F-053 1-619-685-4638 From-FOLEY&LARNDER Oc't-16-2002 '05:01pm STEPHEN THUNBERG Clerk of the Superior Corn. OCT 1 6 2002 D. Munshower, Deputy By: R. ADAMS, Deputy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 9 EAST COUNTY DIVISION 10 11 Case No.: GIE-012239 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ) 12 DECISION OF THE COURT UPON THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT IN THE ex rel. JOHN B. LINDEN, 13 QUO WARRANTO ACTION BEFORE THE Plaintiff, COURT. 14 V5. 15 JOEL SCALZITTI, 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 PREFACE 20 JOEL SCALZITTI (hereinafter referred to as "SCALZITTI") was elected to a position as a Member 21 of the Board of Directors of the Helix Water District (hereinafter referred to as "DISTRICT"). Upon 22 application, JOHN B. LINDEN (hereinafter referred to as "LINDEN") was granted "Leave To Sue" in an 23 action in Quo Warranto by the Attorney General of the State of California in the name of the People of the 24 State of California against SCALZITTI. The purpose of the litigation is to determine whether or not 25 SCALZITTI is entitled to continue to hold and exercise the office of Member of the Board of Directors of

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the DISTRICT or should be ousted from this office and fined pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 809.

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The Complaint, entitled "VERIFIED COMPALINT IN QUO WARRANTO FOR OUSTER" was filed pursuant to the Leave to Sue on May 30, 2002.

## PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CASE

The Complaint having been filed on May 30, 2002 the Court held an ex parte hearing on June 4, 2002 was held to establish the procedures to be followed and set hearing dates. The Court set the date of June 24, 2002 for the commencement of the evidentiary hearing in this action. A General Denial proposed by counsel for SCALZITTI was ordered to be filed with the Court on or before June 7, 2002.

The evidentiary hearing was commenced on June 24, 2002. Testimony was presented and documentary evidence introduced. As the matter was not able to be completed in a single day as anticipated, the hearing was continued to July 17, 2002 for the presentation of additional evidence. On June 26, 2002 at the request of SCALZITTI the hearing was continued to July 30, 2002. The hearing proceeded on July 30, 2002. Further testimonial and documentary evidence was presented during the course of the hearing. The hearing was not completed on July 30th and was continued to the next day, July 31st for presentation of the final testimonial evidence, additional documentary evidence and the arguments of counsel upon LINDEN's Motion for Judgment, both Plaintiff and Defendant having rested their case.

At the conclusion of the oral arguments of counsel and at the request of counsel for SCALZITTI the Court continued the matter to September 6, 2002 in order to allow presentation of additional briefing. SCALZITTI's supplemental briefing was to be filed with the Court on or before August 26th and LINDEN's supplemental and responsive briefing was to be filed on or before September 6" at which point the Court would take the matter under submission for decision. Counsel for SCALZITTI requested additional time within which to file his supplemental briefing. Over the objection of LINDEN's counsel the Court granted the request for additional time to file the supplemental brief. Defendant was given until September 16,

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2002 in which to file his supplemental brief. The brief was filed on September 17th. Additional time was also given to LINDEN in which to file his supplemental brief. The brief was received and filed by the Court on September 30th. The Court took the matter under submission for decision on September 30, 2002.

#### INTRODUCTION

President Theodore Roosevelt once said, "It is character that counts in a nation as in a man." He also observed that "A lie is no more to be excused in politics than out of politics." It is unfortunate that this Court must address both the character and the mendacity of SCALZITTI to reach a conclusion in the present matter.

It may well be suggested that the present action is without the jurisdiction of the Court as it is a "political question" which the courts have traditionally eschewed. Initially in the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 LEd. 60, questions which are by their very nature political are not questions for the court. (Ibid., at page 170). However, it was Marbury v. Madison, supra, that clearly established that questions of constitutional magnitude and statutory construction are questions justiciable and not simply characterized as political. Here, too, this Court addresses not the electorate's choice of the candidates but rather the qualifications of the individual candidate to fulfill the requirements of office.

