residents may vote, the legislature has made a "powerful" recognition that all residents are impacted by this district's affairs. What, under those circumstances, would be the rational basis for requiring land ownership to hold office? If the legislature has determined that everyone should get to vote, because all residents are impacted by the district's affairs, then there can be no rational basis for providing a restriction on the right to run for the board. Even landowners are prejudiced by a landowner requirement to serve on the board, because this requirement restricts candidacy to what may be approximately half of the population of the district. Land owners and non-landowners alike are prejudiced by losing the pool of all qualified candidates.

However, a "strict scrutiny" standard should apply. As exhibits 9 and 10 demonstrate, this is not a specialized district. It affects 31,327 acres. It serves 235,000 residents. It has 54,000 service locations.

Further, the district has changed since its inception. It is not an agricultural district. Mr. Linden will be hard pressed to identify farms in the district. Almost all of its water is sold to urban users.

Its revenue is generated from charges <u>based on use</u>, <u>not ownership</u>. The district owns water. It procures water. It sells water.

The Helix Water District does <u>not</u> limit voting based on property ownership. Rates are <u>not</u> set by property ownership. Access to water is <u>not</u> determined by property ownership. Water is <u>not</u> distributed based on property ownership. Rates are <u>not</u> indexed according to property ownership.

In fact, as the court will see from a review of the exhibits, Helix bases its rates charged on usage only. There is a penalty paid for larger use - the highest rates are charged to the biggest users. This is completely opposite of how an irrigation districts that support farming operate.

The users in this district have no other option for their water. They have to obtain it from their supplier.

Unlike the district in Ball, the district buys water, sells water and owns water.

It does many things beyond water ownership. It treats all water for consumption. Every user of Helix Water District water will soon have fluoride in their water. This was decided as the result of a contract signed by the Helix Water District Board of Directors. Should non-landowners who are forced to drink the fluoridated water, be limited in the election of directors to landowners only, or should everyone have a chance to participate when such an important decisions are being made?

The Helix Water District maintains security for its holdings. It installs and provides water for fire hydrant systems and for street service and building service. It has conducted classroom education programs for over 30 years. It participates in the Water Conservation Garden, a JPA with other water agencies to promote landscaping and conservation concepts.

The district provides recreational facilities at numerous locations, including fishing programs and boat docks. In fact, within the district the largest recreational facilities for residents are those provided by the district. The district built a community park on top of the Grossmont Reservoir.

The evidence shows that this is not a narrow district. It exercises broad powers, and most significantly for constitutional purposes, there is no disproportionate impact at all, between non-owners and owners of land.

This case is controlled by the California Supreme Court decision in *Choudhry*, and the appellate court's decision in *Bjornstad*.

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SECTION 22 OF ARTICLE 1 OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS PROPERTY QUALIFICATIONS TO HOLD OFFICE

Section 22 of Article 1 of the California Constitution provides:

"The right to vote or hold office may not be conditioned by a property qualification."

California Water Code Section 21100 provides, in part:

"Each director, except as otherwise provided in this division, shall be a voter and a landowner in the district...that he or she represents at the time of his or her nomination or appointment and through his or her entire term...."

This is the requirement Mr. Linden relies upon in seeking to remove Mr. Scalzitti from office. It is an unconstitutional under § 22 of Article 1.

Mr. Linden seeks support for the enforcement of Water Code Section 21100 in the United States Supreme Court of Ball v. James (1981) 351 451US 355. However, the Ball case is an equal protection case (discussed above). It did not even address the issue of property qualifications for holding office. It addressed a weighted "voting" system in Arizona on an equal protection challenge. Ball's applicability to this case was addressed above, in the discussion of the equal protection defense that has been asserted here. For reasons identified above, Ball does not help §21100 survive a challenge under section 22 of Article 1 of the California Constitution.

Section 22 of Article 1 of the California Constitution is not the equal protection clause of the California Constitution. It is a separate constitutional provision enacted by the people of the State of California.

Rights guaranteed by the California Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Article 1, Section 21 of the California Constitution.

Dated: 7-17-07

Attorney for JOEL SCALZITTI

Trial Brief

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PROOF OF SERVICE

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2 People of the State of California on the Relation of John B. Linden v. Scalzitti San Diego Superior Court Case No. GIE 012239 3 I am, and was at the time of service of the papers herein referred to, over the age of eighteen 4 years and not a party to this action; I am employed in the County of San Diego, CA, in which county the within-mentioned mailing occurred. My business address is 550 West "C" Street, Suite 1600, San Diego, California 92101. On July 17, 2002 I served the foregoing document described as 7 Answer of Joe Scalzitti to Complaint in Quo Warranto for Ouster on interested parties in this action by placing $\underline{\hspace{0.1cm}}$ the original; $\underline{\hspace{0.1cm}} \underline{\hspace{0.1cm}} X$ a true copy thereof enclosed in a scaled envelope addressed as follows: 10 Steve Smith, Esq. Kenneth S. Klein 11 Best, Best & Kreiger Gregory V. Moser 402 W. Broadway, 13th Floor John C. Lemmo San Diego, CA 92101 Foley & Lardner 402 W. Broadway, 23rd Floor Timothy Barry San Diego, CA 92101 County Counsel 619-234-6655 1600 Pacific Highway 619-234-3510 (fax) San Diego, CA 92101 15 16 BY MAIL: By placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a scaled envelope addressed as above, with postage thereon fully prepaid in the United States mail, at San Diego, California. I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of 17 collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. Postal service on the same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at San Diego, California, in the ordinary course of 18 business. 19 BY FAX: I transmitted a copy of the foregoing document(s) this date via facsimile to the fax numbers shown 20 herein pursuant to Rule 2003(3) BY PERSONAL SERVICE/KNOX ATTORNEY SERVICE Delivered during business hours to 21 receptionist 22 23 Executed on July 17, 2002 at San Diego, California. 24 25 26 27 28

F-053 1-619-685-4638 From-FOLEY&LARNDER Oc't-16-2002 '05:01pm STEPHEN THUNBERG Clerk of the Superior Corn. OCT 1 6 2002 D. Munshower, Deputy By: R. ADAMS, Deputy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 9 EAST COUNTY DIVISION 10 11 Case No.: GIE-012239 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,) 12 DECISION OF THE COURT UPON THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT IN THE ex rel. JOHN B. LINDEN, 13 QUO WARRANTO ACTION BEFORE THE Plaintiff, COURT. 14 V5. 15 JOEL SCALZITTI, 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 PREFACE 20 JOEL SCALZITTI (hereinafter referred to as "SCALZITTI") was elected to a position as a Member 21 of the Board of Directors of the Helix Water District (hereinafter referred to as "DISTRICT"). Upon 22 application, JOHN B. LINDEN (hereinafter referred to as "LINDEN") was granted "Leave To Sue" in an 23 action in Quo Warranto by the Attorney General of the State of California in the name of the People of the 24 State of California against SCALZITTI. The purpose of the litigation is to determine whether or not 25 SCALZITTI is entitled to continue to hold and exercise the office of Member of the Board of Directors of

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the DISTRICT or should be ousted from this office and fined pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 809.

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The Complaint, entitled "VERIFIED COMPALINT IN QUO WARRANTO FOR OUSTER" was filed pursuant to the Leave to Sue on May 30, 2002.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE

The Complaint having been filed on May 30, 2002 the Court held an ex parte hearing on June 4, 2002 was held to establish the procedures to be followed and set hearing dates. The Court set the date of June 24, 2002 for the commencement of the evidentiary hearing in this action. A General Denial proposed by counsel for SCALZITTI was ordered to be filed with the Court on or before June 7, 2002.

The evidentiary hearing was commenced on June 24, 2002. Testimony was presented and documentary evidence introduced. As the matter was not able to be completed in a single day as anticipated, the hearing was continued to July 17, 2002 for the presentation of additional evidence. On June 26, 2002 at the request of SCALZITTI the hearing was continued to July 30, 2002. The hearing proceeded on July 30, 2002. Further testimonial and documentary evidence was presented during the course of the hearing. The hearing was not completed on July 30th and was continued to the next day, July 31st for presentation of the final testimonial evidence, additional documentary evidence and the arguments of counsel upon LINDEN's Motion for Judgment, both Plaintiff and Defendant having rested their case.

At the conclusion of the oral arguments of counsel and at the request of counsel for SCALZITTI the Court continued the matter to September 6, 2002 in order to allow presentation of additional briefing. SCALZITTI's supplemental briefing was to be filed with the Court on or before August 26th and LINDEN's supplemental and responsive briefing was to be filed on or before September 6" at which point the Court would take the matter under submission for decision. Counsel for SCALZITTI requested additional time within which to file his supplemental briefing. Over the objection of LINDEN's counsel the Court granted the request for additional time to file the supplemental brief. Defendant was given until September 16,

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2002 in which to file his supplemental brief. The brief was filed on September 17th. Additional time was also given to LINDEN in which to file his supplemental brief. The brief was received and filed by the Court on September 30th. The Court took the matter under submission for decision on September 30, 2002.

INTRODUCTION

President Theodore Roosevelt once said, "It is character that counts in a nation as in a man." He also observed that "A lie is no more to be excused in politics than out of politics." It is unfortunate that this Court must address both the character and the mendacity of SCALZITTI to reach a conclusion in the present matter.