These matters are not without precedent. In San Diego County there have been previous instances in which current office holders are challenged as to the underlying qualifications for or the right to hold elective office. Two cases involving the Office of District Attorney for the County of San Diego come to mind: People of the State of California, ex rel. Sweet v. Ward (1895) 107 Cal. 236 and People of the State of California, ex rel. Webb v. Marsh (1916) 30 Cal.App. 424.

in this action the People of the State of California through LINDEN, as Realtor, seeks the removal of SCALZITTI from his position as an elected member of the Board of Directors of the Hellx Water District from Division 1. It is alleged by LINDEN that SCALZITTI has falled to qualify for this office upon two

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separate and exclusive grounds: (1) SCALZITTI was not at all times a resident of the defined area of Division 1; and/or (2) SCALZITTI was not at all times a landowner within the geographical description of the Helix Water District.

This action proceeds in quo warranto. LINDEN has received a right to sue letter from the Attorney General of the State of California and is acting, therefore, on behalf of and in the name of the People of the State of California.

The Court has bifurcated the issues and allegations set forth above. The Court will first address the question of SCALZITTI'S continuous residence within Division 1 of the Helix Water District. Should the Court determine that SCALZITTI is qualified by virtue of continuous residence within Division 1 at all relevant times the Court will next determine whether or not SCALZITTI has been a landowner within the Helix Water District at all relevant times. The legal analysis of the question of the Constitutionality of the Helix Water District's requirement of land ownership is to be addressed at a later date.

#### AN ACTION IN QUO WARRANTO

An action in quo warranto is an appropriate means by which to test the qualifications of an individual to hold public office. California Code of Civil Procedure section 803 provides for such an action. Section 803 provides:

\*An action may be brought by the attorney-general, in the name of the people of this state, upon his own information, or upon a complaint of a private party, against any person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises any public office, civil or military, or any franchise, or against any corporation, either de jure or de facto, which usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises any franchise, within this state. And the attorney general must bring the action, whenever he has reason to believe that any such office or franchise has been usurped, intruded into,

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or unlawfully held or exercised by any person, or when he is directed to do so by the governor."

The remedy in quo warranto is the appropriate and only procedure by which to determine the right to a public office where a de facto officeholder holds the office. See Klose v. Superior Court (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 913, 917-918; Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. Number 02-306 (May 10, 2002).

Upon application to the Attorney General of the State of California, Leave To Sue was granted to address two questions:

Is Joel Scalzitti unlawfully holding the office of director of the Helix Water

District due to a failure to satisfy the qualification of being a landowner within the district?

And.

2. Is Joel Scalzitti unlawfully holding the office of director of the Helix Water District due to a fallure to satisfy the qualification of being a resident within the division of the district from which he was elected?

The Attorney General determined that each of these two questions, based upon preliminary inquiry required judicial resolution. See Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen., Number 02-306, (May 10, 2002) at pages 1-2.

The genesis of an action in quo warranto is in the common law and is now statutorily provided by section 803 of the Code of Civil Procedure, noted above. In its broadest sense it is a formal judicial inquiry into the legitimacy or legality of the claim to an elective officer by the current officeholder. See American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, "Quo Warranto" by Anne M. Payner, J.D. It is, therefore, used primarily to question the authority of the claimant asserting a right to public elective office.

The Attorney General must conclude that the issuance of Leave to Sue *in Quo Warranto* is required to have a judicial resolution of a substantial question of fact or law and, if so, would the overall public interest be served by allowing the action to proceed. In this case, by granting the Leave to Sue, the

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Attorney General has determined that these factual and legal questions are not only ripe for determination, but also that the public interest is served by a judicial resolution of the issues.

The Opinion of the Attorney General concludes:

"In the present circumstances, Linden has submitted a verified statement of facts, supported by declarations signed under penalty of perjury, indicating Scalzitti's residence for purposes of section 21100 to be in Division 2 rather than Division 1 of the District. Scalzitti has not presented a verified statement of facts as to the issue of his residence. Accordingly, we believe substantial issues of fact and law have been presented concerning Scalzitti's residence at the time of his election and during his term of office for purposes of section 21100.