It may well be suggested that the present action is without the jurisdiction of the Court as it is a "political question" which the courts have traditionally eschewed. Initially in the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 LEd. 60, questions which are by their very nature political are not questions for the court. (Ibid., at page 170). However, it was Marbury v. Madison, supra, that clearly established that questions of constitutional magnitude and statutory construction are questions justiciable and not simply characterized as political. Here, too, this Court addresses not the electorate's choice of the candidates but rather the qualifications of the individual candidate to fulfill the requirements of office.

These matters are not without precedent. In San Diego County there have been previous instances in which current office holders are challenged as to the underlying qualifications for or the right to hold elective office. Two cases involving the Office of District Attorney for the County of San Diego come to mind: People of the State of California, ex rel. Sweet v. Ward (1895) 107 Cal. 236 and People of the State of California, ex rel. Webb v. Marsh (1916) 30 Cal.App. 424.

in this action the People of the State of California through LINDEN, as Realtor, seeks the removal of SCALZITTI from his position as an elected member of the Board of Directors of the Hellx Water District from Division 1. It is alleged by LINDEN that SCALZITTI has falled to qualify for this office upon two

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separate and exclusive grounds: (1) SCALZITTI was not at all times a resident of the defined area of Division 1; and/or (2) SCALZITTI was not at all times a landowner within the geographical description of the Helix Water District.

This action proceeds in quo warranto. LINDEN has received a right to sue letter from the Attorney General of the State of California and is acting, therefore, on behalf of and in the name of the People of the State of California.

The Court has bifurcated the issues and allegations set forth above. The Court will first address the question of SCALZITTI'S continuous residence within Division 1 of the Helix Water District. Should the Court determine that SCALZITTI is qualified by virtue of continuous residence within Division 1 at all relevant times the Court will next determine whether or not SCALZITTI has been a landowner within the Helix Water District at all relevant times. The legal analysis of the question of the Constitutionality of the Helix Water District's requirement of land ownership is to be addressed at a later date.

AN ACTION IN QUO WARRANTO

An action in quo warranto is an appropriate means by which to test the qualifications of an individual to hold public office. California Code of Civil Procedure section 803 provides for such an action. Section 803 provides:

*An action may be brought by the attorney-general, in the name of the people of this state, upon his own information, or upon a complaint of a private party, against any person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises any public office, civil or military, or any franchise, or against any corporation, either de jure or de facto, which usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises any franchise, within this state. And the attorney general must bring the action, whenever he has reason to believe that any such office or franchise has been usurped, intruded into,

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or unlawfully held or exercised by any person, or when he is directed to do so by the governor."

The remedy in quo warranto is the appropriate and only procedure by which to determine the right to a public office where a de facto officeholder holds the office. See Klose v. Superior Court (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 913, 917-918; Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. Number 02-306 (May 10, 2002).

Upon application to the Attorney General of the State of California, Leave To Sue was granted to address two questions:

Is Joel Scalzitti unlawfully holding the office of director of the Helix Water

District due to a failure to satisfy the qualification of being a landowner within the district?

And.

2. Is Joel Scalzitti unlawfully holding the office of director of the Helix Water District due to a fallure to satisfy the qualification of being a resident within the division of the district from which he was elected?

The Attorney General determined that each of these two questions, based upon preliminary inquiry required judicial resolution. See Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen., Number 02-306, (May 10, 2002) at pages 1-2.

The genesis of an action in quo warranto is in the common law and is now statutorily provided by section 803 of the Code of Civil Procedure, noted above. In its broadest sense it is a formal judicial inquiry into the legitimacy or legality of the claim to an elective officer by the current officeholder. See American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, "Quo Warranto" by Anne M. Payner, J.D. It is, therefore, used primarily to question the authority of the claimant asserting a right to public elective office.

The Attorney General must conclude that the issuance of Leave to Sue *in Quo Warranto* is required to have a judicial resolution of a substantial question of fact or law and, if so, would the overall public interest be served by allowing the action to proceed. In this case, by granting the Leave to Sue, the

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Attorney General has determined that these factual and legal questions are not only ripe for determination, but also that the public interest is served by a judicial resolution of the issues.

The Opinion of the Attorney General concludes:

"In the present circumstances, Linden has submitted a verified statement of facts, supported by declarations signed under penalty of perjury, indicating Scalzitti's residence for purposes of section 21100 to be in Division 2 rather than Division 1 of the District. Scalzitti has not presented a verified statement of facts as to the issue of his residence. Accordingly, we believe substantial issues of fact and law have been presented concerning Scalzitti's residence at the time of his election and during his term of office for purposes of section 21100.

"We have generally viewed the existence of a substantial question of fact or law as presenting a sufficient public purpose to warrant the granting of leave to sue in quo warranto. In such cases, leave will be denied only in the presence of other overriding considerations. . . . No such considerations are present here. Rather, both the public and the District have an interest in a judicial resolution of this matter.

"Accordingly, the application for leave to sue in quo warranto is GRANTED." (Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., Number 02-305, supre at pages 5-6).

In a quo warranto proceeding such as is before this Court, SCALZITTI has both the burden of producing evidence and the burden of proof to demonstrate that he lawfully holds his office. (See People ex rel. Stephenson v. Hayden (1935) 9 Cal.App.2d 312). In fact, the ordinary rules of pleading and proof are reversed from a normal civil proceeding. Here the Realtor (LINDEN) is not required to show or prove anything. Rather it is the responsibility of the defendant (SCALZITTI) to establish his lawful claim to the office of Director as well as his right to exercise the authority of that office. (See Smith v. City of San Jose)

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(1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 57; People ex rel. Paganini v. Town of Corte Maria (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 726. See also, 53 Cal.Jur.3d, Quo Warranto, section 3.)

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT

At the conclusion of the presentation of testimony and documentary evidence, the Realtor
LINDEN moved the Court for Judgment. SCALZITTI has mischaracterized this motion as a Motion for
Nonsuit. It is not a Motion for Nonsuit. It is a Motion for Judgment. (See Code of Civil Procedure section
631.8).

Section 631.8 permits either party to an action to move for a judgment at the close of the other's case. Ordinarily it is the defendant who makes this motion at the close of the plaintiff's case. However, since this case in quo warranto reverses the procedure and requires the defendant to proceed first, the same principles as would apply, with appropriate adaptations. (People v. Mobil Oil Corporation (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 261, 267-268 footnote 6.)

Upon the making of a Motion for Judgment the Court is required to weigh and consider all of the evidence. In that process the Court may refuse to believe witnesses and draw conclusions that are at odds with any expert opinions that are offered during the course of the proceedings. And, if supported by substantial evidence, the grant of a Motion for Judgment will not be reversed. (See Roth v. Parker (1997) 57 Cal.App. 4th 542; Jordan v. City of Santa Barbara (1996) 46 Cal.App. 4th 1245).

The determination of the Court may act as a final adjudication of the matter if judgment is granted pursuant to the motion. (Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8(c)). It is the express purpose of this Motion to dispense with the need for the moving party to produce evidence if the opposing party has falled to meet his burden of producing evidence and burden of proof. (See Roth v. Parker, 57 Cal.App.4th, supra; People v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 143 Cal.App.3d, supra at pages 267-272; and, Heap v. General Motors Corporation (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 824).

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QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED FOR THE OFFICE OF DIRECTOR

OF THE HELIX WATER DISTRICT

As was determined in the Opinion of the Attorney General and now by this Court, the Helix Water District is established as an "Imigation District" pursuant to California Water Code sections 20500 et seq. (See Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 02-306, supra at page 2). Subsequent to its formation as an imigation District, the California State Legislature in 1972 authorized the District to delete the word "imigation" from its appellation and operate under the name "Helix Water District". (Cal. Water Code, section 20980.6).

The District is organized in five separate geographic "Divisions". There is an elective position of Director for each of the Divisions. Each Director is required to be both a "landowner" of the District and a "resident" of the Division in which he or she resides. Residency in the geographic division from which one is elected as a Director is required throughout the entirety of the term of office for which the individual was elected. (See Cal. Water Code section 21100; Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen., supra). Specifically, Cal. Water Code section 21100(a) provides:

"Each [Imigation district] director ... shall be a voter and a landowner in the district and a resident of the division that he or she represents at the time of his or her nomination or appointment and through his or her entire term. ... " [Emphasis is added].

SCALZITTI'S FAILURE TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF

As a procedural matter, it was and is the responsibility of SCALZITTI to establish the requirements for the Office of Director of the Helix Water District. SCALZITTI argued strenuously to have this Court hold that the Office is that of a Director of a Water District and not that of a Director of an Irrigation District. SCALZITTI has failed not only to meet his burden of producing evidence on this issue but has also failed to meet his burden of proof on this issue. As noted above, the Helix Water District, although operating under the appellation of a Water District is in fact and law an Irrigation District with all the requirements of office holders attendant thereto.

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1. SCALZITTI HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF THAT HE WAS A CONTINUOUS RESIDENT OF THE DIVISION FROM WHICH HE WAS ELECTED DIRECTOR THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRETY OF HIS TERM OF OFFICE:

It was clearly established through the testimony of SCALZITTI himself that it is his claim that he maintained, throughout his term of office, his residence at 1063 ½ Sumner Avenue. The residency requirement of an office holder is one which extends throughout the entire term of office. If, then, at any point in time SCALZITTI's residence, during the term of office for which he was elected Director, was outside of the Division from which he was elected, his office must declared vacant and his position forfeit.

The credible evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom is irrefutable that SCALZITTI did not intend nor have physical connection with 1063 ½ Sumner Avenue as his place of residence between December 8, 2000 and December, 2001. As such, the irrefutable credible evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom is that SCALZITTI did not reside, maintain his residence, within the Division from which he was elected throughout the entirety of his term of office.

in summary, the evidence supporting this conclusion is:

- Between November 2000 and January 2002 SCALZITTI filled out and signed five separate documents which, under oath, identified his residence as other than 1003 ½ Gumner. (See Exhibits 12 (a voter registration change from "1063" Sumner Avenue to 975 Spinel Street on April 4, 2001], 43 [Fair Political Practices Commission Form 480 filed on July 31, 2001 identifying (under penalty of perjury) his address as 975 Spinel Avenue) and 45 [a series of Department of Motor Vehicles forms, registrations and driver's license applications dated July 9, 2001; July 27, 2001; November 28, 2001; December 31, 2001; April 30, 2002 and July 31, 2002 each of which indicating his residence address at 10050 Country View Road).
 - Prior to being sworn into office SCALZITTI moved out of the 1083 1/2 Sumner residence and changed his California Driver's License address to 10050 Country View Road. 10050 Country View Road is located within Division 2 and not the Division 1 from which SCALZITTI was

elected. The change of address was under penalty of perjury and remained his mailing and residence address for Department of Motor Vehicle purposes at the 10050 Country View Road address until February 2002 shortly after these proceedings were initiated. (See Exhibit 45).

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- The evidence presented has also demonstrated that SCALZITTI has registered automobiles, a utility trailer, and a boat and trailer at the 10050 Country View Road address. (See Exhibit 45).
- SCALZITTI has not paid any of the property taxes on 1063 % Summer nor was he one of the persons to whom the loan was made to purchase the property. His mother, Judy Matthews testified quite clearly that the loan was made in her name and through a loan broker at Washington Mutual Bank with whom she had had prior dealings.
- SCALZITTI has not obtained or claimed any tax benefits from the alleged ownership of 1063 ½ Sumner.
- The title to the property at 1063 and 1063 ½ Sumner was taken in his mother's name alone at the time of the sale and transfer of the ownership of the property. SCALZITTI's name did not appear on the title to the property until the Quit Claim deed from his mother on June 7, 2002. (See Exhibit 8).
- SCALZITTI has presented no evidence of a telephone listing for himself at any time between
 December 2000 and December 2001 at the 1063 ½ Sumner residence.
- SCALZITTI changed his voter registration from 10050 Country View Road to 1063 ¼ Sumner at the same time he submitted his nomination papers to the Registrar of Voters for the office of Director from Division 1 even though he had purportedly been in residence at 1063 ½ Sumner since May of 2000. (It is also interesting to note that when SCALZITTI reregistered to vote in April 2001 using the 975 Spinel address he listed his prior address as 1063 Sumner and not 1063 ½ Sumner. See Exhibit 12). After the initiation of this action SCALZITTI reregistered to vote using the 1063 ½ Sumner address. (See Exhibit 13).

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In summary, SCAZITTI did not, through the entirety of his term of elected office of Director from Division 1 of the Helix Water District, maintain residency within that Division. At a very minimum SCALZITTI has failed to sustain his burden of proof on this issue.

While the specific issue of being a *landowner* is technically to await another day, the evidence on this issue bears great significance as to the credibility and believability of SCALZITTI. It is certainly a fact that a witness who has falled to be forthright in one material part of his testimony is to be distrusted in others. Simply put, SCALZITTI was not a *landowner* within the District. The artful creation of a "ledger" (See Exhibits 7 and 72) from a calendar of hours worked for his mother (See Exhibits 61, 62, and 63) is but a subterfuge of the worst kind. The documents are all created in the same ink which gives one great pause from the outset.

It is also interesting to note that as of August 10th when SCALZITTI filed his nomination papers.

The had paid over to his mother \$1,800.00 from the sale of his Chevy truck (although his mother testified that she believed that the amount was \$1,400.00 which she had been holding for him four a couple of months since the sale of the vehicle even though the "ledger" reflects the \$1,800.00 and not the \$1,400.00) and 9 hours of work at \$10.00 per hour. In other words, SCALZITTI had a purported financial investment in real property as of August 10th at most of 8%. Interesting also is the absence of any evidence of any payments by SCALZITTI on the mortgage.

However, more persuasive are the facts that he was not on the title to the property until recently and after this action was begun; he never claimed a mortgage deduction; the loan to secure the property was in his mother's name; he never paid any property taxes on the property; the insurance was not in his name; he never reported income form the rents received on the property; and, this alleged "contract" with his mother can only be one which is wholly executory given the testimony of his mother that avery indication of ownership was in her while SCALZITTI "worked off" what was to have been his share of the down payment of \$40,000.00.

Even though not required of the Court on the Motion for Judgment and the defendant having presented his evidence regarding ownership through his own testimony and that of his mother, the

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Court specifically finds that at no time did SCALZITTI own property within the geographical boundaries of the Heilx Water District. That is, SCALZITTI did not at all times qualify for office because he was not a landowner within the District.

CONCLUSION

President Abraham Lincoln said:

"If you once forfeit the confidence of your fellow citizens, you can never regain their respect and esteem. It is true that you may fool all the people some of the time; you can even fool some of the people all of the time; but you can't fool all of the people all of the time."

A public office is a public trust and those who assume a public office should do so not for personal advancement or private advantage. Public office is a unique opportunity in a democratic society to serve ones community in the fulfillment of a public trust. This service cannot begin with a deception.

While the State and Federal Courts are loathe to embark upon resolution of purely political matters when the very foundation upon which a public office and trust is compromised the courts will move to protect the institutions of democracy.

This Court has considered carefully all of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, and, in particular, the testimony and explanations offered by SCALZITTI regarding his places of residence and his assertion of ownership of land within the geographical construct of the Helix Water District. The Court has reached the following conclusions on the issues presented:

- SCALZITTI has failed to establish his residency throughout his term of office as being continuously located at 1063 ½ Sumner.
- SCALZITTI has failed to establish that he was a landowner within the geographical construct of the Helix Water District throughout his term of office.

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 SCALZITTI has failed to sustain his burden of proof that he is qualified to hold the office of Director from Division 1 of the Helix Water District throughout the entire term of his office.

THEREFORE, it is the determination of this Court that Judgment must and shall be entered in favor of the People ex rel. LINDEN; and JOEL SCALZITTI is immediately ousled from the office of Director of the Helix Weter District; and the office of Director of the Helix Weter District, Division 1 shall be and la declared to be vacant; and the People, acting through Realtor John B. LINDEN as a private attorney general have prevailed and are the prevailing party in this action in quo warranto. Counsel for the prevailing party is directed to prepare and submit an Order and Judgment consistent with the Court's findings, conclusions and orders set forth above. SCALZITTI shall be assessed reasonable costs pursuant to a memorandum of costs to be submitted by the People pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 809. The Court determines that a reimbursement of all per diem payments made to SCALZITTI during the time he unlawfully held office is appropriate and upon an accounting presented by the Helix Water District an Order of Restitution shall be made. The Court determines that it is not appropriate to impose a fine pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 809 as SCALZITTI shall be responsible for costs of the action and the per diem reimbursement to the District.

DATED: October 16, 2002.

WILLIAM & HOWATT, JR., Judge

Ost-18-2002 04:44pm From-FOLEY&LARN 1-619-685-463 Clark of the Superior Court OCT 1 8 2002 1 By K. Rominger, De EAST COUNTY DIVISIO 2 3 4 5 б 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 9 EAST COUNTY DIVISION 10 11 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA EX) CASE No.: GIE 012239 12 REL. JOHN B. LINDEN, DECEMBER T FOR PLAINTIFF 13 AND ORDER PLAINTIFF, 14 V. 15 JOEL SCALZITTI, 16 DEFENDANT. 17 18 19 This action in quo warranto came on for evidentiary hearing beginning on June 20 24, 2002, in the Courtroom of the Honorable William J. Howatt, Department 17, of this 21 Court. All parties appeared by and through their counsel of record. 22 The People of the State of California, through John B. Linden ("LINDEN") as 23 relator, seek the removal of Joel Scalzitti ("SCALZITTI") from his position as an elected 24 member of the Board of Directors of the Helix Water District from Division 1. It is 25 alleged by LINDEN that SCALZITTI has failed to qualify for office upon two separate 26 and exclusive grounds: (1) SCALZITTI was not at all times a resident of the defined area 27 of Division 1; and/or (2) SCALZITTI was not at all times a landowner within the 28

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[PROPOSED] JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF AND ORDER CASE NO. GIE 012239 TION DOSE DOSE NITORO

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geographical description of the Helix Water District.

The Complaint, entitled "VERIFTED COMPLAINT IN QUO WARRANTO FOR OUSTER" was filed on May 30, 2002, pursuant to the Leave to Sue letter granted to LINDEN by the Attorney General of the State of California. A General Denial proposed by counsel for SCALZITTI was ordered to be filed with the Court on or before June 7, 2002. The evidentiary hearing was commenced on June 24, 2002, and was continued at the request of SCALZITTI to July 30, and again to July 31, 2002. At the conclusion of presentation of testimony and documentary evidence, the Plaintiff moved this Court for Judgment, both Plaintiff and Defendant having rested their case.