"We have generally viewed the existence of a substantial question of fact or law as presenting a sufficient public purpose to warrant the granting of leave to sue in quo warranto. In such cases, leave will be denied only in the presence of other overriding considerations. . . . No such considerations are present here. Rather, both the public and the District have an interest in a judicial resolution of this matter.

"Accordingly, the application for leave to sue in quo warranto is GRANTED." (Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., Number 02-305, supre at pages 5-6).

In a quo warranto proceeding such as is before this Court, SCALZITTI has both the burden of producing evidence and the burden of proof to demonstrate that he lawfully holds his office. (See People ex rel. Stephenson v. Hayden (1935) 9 Cal.App.2d 312). In fact, the ordinary rules of pleading and proof are reversed from a normal civil proceeding. Here the Realtor (LINDEN) is not required to show or prove anything. Rather it is the responsibility of the defendant (SCALZITTI) to establish his lawful claim to the office of Director as well as his right to exercise the authority of that office. (See Smith v. City of San Jose

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(1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 57; People ex rel. Paganini v. Town of Corte Maria (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 726. See also, 53 Cal.Jur.3d, Quo Warranto, section 3.)

#### MOTION FOR JUDGMENT

At the conclusion of the presentation of testimony and documentary evidence, the Realtor
LINDEN moved the Court for Judgment. SCALZITTI has mischaracterized this motion as a Motion for
Nonsuit. It is not a Motion for Nonsuit. It is a Motion for Judgment. (See Code of Civil Procedure section
631.8).

Section 631.8 permits either party to an action to move for a judgment at the close of the other's case. Ordinarily it is the defendant who makes this motion at the close of the plaintiff's case. However, since this case in quo warranto reverses the procedure and requires the defendant to proceed first, the same principles as would apply, with appropriate adaptations. (People v. Mobil Oil Corporation (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 261, 267-268 footnote 6.)

Upon the making of a Motion for Judgment the Court is required to weigh and consider all of the evidence. In that process the Court may refuse to believe witnesses and draw conclusions that are at odds with any expert opinions that are offered during the course of the proceedings. And, if supported by substantial evidence, the grant of a Motion for Judgment will not be reversed. (See Roth v. Parker (1997) 57 Cal.App. 4<sup>th</sup> 542; Jordan v. City of Santa Barbara (1996) 46 Cal.App. 4<sup>th</sup> 1245).

The determination of the Court may act as a final adjudication of the matter if judgment is granted pursuant to the motion. (Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8(c)). It is the express purpose of this Motion to dispense with the need for the moving party to produce evidence if the opposing party has falled to meet his burden of producing evidence and burden of proof. (See Roth v. Parker, 57 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup>, supra; People v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 143 Cal.App.3d, supra at pages 267-272; and, Heap v. General Motors Corporation (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 824).

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# QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED FOR THE OFFICE OF DIRECTOR

## OF THE HELIX WATER DISTRICT

As was determined in the Opinion of the Attorney General and now by this Court, the Helix Water District is established as an "Imigation District" pursuant to California Water Code sections 20500 et seq. (See Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 02-306, supra at page 2). Subsequent to its formation as an imigation District, the California State Legislature in 1972 authorized the District to delete the word "imigation" from its appellation and operate under the name "Helix Water District". (Cal. Water Code, section 20980.6).

The District is organized in five separate geographic "Divisions". There is an elective position of Director for each of the Divisions. Each Director is required to be both a "landowner" of the District and a "resident" of the Division in which he or she resides. Residency in the geographic division from which one is elected as a Director is required throughout the entirety of the term of office for which the individual was elected. (See Cal. Water Code section 21100; Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen., supra). Specifically, Cal. Water Code section 21100(a) provides:

"Each [Imigation district] director ... shall be a voter and a landowner in the district and a resident of the division that he or she represents at the time of his or her nomination or appointment and through his or her entire term. ... " [Emphasis is added].

## SCALZITTI'S FAILURE TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF

As a procedural matter, it was and is the responsibility of SCALZITTI to establish the requirements for the Office of Director of the Helix Water District. SCALZITTI argued strenuously to have this Court hold that the Office is that of a Director of a Water District and not that of a Director of an Irrigation District. SCALZITTI has failed not only to meet his burden of producing evidence on this issue but has also failed to meet his burden of proof on this issue. As noted above, the Helix Water District, although operating under the appellation of a Water District is in fact and law an Irrigation District with all the requirements of office holders attendant thereto.