The Court has bifurcated the issues and allegations concerning residence within Division 1 and landownership within the District at all relevant times. The legal analysis of the question of the Constitutionality of the Helix Water District's requirement of landownership is to be addressed at a later date.

Having considered all of the evidence, arguments, and papers provided by counsel and the parties, the Motion for Judgment having been submitted for decision, and the Court having issued its Decision,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:

- This Court has jurisdiction in this quo warranto matter. Questions of constitutional magnitude and statutory construction are questions justiciable and not simply characterized as political.
- The remedy in quo warranto is the appropriate and only procedure by which to determine the right to a public office where a de facto officeholder holds the office.
- LINDEN has received a Leave to Sue letter from the Attorney General of 3. the State of California and is acting, therefore, on behalf of and in the name of the People of the State of California.
- In a quo warranto proceeding such as is before this Court, SCALZITTI has 4 both the burden of producing evidence and the burden of proof to demonstrate that he

[PROPOSED] JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF AND ORDER CASE NO. GIE 012239

lawfully holds office.

- 5. It is the responsibility of SCALZITTI to establish his lawful claim to the office of Director as well as his right to exercise the authority of that office.
- 6. At the conclusion of the presentation of testimony and documentary evidence, LINDEN moved the Court for judgment.
- 7. Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 permits either party to an action to move for a judgment at the close of the other's case. Ordinarily, it is the defendant who makes the motion at the close of plaintiff's case. However, since this case in quo warranto reverses the procedure and requires the defendant to proceed first, the same principles apply, with appropriate adaptations.
- 8. Upon the making of a Motion for Judgment, the Court is required to weigh and consider all of the evidence. In that process the Court may refuse to believe witnesses and draw conclusions that are at odds with any expert opinions that are offered during the course of the proceedings. And, if supported by substantial evidence, the grant of a Motion for Judgment will not be reversed.
- 9. The determination of the Court may act as a final adjudication of the matter if judgment is granted pursuant to the motion.
- 10. As was determined in the Opinion of the Attorney General and now by this Court, the Helix Water District is established as an "irrigation district" pursuant to the California Water Code sections 20500 et seq.
- 11. The District is organized into five separate geographic "Divisions". There is an elective position of Director for each of the Divisions.
- 12. SCALZITTI was elected in November 2000 to the office of Director of Division 1 of the Helix Water District.
- 13. Each Director is required to be both a "landowner" of the District and a "resident" of the Division in which he or she resides.
- 14. Residency in the Division from which one is elected as a Director is required throughout the entirety of the term of office for which the individual was

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elected.

It was and is the responsibility of SCALZITTI to establish the requirements 15. for the Office of Director of the Helix Water District. Despite SCALZITTI's strenuous argument to have this Court hold that the Office is that of a Director of a "water district" and not that of an irrigation district, SCALZITTI has failed not only to meet his burden of producing evidence on this issue but has also failed to meet his burden of proof on this issue.

- It was clearly established through the testimony of SCALZITTI himself 16. that it is his claim that he maintained his residence at 10631/2 Sumner Avenue throughout his term of office. Because the residency requirement of an office holder is one which extends throughout the entire term of office, if at any point in time SCALZITTI's residence, during the term of office for which he was elected as a Director, was outside of Division 1, the Office must be declared vacant and his position forfeited.
- The credible evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom is 17. irrefutable that SCALZITTI did not intend nor have physical connection with 1063 1/2 Sumner Avenue as his place of residence between December 8, 2000 and December, 2001. As such, the irrefutable credible evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom is that SCALZITTI did not reside, maintain his residence, within the Division from which he was elected throughout the entirety of his term of office.
- Even though not required of the Court on the Motion for Judgment and defendant having presented his evidence regarding ownership through his own testimony and that of his mother, the Court specifically finds that at no time did SCALZITTI own property within the geographical boundaries of the Helix Water District. Therefore, SCALZITTI did not at all times qualify for Office because he was not a landowner within the District.
 - The Court has reached the following conclusions on the issues presented: 19.
 - SCALZITTI has failed to establish his residency throughout his term a. of office as being continuously located at 1063½ Sumner.

- SCALZITTI has failed to establish that he was a landowner within b. the geographical boundaries of the Helix Water District throughout his term of office.
- SCALZITTI has failed to sustain his burden of proof that he is qualified to hold the office of Director from Division 1 of the Helix Water District throughout his entire term of office.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:

- Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the People ex rel. LINDEN; 20.
- JOEL SCALZITTI is immediately ousted from the Office of Director of the 21. Helix Water District:
- The Office of Director of the Helix Water District, Division 1, shall be and 22. is declared to be vacant;
- The People, acting through the relator JOHN B. LINDEN as a private 23. attorney general, have prevailed and are the prevailing party in this action in quo warranto:
- LINDEN recovers against SCALZITTI the costs of the action in the 24. pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 809 amount of \$ [LINDEN shall submit a memorandum of costs];
- The Helix Water District recovers against SCALZITTI a reimbursement of 25. all per diem payments made to SCALZITTI during the time he unlawfully held office in [upon presentation of an accounting by the Helix the amount of \$___ Water District.)

DATE: OCT 1 8 2002

WILLIAM J. HOWATT, JR. HON, WILLIAM J. HOWATT JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

EXEMPT FROM FILING FEES JAMES B. GILPIN, Bar No. 151466 1 PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT MELISSA W. WOO, Bar No. 192056 **CODE SECTION 6103** LAW OFFICES OF 2 BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP 402 WEST BROADWAY, 13^{TH} FLOOR 3 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101-3542 TELEPHONE: (619) 525-1300 TELECOPIER: (619) 233-6118 5 Attorneys for Cross-Defendant HELIX WATER DISTRICT, and REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST HAROLD BALL, H. WARREN BUCKNER, BARBARA BARBER and JIM **LEWANSKI** 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - EAST COUNTY DIVISION 11 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF Case No. GIE 012239 CALIFORNIA ON THE RELATION OF Judge: William J. Howatt 12 JOHN B. LINDEN. 13 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN Plaintiff. SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION BY CROSS-DEFENDANTS HELIX 14 v. WATER DISTRICT AND REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST HAROLD BALL, H. 15 JOEL SCALZITTI, WARREN BUCKNER, BARBARA BARBER and JIM LEWANSKI FOR 16 Defendant. RESTRAINING ORDER 17 JOEL SCALZITTI, 18 OCTOBER 31, 2002 DATE: Cross-Complainant, 4:00 P.M. TIME: 19 17 DEPT: ٧. 20 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN THE RELATION OF June 24, 2002 21 Trial Date: JOHN B. LINDEN, HELIX WATER DISTRICT, SALLY McPHERSON, sued 22 solely in her capacity as the San Diego County Registrar of Voters, and DOES 1 23 through 50, 24 Cross-Defendants. 25 REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST: 26 HAROLD BALL; H. WARREN BUCKNER; 27 BARBARA BARBER; JIM LEWANSKI.

1	Cross-Defendants Helix Water District and Real Parties in Interest Harold Ball, H. Warren
2	Buckner, Barbara Barber and Jim Lewanski respectfully request that the Court take judicial notice
3	of the following documents (of which true and correct copies are attached) in support of its Ex Parte
4	Application for Restraining Order:
5	EXHIBIT A: Decision of the Court Upon the Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment in the Quo
6	Warranto Action Before the Court;
7	EXHIBIT B: Judgment for Plaintiff and Order.
8	The Court is requested to take judicial notice of Exhibits "A" and "B" pursuant to Evidence
9	Code sections 452 and 453. Both Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "B" are documents of record filed with
10	this Court. A court may properly take judicial notice of documents in its own records (Evidence
11	Code section 452(e); Day v. Sharp (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 904, 914 [123 Cal.Rptr. 918], citing 2
12	Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (2d ed. 1982) Judicial Notice, section 47.2, p. 1757).
13	DATED: October <u>90</u> , 2002 BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP
14	
15	By: MMWSairs Sor
16	JAMES B. GILPIN MELISSA W. WOO
17	Attorneys for Cross-Defendants HELIX WATER DISTRICT and Real
18	Parties in Interest HAROLD BALL, H. WARREN BUCKNER, BARBARA
19	BARBER and JIM LEWANSKI
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JIM LEWANSKI.

1.	IT APPEARING TO THE COURT, based upon the Ex Parte Application and other
2	documents filed therewith by Cross-Defendants Helix Water District ("District") and Real Parties
3	in Interest Harold Ball, H. Warren Buckner, Barbara Barber and Jim Lewanski that this is a proper
4	case for granting a restraining order to prevent Defendant/Cross-Complainant Joel Scalzitti from
5	representing to any member of the public that he is a Board Member, representative of, or otherwise
6	affiliated with, the Helix Water District.
7	IT FURTHER APPEARING TO THE COURT that unless a restraining order is issued, it is
8	probable that great and irreparable injury will result; and for good cause therefore,
9	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Joel Scalzitti is hereby restrained from representing to any
10	member of the public that he is a Board Member, representative of, or otherwise affiliated with, the
11	Helix Water District.
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EXEMPT FROM FILING FEES JAMES B. GILPIN, Bar No. 151466 1 PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT MELISSA W. WOO, Bar No. 192056 CODE SECTION 6103 LAW OFFICES OF 2 BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP 402 WEST BROADWAY, 13TH FLOOR 3 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101-3542 4 TELEPHONE: (619) 525-1300 TELECOPIER: (619) 233-6118 5 Attorneys for Cross-Defendants HELIX WATER DISTRICT, and REAL PARTIES IN 6 INTEREST HAROLD BALL, H. WARREN BUCKNER, BARBARA BARBER and JIM 7 **LEWANSKI** 8 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - EAST COUNTY DIVISION 11 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ON THE RELATION OF Case No. GIE 012239 12 JOHN B. LINDEN. Judge: William J. Howatt 13 Dept. 17 Plaintiff, 14 DECLARATION OF LORI L. FORD OF ν. TELEPHONIC NOTICE OF EX PARTE 15 HEARING JOEL SCALZITTI, 16 Defendant. 17 JOEL SCALZITTI, OCTOBER 31, 2002 DATE: 18 TIME: 4:00 P.M. Cross-Complainant, DEPT: 17 19 v. 20 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF Trial Date: June 24, 2002 CALIFORNIA IN THE RELATION OF 21 JOHN B. LINDEN, HELIX WATER DISTRICT, SALLY McPHERSON, sued 22 solely in her capacity as the San Diego County Registrar of Voters, and DOES 1 23 through 50, 24 Cross-Defendants. 25 REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST: 26 HAROLD BALL: H. WARREN BUCKNER; 27 BARBARA BARBER; JIM LEWANSKI 28

DECLARATION RE NOTICE OF EX PARTE HEARING

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I, Lori L. Ford, declare as follows:

- 1. I am employed with the law firm of Best Best & Krieger LLP, the attorneys of record for Defendants Helix Water District and Real Parties in Interest Harold Ball, H. Warren Buckner, Barbara Barber, Jim Lewanski, in the above-entitled matter. I am secretary to Melissa W. Woo, one of the counsel primarily responsible for handling this case on behalf of Defendants. I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth below and could and would competently testify thereto if required to do so.
- 2. On Thursday, October 30, 2002, between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., I telephoned the law offices of Robert Ottilie and gave notice to his assistant, Frieda, of Ms. Woo's Ex Parte appearance on behalf of Defendants and of the nature of the Ex Parte application. Further, on October 30, 2002, I faxed to Mr. Ottilie copies of Defendants' Ex Parte Application for Restraining Order, and all supporting papers.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 30th day of October, 2002 at San Diego, California.

Lori I Ford

EXEMPT FROM FILING FEES JAMES B. GILPIN, Bar No. 151466 1 PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT MELISSA W. WOO, Bar No. 192056 **CODE SECTION 6103** LAW OFFICES OF 2 BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP 402 WEST BROADWAY, 13^{TH} FLOOR 3 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101-3542 TELEPHONE: (619) 525-1300 4 TELECOPIER: (619) 233-6118 Attorneys for Cross-Defendant HELIX WATER DISTRICT, and REAL PARTIES IN 6 INTEREST HAROLD BALL, H. WARREN BUCKNER, BARBARA BARBER and JIM 7 **LEWANSKI** 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - EAST COUNTY DIVISION 11 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF Case No. GIE 012239 CALIFORNIA ON THE RELATION OF Judge: William J. Howatt 12 JOHN B. LINDEN, DECLARATION OF JULIE CRAVEN IN 13 Plaintiff, SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION 14 BY CROSS-DEFENDANT HELIX ٧. WATER DISTRICT FOR RESTRAINING 15 ORDER JOEL SCALZITTI, 16 Defendant. 17 JOEL SCALZITTI, 18 OCTOBER 31, 2002 DATE: Cross-Complainant, 4:00 P.M. TIME: 19 DEPT: 17 ٧. 20 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN THE RELATION OF 21 June 24, 2002 Trial Date: JOHN B. LINDEN, HELIX WATER DISTRICT, SALLY McPHERSON, sued 22 solely in her capacity as the San Diego County Registrar of Voters, and DOES 1 23 through 50,, 24 Cross-Defendants. 25 REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST: 26 HAROLD BALL; H. WARREN BUCKNER; 27 BARBARA BARBER; JIM LEWANSKI. 28

DECLARATION OF JULIE CRAVEN IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR RESTRAINING ORDER

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I, Julie Craven, declare as follows:

- 1. I am a student in the eleventh grade at Grossmont Union High School.
- 2. On Tuesday, October 22, 2002, I attended my U.S. History class at Grossmont Union High School with Mr. Neill. During this class, Joel Scalzitti, appeared as a guest lecturer. During his lecture, Mr. Scalzitti told the class that he was with the Helix Water District. Mr. Scalzitti spoke to the class about the campaign of Duane Hanson.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this and day of October, 2002 at El Cayon, California.

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EXEMPT FROM FILING FEES JAMES B. GILPIN, Bar No. 151466 1 PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT MELISSA W. WOO, Bar No. 192056 CODE SECTION 6103 LAW OFFICES OF 2 BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP 402 WEST BROADWAY, 13TH FLOOR 3 SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101-3542 TELEPHONE: (619) 525-1300 4 TELECOPIER: (619) 233-6118 5 Attorneys for Cross-Defendant HELIX WATER DISTRICT, and REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST HAROLD BALL, H. WARREN BUCKNER, BARBARA BARBER and JIM LEWANSKI 8 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - EAST COUNTY DIVISION 11 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ON THE RELATION OF Case No. GIE 012239 12 Judge: William J. Howatt JOHN B. LINDEN. 13 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND Plaintiff, AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF EX 14 PARTE APPLICATION BY CROSS-٧. **DEFENDANTS HELIX WATER** 15 DISTRICT FOR RESTRAINING ORDER JOEL SCALZITTI, AND REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST 16 HAROLD BALL, H. WARREN Defendant. BUCKNER, BARBARA BARBER and JIM 17 LEWANSKI JOEL SCALZITTI, 18 Cross-Complainant, OCTOBER 31, 2002 DATE: 19 4:00 P.M. TIME: DEPT: 17 v. 20 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 21 CALIFORNIA IN THE RELATION OF June 24, 2002 Trial Date: JOHN B. LINDEN, HELIX WATER 22 DISTRICT, SALLY McPHERSON, sued solely in her capacity as the San Diego 23 County Registrar of Voters, and DOES 1 through 50,, 24 Cross-Defendants. 25 REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST: 26 HAROLD BALL; 27 H. WARREN BUCKNER; BARBARA BARBER; 28 JIM LEWANSKI.

Ps & A'S IN SUPPORT OF EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR RESTRAINING ORDER

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Cross-Defendant Helix Water District ("District") and Real Parties in Interest Harold Ball, H. Warren Buckner, Barbara Barber and Jim Lewanski respectfully submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of their Ex Parte Application for an Order restraining Joel Scalzitti ("Scalzitti") from representing to any member of the public that he is a Board Member, representative of, or otherwise affiliated with, the Helix Water District.

I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On May 30, 2002, the Attorney General granted leave pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 803 to relator John B. Linden (hereinafter "Linden") to file a Complaint for Quo Warranto in the name of the People of the State of California and to conduct and prosecute the action on behalf of the People of the State of California. The Quo Warranto Action sought to oust defendant Joel Scalzitti (hereinafter "Scalzitti") from his position as Member of the Board of Directors of the District on the ground that Scalzitti is not and has never been an owner of real property within the District and does not reside within the District.

On or about June 10, 2002, Scalzitti filed a Cross-Complaint against the District and four of its Directors, including, Harold Ball, Warren Buckner, Barbara Barber, and Jim Lewanski. In the Cross-Complaint, Scalzitti attempts to state three causes of action including: (1) declaratory relief regarding whether District is an irrigation district and whether District is a "landowner" district and if so, a declaration that all of the Director position have been conducted illegally); (2) writ of mandate compelling the District and each of them to (a) void all elections conducted; (b) vacate the Directors position with respect to each position filled by an illegal election or election in violation of the law; and (c) order compelling the District to immediately conduct a new election to fill each Director position that has been held by an individual elected at an illegal election or an election in violation of the law; and (3) injunctive relief directing the District and its employees and agents from removing Scalzitti from office unless all other offices are vacated. The Cross-Complaint was stayed pending the trial of the Quo Warranto Action.

The trial of the Quo Warranto Action commenced on June 24, 2002. Because the matter was not completed on June 24, 2002, the hearing was continued to July 17, 2002 for the

presentation of additional evidence. On June 26, 2002 at the request of Scalzitti, the hearing was continued to July 30, 2002. Further testimonial and documentary evidence was presented during the course of the hearing. The hearing was not completed on July 30, 2002 and was continued to the next day, July 31, 2002 for the presentation of final testimonial evidence, additional documentary evidence and the argument of counsels upon Linden's Motion for Judgment.

At the conclusion of the trial, oral arguments of counsel and at the request of counsel for Scalzitti was continued until September 6, 2002 in order to allow presentation of additional briefing. After the additional briefs were submitted, the Court took the matter under submission for decision on September 30, 2002.