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# 1. SCALZITTI HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN OF PROOF THAT HE WAS A CONTINUOUS RESIDENT OF THE DIVISION FROM WHICH HE WAS ELECTED DIRECTOR THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRETY OF HIS TERM OF OFFICE:

It was clearly established through the testimony of SCALZITTI himself that it is his claim that he maintained, throughout his term of office, his residence at 1063 ½ Sumner Avenue. The residency requirement of an office holder is one which extends throughout the entire term of office. If, then, at any point in time SCALZITTI's residence, during the term of office for which he was elected Director, was outside of the Division from which he was elected, his office must declared vacant and his position forfeit.

The credible evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom is irrefutable that SCALZITTI did not intend nor have physical connection with 1063 ½ Sumner Avenue as his place of residence between December 8, 2000 and December, 2001. As such, the irrefutable credible evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom is that SCALZITTI did not reside, maintain his residence, within the Division from which he was elected throughout the entirety of his term of office.

in summary, the evidence supporting this conclusion is:

- Between November 2000 and January 2002 SCALZITTI filled out and signed five separate documents which, under oath, identified his residence as other than 1003 ½ Gumner. (See Exhibits 12 (a voter registration change from "1063" Sumner Avenue to 975 Spinel Street on April 4, 2001], 43 [Fair Political Practices Commission Form 480 filed on July 31, 2001 identifying (under penalty of perjury) his address as 975 Spinel Avenue) and 45 [a series of Department of Motor Vehicles forms, registrations and driver's license applications dated July 9, 2001; July 27, 2001; November 28, 2001; December 31, 2001; April 30, 2002 and July 31, 2002 each of which indicating his residence address at 10050 Country View Road).
  - Prior to being sworn into office SCALZITTI moved out of the 1083 1/2 Sumner residence and changed his California Driver's License address to 10050 Country View Road. 10050 Country View Road is located within Division 2 and not the Division 1 from which SCALZITTI was

elected. The change of address was under penalty of perjury and remained his mailing and residence address for Department of Motor Vehicle purposes at the 10050 Country View Road address until February 2002 shortly after these proceedings were initiated. (See Exhibit 45).

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- The evidence presented has also demonstrated that SCALZITTI has registered automobiles, a utility trailer, and a boat and trailer at the 10050 Country View Road address. (See Exhibit 45).
- SCALZITTI has not paid any of the property taxes on 1063 % Summer nor was he one of the persons to whom the loan was made to purchase the property. His mother, Judy Matthews testified quite clearly that the loan was made in her name and through a loan broker at Washington Mutual Bank with whom she had had prior dealings.
- SCALZITTI has not obtained or claimed any tax benefits from the alleged ownership of 1063 1/2
  Sumner.
- The title to the property at 1063 and 1063 ½ Sumner was taken in his mother's name alone at the time of the sale and transfer of the ownership of the property. SCALZITTI's name did not appear on the title to the property until the Quit Claim deed from his mother on June 7, 2002. (See Exhibit 8).
- SCALZITTI has presented no evidence of a telephone listing for himself at any time between
   December 2000 and December 2001 at the 1063 ½ Sumner residence.
- SCALZITTI changed his voter registration from 10050 Country View Road to 1063 ¼ Sumner at the same time he submitted his nomination papers to the Registrar of Voters for the office of Director from Division 1 even though he had purportedly been in residence at 1063 ½ Sumner since May of 2000. (It is also interesting to note that when SCALZITTI reregistered to vote in April 2001 using the 975 Spinel address he listed his prior address as 1063 Sumner and not 1063 ½ Sumner. See Exhibit 12). After the initiation of this action SCALZITTI reregistered to vote using the 1063 ½ Sumner address. (See Exhibit 13).

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In summary, SCAZITTI did not, through the entirety of his term of elected office of Director from Division 1 of the Helix Water District, maintain residency within that Division. At a very minimum SCALZITTI has failed to sustain his burden of proof on this issue.