On or about October 16, 2002, the Court issued its "Decision of the Court Upon Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment in the Quo Warranto Action Before the Court." (RJN, Exh. "A.") The Court reached the following conclusions:

SCALZITTI has failed to establish his residency throughout his term of office as being continuously located at 10631/2 Sumner.

SCALZITTI has failed to establish that he was a landowner within the geographical construct of the Helix Water District throughout his term of office.

SCALZITTI has failed to sustain his burden of proof that he is qualified to hold the office of Director from Division I of the Helix Water District throughout the entire term of his office.

THEREFORE, it is the determination of this Court that Judgment must and shall be entered in favor of the People ex rel. LINDEN; and JOEL SCALZITTI is immediately ousted from the office of the Director of the Helix Water District; and the office of Director of the Helix Water District, Division I shall be and is declared to be vacant; and the People, acting through Realtor John B. LINDEN as a private attorney general have prevailed and are the prevailing party in this action in quo warranto.

On or about October 18, 2002, the Court entered judgment declaring that "JOEL SCALZITTI is immediately ousted from the Office of Director of the Helix Water District" and that "The Office of Director of the Helix Water District, Division 1, shall be and is declared to be vacant."

On or about October 22, 2002, Scalzitti gave a presentation to a U.S. History Class at Grossmont Union High School. (Craven Decl., ¶ 2.) During the course of the presentation,

Scalzitti conveyed the representation that he was affiliated with the Helix Water District and spoke to the class about the campaign of Duane Hanson, a candidate in the upcoming elections for Director of the District. (Craven Decl., ¶ 2.) Because Scalzitti, pursuant to the October 18, 2002 order and judgment, has been ousted from the Office of the Helix Water District, the District seeks an order restraining Scalzitti from representing to any member of the public that he is a Board Member, representative of, or otherwise affiliated with the District.

II.

THIS COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO GRANT THE RELIEF REQUESTED HEREIN BY THE DISTRICT

An injunction may be granted when it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and the relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or continuance of an act complaintive, either for a limited period or perpetually period. (Code Civ. Proc., § 526(a)(1); Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Al Malaikah Auditorium Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 207, 223 [281 Cal.Rptr. 216].) An injunction may also be issued when it appears by the complaint (or affidavits, or declarations) that the commission or continuance of act during the litigation would produce waste, or great or irreparable injury to a party to the action. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 526(a)(2), 2015.5; Volpicelli v. Jared Sydney Torrance Memorial Hosp. (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 242 [167 Cal.Rptr. 610].)

As set forth above, this Court has entered an order and judgment which oust Scalzitti from the Office of Director of the Helix Water District" and further declared the office vacant.

Because Scalzitti is no longer a Director of the Helix Water District, he cannot make that representation to the public and should be restrained from doing so.

A. AN INJUNCTION SHOULD ISSUE BECAUSE THE COURT HAS ALREADY DETERMINED THAT SCALZITTI IS NO LONGER A DIRECTOR OF THE HELIX WATER DISTRICT.

In determining whether the issuance of the an injunction is appropriate, the courts have looked at two interrelated factors. The first is the likelihood that the [applicant] will prevail on the merits at trial. The second is the interim harm that the [applicant] is likely to sustain if the preliminary injunction is denied as compared to the harm that [opponent] is likely to suffer if the

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preliminary injunction were issued. (Cohen v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 40 Cal.3d 277, 286 [219 Cal.Rptr. 467].)

As set forth above, this Court has already determined that Scalzitti is no longer a Director of the Helix Water District and that the position previously held by Scalzitti is vacant. Accordingly, there is no harm to Scalzitti if the order requested by the District is entered. However, the harm to the District would be great if the order requested is not entered because Scalzitti may, as demonstrated by the declaration of Julie Craven submitted herewith, continue to represent himself as a member of the Board of Directors of the Helix Water District.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court should enter an Order restraining Scalzitti from representing to any member of the public that he is a Board Member, representative of or otherwise affiliated with the Helix Water District. As set forth above, pursuant to the October 18, 2002 judgment entered by the Court in the original action, Scalzitti has been ousted from office. Hence, because Scalzitti is no longer a Board Member of the Helix Water District, he may not make such representations to the public.

DATED: October 30, 2002

BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP

MELISSA W. WOO

Attorneys for Cross-Defendants HELIX WATER DISTRICT and Real

Parties in Interest HAROLD BALL, H.

WARREN BUCKNER, BARBARA BARBER and JIM LEWANSKI

EXEMPT FROM FILING FEES JAMES B. GILPIN, Bar No. 151466 1 PURSUANT TO GOVERNMENT MELISSA W. WOO, Bar No. 192056 **CODE SECTION 6103** 2 LAW OFFICES OF BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP 3 402 WEST BROADWAY, 13TH FLOOR SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101-3542 TELEPHONE: (619) 525-1300 4 TELECOPIER: (619) 233-6118 5 Attorneys for Cross-Defendants HELIX WATER DISTRICT, and REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST HAROLD BALL, H. WARREN BUCKNER, BARBARA BARBER and JIM LEWANSKI 8 9 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 10 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO - EAST COUNTY DIVISION 11 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF Case No. GIE 012239 CALIFORNIA ON THE RELATION OF 12 Judge: William J. Howatt JOHN B. LINDEN, 13 EX PARTE APPLICATION BY CROSS-Plaintiff, DEFENDANTS HELIX WATER DISTRICT AND REAL PARTIES IN 14 V. INTEREST HAROLD BALL, H. WARREN 15 BUCKNER, BARBARA BARBER and JIM JOEL SCALZITTI, LEWANSKI FOR RESTRAINING 16 ORDER Defendant. 17 JOEL SCALZITTI, 18 OCTOBER 31, 2002 Cross-Complainant, DATE: TIME: 4:00 P.M. 19 DEPT: 17 v. 20 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN THE RELATION OF 21 Trial Date: June 24, 2002 JOHN B. LINDEN, HELIX WATER DISTRICT, SALLY McPHERSON, sued 22 solely in her capacity as the San Diego County Registrar of Voters, and DOES 1 23 through 50... 24 Cross-Defendants. 25 REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST: 26 HAROLD BALL: H. WARREN BUCKNER; 27 BARBARA BARBER: JIM LEWANSKI. 28

Cross-Defendants Helix Water District and Real Parties in Interest Harold Ball, H. Warren Buckner, Barbara Barber and Jim Lewanski hereby make the following Ex Parte Application for a restraining order preventing Defendant/Cross-Complainant Joel Scalzitti from representing to any member of the public that he is a Board Member, representative of, or otherwise affiliated with, the Helix Water District.

Said Application will be based upon the supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Melissa W. Woo, the oral argument of counsel, the entire record herein, and any other evidence which may be presented at the time of hearing this Application.

DATED: October 30, 2002

BEST BEST & KRIEGER LLP

By:

JAMES B. GILPIN MELISSA W. WOO

Attorneys for Cross-Defendants
HELIX WATER DISTRICT and Real
Parties in Interest HAROLD BALL, H.
WARREN BUCKNER, BARBARA
BARBER and JIM LEWANSKI

FOLEY & LARDNER 1 ATTORNEYS AT LAW 402 W. BROADWAY, 23RD FLOOR SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 92101-3542 TELEPHONE: (619) 234-6655 FACSIMILE: (619) 234-3510 3 KENNETH S. KLEIN, BAR NO. 129172 4 GREGORY V. MOSER, BAR NO. 101137 JOHN C. LEMMO, BAR NO. 190885 ATTORNEYS FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 10 **EAST COUNTY DIVISION** 11 12 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA EX) CASE No.: GIE 012239 REL. JOHN B. LINDEN, 13 JOINDER OF PLAINTIFF IN EX PARTE APPLICATION OF HELIX WATER PLAINTIFF, 14 DISTRICT FOR RESTRAINING ORDER ٧. 15 JUDGE: HON. WILLIAM HOWATT, JR. JOEL SCALZITTI, 16 DEPT.: DEFENDANT. DATE: OCTOBER 31, 2002 17 8:30 A.M. TIME: 18 19 20 /// 21 22 III23 /// 24 III25 III26 III27 /// 28 /// REQUEST TO JOIN EX PARTE APPLICATION OF HELIX WATER DISTRICT FOR RESTRAINING ORDER:

REQUEST FOR CONTEMPT ORDER CASE NO. GIE 012239

017.206267.1

<u>INTRODUCTION</u>

The People ex rel. John Linden (the "People") Join the Helix Water District's Ex Parte Application as it relates to the underlying quo warranto action to which the People are the Plaintiff, specifically as it relates to compliance with the Judgment and Order entered on October 18, 2002.

SCALZITTI WILLFULLY MISREPRESENTED THAT HE WAS A DIRECTOR,
AFTER JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED

Mr. Scalzitti's attorney, Bob Ottilie, telephoned this office at about 9:30 A.M. on October 22, 2002, to discuss his ex parte motion for reconsideration of the Judgment and Order. In Mr. Ottilie's motion, he recognized that there was in place a judgment that had removed Joel Scalzitti from the Helix Water District Board. Nonetheless, that same day Mr. Scalzitti apparently was falsely representing that he was a member of the Board of Directors. Further, Mr. Scalzitti was quoted in the San Diego Union Tribune days before (on October 18, 2002) in an article entitled *Water board washes its hands of member ousted in dispute*. When Mr. Scalzitti spoke to Ms. Craven's history class on October 22, 2002, he knew very well that he had been ousted from the Board.