While the specific issue of being a *landowner* is technically to await another day, the evidence on this issue bears great significance as to the credibility and believability of SCALZITTI. It is certainly a fact that a witness who has falled to be forthright in one material part of his testimony is to be distrusted in others. Simply put, SCALZITTI was not a *landowner* within the District. The artful creation of a "ledger" (See Exhibits 7 and 72) from a calendar of hours worked for his mother (See Exhibits 61, 62, and 63) is but a subterfuge of the worst kind. The documents are all created in the same ink which gives one great pause from the outset.

It is also interesting to note that as of August 10<sup>th</sup> when SCALZITTI filed his nomination papers.

The had paid over to his mother \$1,800.00 from the sale of his Chevy truck (although his mother testified that she believed that the amount was \$1,400.00 which she had been holding for him four a couple of months since the sale of the vehicle even though the "ledger" reflects the \$1,800.00 and not the \$1,400.00) and 9 hours of work at \$10.00 per hour. In other words, SCALZITTI had a purported financial investment in real property as of August 10<sup>th</sup> at most of 8%. Interesting also is the absence of any evidence of any payments by SCALZITTI on the mortgage.

However, more persuasive are the facts that he was not on the title to the property until recently and after this action was begun; he never claimed a mortgage deduction; the loan to secure the property was in his mother's name; he never paid any property taxes on the property; the insurance was not in his name; he never reported income form the rents received on the property; and, this alleged "contract" with his mother can only be one which is wholly executory given the testimony of his mother that avery indication of ownership was in her while SCALZITTI "worked off" what was to have been his share of the down payment of \$40,000.00.

Even though not required of the Court on the Motion for Judgment and the defendant having presented his evidence regarding ownership through his own testimony and that of his mother, the

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Court specifically finds that at no time did SCALZITTI own property within the geographical boundaries of the Heilx Water District. That is, SCALZITTI did not at all times qualify for office because he was not a landowner within the District.

#### CONCLUSION

President Abraham Lincoln said:

"If you once forfeit the confidence of your fellow citizens, you can never regain their respect and esteem. It is true that you may fool all the people some of the time; you can even fool some of the people all of the time; but you can't fool all of the people all of the time."

A public office is a public trust and those who assume a public office should do so not for personal advancement or private advantage. Public office is a unique opportunity in a democratic society to serve ones community in the fulfillment of a public trust. This service cannot begin with a deception.

While the State and Federal Courts are loathe to embark upon resolution of purely political matters when the very foundation upon which a public office and trust is compromised the courts will move to protect the institutions of democracy.

This Court has considered carefully all of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, and, in particular, the testimony and explanations offered by SCALZITTI regarding his places of residence and his assertion of ownership of land within the geographical construct of the Helix Water District. The Court has reached the following conclusions on the issues presented:

- SCALZITTI has failed to establish his residency throughout his term of office as being continuously located at 1063 ½ Sumner.
- SCALZITTI has failed to establish that he was a landowner within the geographical construct of the Helix Water District throughout his term of office.

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SCALZITTI has failed to sustain his burden of proof that he is qualified to hold the office of Director from Division 1 of the Helix Water District throughout the entire term of his office.

THEREFORE, it is the determination of this Court that Judgment must and shall be entered in favor of the People ex rel. LINDEN; and JOEL SCALZITTI is immediately ousled from the office of Director of the Helix Weter District; and the office of Director of the Helix Weter District, Division 1 shall be and la declared to be vacant; and the People, acting through Realtor John B. LINDEN as a private attorney general have prevailed and are the prevailing party in this action in quo warranto. Counsel for the prevailing party is directed to prepare and submit an Order and Judgment consistent with the Court's findings, conclusions and orders set forth above. SCALZITTI shall be assessed reasonable costs pursuant to a memorandum of costs to be submitted by the People pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 809. The Court determines that a reimbursement of all per diem payments made to SCALZITTI during the time he unlawfully held office is appropriate and upon an accounting presented by the Helix Water District an Order of Restitution shall be made. The Court determines that it is not appropriate to impose a fine pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 809 as SCALZITTI shall be responsible for costs of the action and the per diem reimbursement to the District.

DATED: October 16, 2002.

WILLIAM & HOWATT, JR., Judge