MR. SCALZITTI ACTED IN CIVIL CONTEMPT OF THIS COURT'S ORDER

By intentionally misrepresenting to the public that he was a member of the Board, Mr. Scalzitti acted in contempt of this Court. Apparently, he lied about his affiliation in a presentation to high school students in the context of discussing a candidate for election to the very Board from which he was ousted—two weeks before the election.

On its own motion, or on motion of any party, the court may cite any person before it for contempt. Code Civ. Proc. § 128. "Contempt" is any act, in or out of court, "that tends to impede, embarrass or obstruct the court in the performance of its duties." In re Shortridge (1893) 99 Cal. 526, 532. Any party to the action (including entities and organizations) who willfully disobeys court orders may be punished for contempt. In re

REQUEST TO JOIN EX PARTE APPLICATION OF HELIX WATER DISTRICT FOR RESTRAINING ORDER;
REQUEST FOR CONTEMPT ORDER

017.206267.1

Coleman (1974) 12 Cal.3d 568, 573. **CONCLUSION** For the forgoing reasons, the Court should on its own motion order penalties for Mr. Scalzitti's contempt. DATE: OCTOBER 30, 2002 FOLEY & LARDNER KENNETH S. KLEIN GREGORY V. MOSER JOHN C. LEMMO ATTORNEYS FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

PROOF OF SERVICE

1 I am employed in the County of, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a 2 party to this action; my current business address is 402 W. Broadway, Suite 2300, San 3 Diego, California 92101-3542. On October 30, 2002. I served the foregoing document(s) described as: 4 Joinder of Plaintiff in Ex Parte Application of Helix Water District for Restraining 5 Order 6 on the interested parties in this action as follows: 7 8 BY THE FOLLOWING MEANS: X I placed a true copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelope(s) addressed as follows: 9 X 10 Attorney for Defendant Joel Scalzitti Robert P. Ottilie, Esq. 550 W. C Street, Suite 1600 11 San Diego, CA 92101 12 Attorney for Helix Water District Melissa W. Wood, Esq. Best Best & Krieger, LLP 13 402 West Broadway, 13th Floor San Diego, CA 92101-3542 14 15 BY HAND DELIVERY. I delivered the envelope(s) by hand to addressee(s). X 16 17 Executed on October 30, 2002, at San Diego, California. \mathbf{X}_{-} 18 19 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California X that the above is true and correct. 20 I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this 21 court at whose direction the service was made. 22 23

Cynthia J. King

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Grant of the Superior Count NUV I 2 2002

By: D. MUNSHOWER, Deputy

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

EAST COUNTY DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ex

Case No.: GIE-012239

13 rel. JOHN B. LINDEN,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S POST HEARING MOTIONS

Plaintiff,

15 Vs.

W-29,

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JOEL SCALZITTI,

Defendant.

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On November 4, 2002, the Court, the Honorable William J. Howatt, Jr., presiding, heard and considered the Post Hearing Motions of the Defendant JOEL SCALZITT (1) To Vacate the Judgment Entered by the Court on October 18, 2002 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sections 476 [presumably section 478] and 583: (2) For a New Trial, or, in the alternative, To Modify the Court's Statement of Decision/Judgment; (3) For Reconsideration; and, (4) To Stay the Enforcement of the Court's Judgment.

The People of the State of California were represented through the Realtor JOHN B. LINDEN
by POLEY & LARDNER by KENNETH S. KLEIN, Esq., GREGORY V. MOSER, Esq., and JOHN C. LEMMO;
the Helix Water District was represented by BEST, BEST & KRIEGER by MELISSA WOO, Esq.; the
Defendant JOEL SCALZITI was present and represented by ROBERT P. OTTILLE, Esq.

The Court received and considered the written arguments and Points and Authorities submitted by the Realtor and the Defendant as well as the oral presentations and lodged documents.

Based upon the Court's review of the evidence presented at the previous hearings, the Points and Authorities submitted by counsel for the parties and the oral arguments of counsel at the present hearing the Court reached the following determinations on the issues presented to the Court upon the Post Hearing Motions of the Defendant.

The Court denies the request for a Statement of Decision by the defendant as the Court has previously issued a 13-page written Decision in this matter. The vast majority of the "objections" stated by defendant relate to his disagreement with the conclusions regarding credibility of witnesses and the believability of evidence reached by the Court. The Court carefully reviewed and considered all aspects of the testimony of each witness and all of the documentary evidence before reaching its conclusions regarding believability. The oral testimony of the witnesses measured against the documentary evidence (which thoroughly contradicts the testimony) assisted the Court in resolving the question of credibility of the defendant and his position in this matter.

The offer of additional character evidence referenced in MR. OTTILIE'S comments to the Court regarding the number of personal supporters of the defendant present in the court com was noted by the Court. It is, however, frequently the case that character evidence is offered after the fact to explain, as are "good intentions", an unfortunate act. So too, like "good intentions", character evidence cannot erase intentional and deliberate conduct.

There is one point of clarification which has been pressed by Defendant, namely, that the Court identify the location at which the Defendant SCALZITTI was in residence if not within the geographic description of Division 1.

First, it is the Court's view that, as explained in the Court's written Decision filed on October 16, 2002, that SCALZIFFI was not in residence continuously in Division 1 for the reasons expressed

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 therein. Second, it is not the obligation of the Court to identify a specific place of residence of SCALZITTI but rather SCALZITTI'S burden of proof and burden of producing evidence under the in quo warranto action to establish his continuous residence within Division 1 and he did not satisfy either burden. It is, then, enough for the Court to have determined based upon all the evidence that SCALZITTI did not live continuously within the Division 1 geographic boundaries. The Court, herein, adopts all the factors previously set forth in the Court's written Decision of October 16, 2002 upon this issue of residency.

The request of SCALZITH to eliminate the requirement of Reimbursement or Restitution to the Helix Water District is DENIED. It is the Court's view (there being no authority to the contrary being presented) that the Court does have the inherent power and authority to require a reimbursement to the Water District of the funds received by an unqualified officer holder. As noted by the Court at the hearing of this matter, the amount of the restitution shall be determined only after a hearing at which the District shall have the burden of proof and the burden of producing evidence as to the exact amount paid to SCALZITH to which he was not entitled. At such hearing SCALZITH may again address the issue of the Court's authority to require restitution or reimbursement.

Pending the hearing defendant's Motions, the Court again reviewed the "ledger" and "calendars" reflecting alleged work by SCALZITT in conjunction with the Supplemental Declarations and materials of MS JUDY MATTHEWS (defendant's mother). The Court is not persuaded as to the legitimacy of these records both because they are incomplete and internally inconsistent as well as appearing to have been made all at one time and not on regular basis to reflect accurately hours of work completed at the time the work was accomplished. Additionally, it must be recalled that SCALZITTI was also operating as a property manager for MS MATTHEWS' real estate investments and there is nothing to distinguish these documents (Exhibits 7; 61; 62; 63 and 72) from his work as property manager. Finally, on this issue, the testimony of MS MATTHEWS and defendant SCALZITTI is not believable.

The Court would also note that the Objection of the defendant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 681.8 is wholly without merit as this Court extended time and date for the pleadings of the defendant's course. At no time did defendant ever request, in a timely fashion, to

MANACOR (CIANDO LIVELIA PERMITTED

present any additional evidence. Neither did the defendant ever request, prior to the present hearing, the opportunity to present additional evidence. Likewise, the Court has read and considered the lodged declarations and materials presented by the defendant and finds nothing new or significant that has changed the Court's view of all of the evidence presented.

CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION

Defendant SCALZITTI'S Motion to Vacate the Judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 478 and 663 is DENIED.

Defendant SCALZITTI'S Motion for a New Trial, or in the alternative, to Modify the Statement of Decision and Judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 662 is DEIVED.

Defendant SCALZITTI'S Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

Defendant SCALZITTI'S Motion for a Stay of the Enforcement of the Judgment is DENIED.

DATED: November 12, 2002.

WILLIAM J. HOWATT, JF., Judge

FIFED

Clark of the Superior Court

JAN 08 2003

By: D. MUNSHOWER, Deputy

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

EAST COUNTY DIVISION

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,)
ex. rel. JOHN B. LINDEN,)
Plaintiff,)
Vs.

Case No.: GIE-012239

DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT UPON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS; DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TAX COSTS; DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO THE IMPOSITION OF AN ORDER OF RESTITUTION

JOEL SCALZITTI,

Defendant.

The above-entitled matters came on regularly before the Court for determination of these post

trial issues. Defendant SCALZITTI has requested that the Court not only rule upon the various issues

presented but also prepare and file a Statement of Decision in ruling upon these post trial motions and

issues.

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FACTUAL SUMMARY

The present post trial motions come at the conclusion of an *in quo warranto* action in which the Court was required to make factual and legal conclusions after the presentation of oral and documentary evidence regarding the legitimacy of SCALZITTI'S claim to hold the elective office of Member of the Board of Directors of the Helix Water District. At the conclusion of the evidentiary and argument presentations of counsel the Court ruled that SCALZITTI was not qualified to hold the office to which he was elected because he was not a resident of Division One and he was not a landowner within the District for his entire term of office. Upon those factual and legal findings the Court ruled that SCALZITTI did not have a rightful claim to the office to which he was elected and the Court declared the office of Director, Division One to be vacant.

The People of the State of California, on the relation of JOHN B. LINDEN, have pursued this action in quo warranto based upon and under the authority of a formal preliminary finding and leave to sue letter by the Attorney General of the State of California. LINDEN prevailed in his action.

LINDEN now seeks to recover attorney's fees and costs as the undisputed prevailing party pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 809 and the private attorney general doctrine pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.

STATEMENT OF DECISION: ISSUES

The Court is not informed of specific issues which the Defendant seeks to have addressed in a Statement of Decision by the Court. However, the Court will attempt to address each of the concerns that was apparent from the oral arguments heard by the Court on December 13, 2002.

DISCUSSION

Request of the Court for an Accounting from the Helix Water District and

Reimbursement/Restitution for Monies Received By SCALZITTI While Serving As a Director of the

Helix Water District:

 The Helix Water District responded to the Court's request for an accounting of funds paid to SCALZITTI during his holding of office on the Board of Directors. The accounting provided to the Court establishes that SCALZITTI received compensation form the Water District in the total amount of \$51,536.84. This amount is the total of \$30,300.00 in per diem payments; \$7,381.37 for attendance at conferences as a member of the District's Board; \$389.86 for mileage reimbursements; \$1,928.88 for miscellaneous expenses paid by the District; \$330.51 for installation of computer by Cox Communication and, \$11,206.22 for Health and Life Insurance premiums paid by the District on behalf of SCALZITTI.

The Defendant does not dispute the accounting.

Defendant argues that the Court is without legal authority or inherent power to issue an Order of Reimbursement/Restitution. Factually, Defendant argues that he attended all meetings of the Board and conferences for which he was paid a per diem. All other expenses paid by the District were reasonably incurred by Defendant in the performance of his responsibilities as a member of the Board and for which he was legitimately reimbursed by the District upon the submission of proof of the expenses.

Defendant argues that under Code of Civil Procedure section 809 the sole and exclusive remedies provided by statute in an *in quo warranto* action are the ouster from office, payment of costs, and the imposition of a fine of up to \$5,000.00. In support of this proposition Defendant cites the Court to the decision in *Havemeyer v. Superior Court (1890) 84 Cal. 327*. This Court is persuaded that the *Havemeyer* Court decision establishes that, prior to the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, the only action which may be taken by the Court upon the finding of guilty in an *in quo warranto* action is that which is specifically provided within the terms of Section 809 of the Code of Civil Procedure This conclusion is supported by the determination of the Court of Appeal in a later decision in the case of *Black v. Bailey (1916) 30 Cat.App. 581*. In the *Black* case, (an *in quo warranto* action), the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order requiring the ousted office holder to repay salary received.

This Court, therefore acknowledges that it is without legal precedent and/or authority to impose a condition of Reimbursement/Restitution.

RULING: THE COURT RECEIVES THE ACCOUNTING OF THE HELIX WATER DISTRICT
BUT DECLINES TO ISSUE AN ORDER OF REIMBURSEMENT/RESTITUTION OF THE SUMS
STATED.

Defendant's Motion to Tax Costs:

The Defendant objects to the claim by LINDEN to recover the sum of \$1,964.47 for the cost of the trial transcripts as well as the sum of \$100.00 for the bond premium. Defendant's objection to the cost of the bond is that there has been no documentation of this expense by the Plaintiff. Defendant objects to the cost of the trial transcripts as an unnecessary expense. Defendant asserts that the transcripts may well have been of assistance and beneficial, but nothing to establish that the transcripts were necessary has been presented by LINDEN. LINDEN, however, argues that the production of the transcripts was made necessary by the interruption of the trial and examination of witnesses as well as in the preparation of the Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment, a brief which was requested of the Plaintiff by the Defendant.

It is generally considered to be the rule that trial transcripts not ordered by the trial court are not allowable as costs. (See Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5(b)(5)).

The Court did request copies of the transcripts that had been prepared at the request of Plaintiff's counsel. These transcripts were necessary to the Court's preparation for the balance of the evidentiary proceedings as well as helpful to the Court in the preparation of its Statement of Decision as requested by Defendant's counsel. These transcripts were certainly necessary in the proper preparation of counsel for the balance of the evidentiary proceedings as well as the Plaintiff's Brief in support of the Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment.

The Court concludes, based upon the foregoing, that the preparation of the trial transcripts was a legitimate and necessary expense in the prosecution of this action. The bond premium is also a legitimate expense.

RULING: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TAX COSTS IS DENIED.

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Plaintiff's Motion for an Award of Attorney's Fees:

Counsel for the Defendant raises the previous argument that section 809 is specific and exclusive with regard to penalties to be imposed and costs awarded. Counsel asserts that the "costs" referred to in section 809 do not include an award of attorney's fees but simply the costs of litigation. Counsel for the Defendant also argues that since the action in quo warranto is exclusive to the State of California and the State is a public entity, attorney's fees cannot be awarded to the Plaintiff.

Addressing these two arguments it is important to note that the cases and propositions of the cases cited by Defendant all are dependent upon legal analysis and precedent that is prior to the addition of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.

It is also worthy of note that the following section, section 810, uses "costs" in conjunction with the phrase "expenses" in very much a collective sense. Such language when construed in a reasonable manner as affecting both section 809 and 810 includes not only actual costs of litigation but attorney's fees as well. Certainly if a relator is to be liable for the costs and expenses of the failure of the action, it stands to reason that the successful relator is entitled to collect costs and expenses in victory.

It is this Court's view, however that such a construction of statutes is unnecessary in that the present *in quo warranto* action is exactly the type of action for which Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 was enacted. It cannot be gainsaid that there are a significant number of actions which pertain to the public interest that the Attorney General of this State does not have the resources to pursue. In the case at bar the issuance of a Leave To Sue authorization by the Attorney General (Opinion of the Attorney General Number 02-306 dated May 10, 2002) is based upon the demonstration of the existence of a substantial question of fact or law of sufficient public interest to warrant the granting of leave to sue *in quo warranto*. In the final words of the Opinion: "Rather, both the public and the District have an interest in a judicial resolution of this matter. Accordingly, the application for leave to sue *in quo warranto* is GRANTED." (Opinion of the Attorney General, Number 02-306, May 10, 2002). It is difficult to perceive a matter of more substantial public interest than the legitimacy of the democratic elective process. It is,

therefore, without question that the authorization of LINDEN to proceed in the name of the People of the State of California was based upon a substantial issue of public interest and the resolution of which will result in a substantial public benefit.

To paraphrase President John F. Kennedy, the deception of one voter in a democracy impairs the security of all.

In surn, it is appropriate to award attorney's fees to the successful private relator in an in quo warranto action. The Supreme Court in the case of People of the State of California ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Association v. City of Seal Beach (1984) 36 Cal.3d 591 at page 602 states in a matter of fact way, almost in passing, in an in quo warranto action:

"We are satisfied that relators' action meets the requirement of section 1021.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 142-143...). They are therefore entitled to recover attorney fees." [Emphasis added].

It is also quite clear that prior to the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 the Supreme Court concluded that it was and is within the inherent power and equitable authority of the California courts to award attorney's fees under a "Private Attorney General" theory to litigants who successfully pursue "Public Interest" litigation in which an important constitutional right is vindicated. (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25 [Serrano III]; cited in Woodland Hills Residents Association, Inc. v. City Council of Los Angeles (1979) 23, Cal.3d 917, 924-925).

In conclusion the successful relator in an *in quo warranto* action may be awarded attorney's fees under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.

This conclusion is not end of the analysis with regard to the request for attorney's fees by

LINDEN. The trial court must make the specific finding required by the statute that the action has resulted
in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest. Additionally, it is the responsibility of
the trial court to determine the reasonableness of the attorney's fees requested by the successful relator.

The Court finds that this action brought by LINDEN as relator on behalf of the People of the State of California pursuant to a Leave to Sue authorization from the Attorney General is an authorization to proceed in the capacity of a private attorney general. The Court also finds that the resolution of this matter has conferred a substantial public benefit upon the general public and, in particular, a significant and substantial public benefit to the public served by the Helix Water District. The Court also finds that in the vindication of an important public and constitutional right the financial burden imposed upon the relator LINDEN was out of proportion to his individual or personal stake in the matter.

As to the reasonableness of the fees requested by LINDEN, the Court has determined that upon an analysis of the complexity of the issues presented, the investigation and preparation for the Leave to Sue letter, the preparation and presentation of the legal and factual issues, the expertise required of counsel, and the skill and dedication of counsel to this matter that a reasonable award of attorney's fees is in the amount of \$75,000.00. The Court recognizes that this is significantly less than that requested and documented, but the Court is also cognizant of the need for an equitable balance which needs be struck between the result achieved and the significant impact such an award will have on SCALZITTI, the individual.

RULING: RELATOR LINDEN'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IS GRANTED IN THE SUM OF \$75,000.00 TO BE PAID BY THE DEFENDANT SCALZITTI.

ORDER UPON DETERMINATION

Counsel for the relator LINDEN is Ordered and Directed to prepare and submit to the Court an Order in conformity with the Court's Rulings in this matter as set forth above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 8, 2003.

WILLIAM HOWATT, JR., Judge